Conference on Demographic Challenges in the Republic of Armenia

Conference Materials
Views and opinions expressed in this publication belong to the authors and may not always reflect the ones of the UNFPA.
CONTENTS

Dr. Victor Agadjanian, Dr. Arusyak Sevoyan,
EMBEDDING OR UPROOTING? THE EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONAL
LABOUR MIGRATION ON RURAL HOUSEHOLDS IN ARMENIA ................. 4

Dr. Arusyak Sevoyan, Dr. Victor Agadjanian,
Contraception and Abortion in a Low-Fertility Setting:
The Role of Seasonal Migration................................................................. 36

Russian-Armenian (Slavonic) University Research Team,
THE DEPOPULATION CRISIS IN ARMENIA ........................................ 60

Dr. Aleksandr Grigoryan,
Who else migrates from Armenia? Evidence from intentions.................. 154

Այնուհետ Ադախայել, այնուհետ Անդրադարձնել,
Անդրանիկ Ազատյան և Արմեն Ղազանչյան
Սովերունությունը և ագրարության անվտանգությունը ........................... 199

Г-жа И. Мурадян
К основным проблемам правового регулирования миграционных
процессов в Республике Армения на 2013г .............................................. 206
EMBEDDING OR UPROOTING?
THE EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LABOUR MIGRATION ON RURAL HOUSEHOLDS IN ARMENIA *

Victor Agadjanian
Arizona State University

Arusyak Sevoyan
University of Adelaide

Abstract

The impact of international labour migration on human wellbeing and socioeconomic development in communities of origin is an important yet understudied issue in contemporary migration research. This study examines whether men’s labour migration from rural Armenia to Russia and other international destinations enhances the economic and social connections of the left-behind households to their communities, or on the contrary, undermines those connections and encourages household members’ own migration. Using survey data it compares families of migrants and of non-migrants with respect to ownership of productive and major non-productive assets in the community, and left-behind women’s non-farm labour force participation, their social engagement in the village, and their desires to migrate abroad. The results of statistical tests indicate that men’s migration is negatively associated with households’ asset ownership and with women’s remunerated employment. The results for women’s social engagement in the villages are less consistent. Finally, regardless of economic attachment, social engagement, and a host of other factors, wives of migrants were significantly more likely to wish to move abroad than women married to non-migrants, and the difference in propensity to emigrate between migrants’ and non-migrants’ wives increases with duration of husband’s migration. We situate these findings in the context of Central Eurasia’s international labour migration system and discuss their implications for future migration trends and for socioeconomic development of Armenia and similar settings.

* This paper was published earlier in International Migration.
INTRODUCTION

Although international migration research is still disproportionately focused on destination areas, recent years have seen a steady rise in studies dealing with the effects of labour migration on areas of migration origin. A key issue that concerns scholars and policy-makers alike is the extent to which international migration contributes to growth and welfare in sending countries and regions: whereas the importance of remittances for the well-being of migrants’ families is undeniable, it is much less clear whether migration fosters socioeconomic development in origin communities (e.g., Crush and Frayne 2007; Nyberg-Sørensen et al. 2002; Taylor et al. 1996). This article contributes to the debate on the impact of international labour migration on rural families and communities in sending countries. It seeks to answer the following general question: Does seasonal international labour migration, on balance, help to embed migrants’ families in their rural communities, or on the contrary, does it tend to uproot them from those communities and encourage their own migration?

While addressing one of the central questions in contemporary migration research, this article also contributes to a better understanding of patterns and consequences of international migration in Central Eurasia, the vast and diverse region that encompasses most of the successor states of the former U.S.S.R. Despite the massive scale of migration in that region after the collapse of the Soviet Union, pivoted on the flows from the former Soviet republics of Central Asia and southern Caucasus to the Russian Federation, this migration and its consequences have been relatively understudied (Heleniak 2008).

We use survey data look at the role that labour migration may play in the economic attachment of migrants’ left-behind households to their rural communities, measured by household ownership of productive and major non-productive assets and by labour force participation among migrants’ wives; the social engagement of migrants’ wives within their communities, approximated by their social interactions; and migrants’ wives own desires to migrate abroad.
BACKGROUND AND CONCEPTUALIZATION

Much of the literature on the impact of migration on areas of migrants’ origin has focused on migrant remittances, their consequences for economic and social development in those areas, and their implications for further migration flows and trends (e.g., Crush and Frayne 2007; Martin et al. 2002). Although the economic benefits derived or expected from migration are often taken for granted in this literature and are assumed to sustain migration flows, the utilization of remittances may not be straightforward and may depend both on migrants’ incorporation into the receiving society and on the structure of economic opportunities in sending areas (Binford 2003; Mooney 2004). Thus in rural settings where agricultural investments are not an attractive option due to men’s absence, low crop yields, inadequate markets for agricultural produce, underdeveloped infrastructure, or other reasons, migrant households are not likely to make such investments, or such investments, even if made, do not generate appreciable returns (e.g., Damon 2010; Davis et al. 2010; Durand and Massey 1992; Durand et al. 1996a; De Brauw 2010; Maphosa 2007; Miluka et al., 2010; Mines and Janvry 1982; Taylor et al., 1996; Taylor 1999). However, some studies find that remittances do provide a boost to agricultural investments and productivity (e.g., de Haas 2009; Rozelle et al. 1999; Taylor and Lopez-Feldman 2010). Lucas (1987) found that labour migration to South Africa from neighbouring countries was associated with an initial decrease but a subsequent increase of farm productivity in sending communities. And when investments in agricultural assets are lacking, remittances are typically used for housing and accumulation of consumer durable assets, in addition to food, health care, and educational expenses (Airola 2007; Quisumbing and McNiven 2010).

A number of studies have focused on the effects of migration on household non-agricultural productive investments and especially on labour force participation outside subsistence agriculture among women left behind. Typically these studies conclude that remittances received from migrant men, while boosting the household food and material security, often discourage women’s own gainful employment, especially where the contribution of such employment to household income is trivial (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 2006; Lokshin and Glinskaya 2009). Aysa and Massey (2004) found a positive effect of men’s migration on non-migrant women’s employment in Mexico, but this effect was largely confined to urban areas, where job opportunities for women were more abundant.
Given our primary interest in the effects of migration on migrant families’ attachment to the community of residence, we focus here on ownership of main agricultural productive assets—agricultural land and cattle. If migration tends to discourage agricultural investment, then we should expect that migrants’ families, other things being equal, would own less agricultural land and fewer heads of cattle than families of non-migrants. On the contrary, if migration stimulates investment in local agricultural production, migrants’ households should have, on average, more land and cattle than non-migrants’ households. We also look at two major non-productive assets—size of dwelling and automobile ownership. Again, if migration discourages large-scale investment in the community, then, ceteris paribus, migrants’ families should have smaller houses and should be less likely to own an automobile. If on the contrary, migration enhances the family’s attachment to the community or at least does not undermine it, then it seems reasonable to expect migrants’ families to translate their income advantage into acquisition or expansion of housing and purchase of an automobile. Finally, we construe left-behind women’s labour force participation outside subsistence farming as a measure of economic engagement in their community. While in a context like that of rural Armenia virtually all women whose households own farming land or cattle are, at least to some extent, involved in subsistence agriculture, women’s employment in paid agricultural or non-agricultural activities is more limited and selective. We see such employment as an important economic tie to the community, in addition to the ties established through agricultural assets ownership and unpaid farming work. Although the literature cited above points to a possible association between men’s migration and left-behind women’s employment, the direction of this association remains debatable. Therefore, if a man’s migration indeed discourages his wife’s employment outside the home, then the wife and the family in general will lack an important connection to the community. On the contrary, if a man’s migration is positively associated with his wife’s employment, then migration can be seen as strengthening the family’s economic connection to the village.

Social implications of migration for non-migrating family members, especially female spouses, are even less well understood than the economic ones. While the reconfiguration of marital relations as a result of spousal separation is typically acknowledged, specific shapes and outcomes of this change are often contradictory (Aysa and Massey 2004; Menjívar and Agadjanian 2007; Reeder 2001; Salgado de Snyder 1993). Some authors posit that
migration fosters non-migrant women’s autonomy and empowerment by increasing their role in household decision-making (Boehm 2008; Goodson-Lawes 1993; Hadi 2001; Khaled 1995; Pribilsky 2004). Others, on the contrary, argue that men’s migration and a steady flow of remittances that such migration generates cement gender inequality, hinder women’s autonomy, and in fact may even increase women’s dependence on their husbands (e.g., Menjívar and Agadjanian 2007; Bever 2002; Erman 2001). Regardless of the conclusions they reach, studies dealing with the social effects of migration disproportionately focus on relationship between spouses and women’s positions within the household. If women’s social ties outside their households are examined, they are typically viewed through the prism of the autonomy and related opportunities for socializing gained as a result of their husbands’ migration (Sadiqi and Ennaji 2004; Salgado de Snyder 1993). However, social interactions with relatives, in-laws, or neighbours may also be thought of as an indicator of social engagement in the community by members of migrants’ households and by migrants’ spouses in particular. From this perspective, if migration increases left-behind women’s social interactions, then it can be said to contribute to greater involvement of these women in their communities. In contrast, if migration is associated with diminished social interactions, then we can argue that migration may lead to disengagement from community life.

Here we focus on four markers of community social engagement among left-behind women: time spent daily socializing with others; visits to other households; attendance of celebrations; and participation in collective activities with other village women. We cannot distinguish purely utilitarian interactions from purely leisurely and emotional ones (if such a strict distinction is at all possible in real life), so we assume that each of these four types of social interactions involves some elements of both. We should stress, however, that because of the paucity of studies on possible connections between men’s migration and their non-migrant partners’ social engagement in sending communities this part of our study is largely exploratory.

Finally, the most direct measure of left-behind household members’ connectedness to their communities is their own desire to migrate internationally (typically to join their husbands or relatives working abroad). In the last part of our analysis we look at women’s migration desires. If men’s migration tends to uproot their families, then it should also be expected to make their wives more prone to migrate, relative to non-migrants’ wives, and this effect should strengthen as migration duration increases. However, we also expect this association
to be mediated by household’s and woman’s economic attachment to and social engagement in the community. Finally, in our analysis we want to account for other individual-, household-, and community-level factors, both directly related and unrelated to migration, that may affect economic attachment and social engagement and make life in the rural community of residence and prospects in a place of potential migration destination more or less attractive.

**SETTING**

One of the independent nations that emerged from the rubble of the Soviet empire almost two decades ago, Armenia has displayed migration dynamics that are exemplary of the post-Soviet international migration system (Heleniak 2008). The roots of this migration system, however, go back to the Soviet era. Similarly to several other former Soviet republics, men’s seasonal labour migration, primarily to Russia, popularly known in Armenia as khopan, was an important feature of Armenian rural life for decades under the Soviet rule. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and Armenia’s ensuing economic paralysis, exacerbated by a military conflict with neighbouring Azerbaijan, led to massive emigration from the new nation in the early 1990s. By the turn of the century, however, Armenia’s political situation stabilized and economic growth started to perk up. Permanent emigration subsided and temporary labour migration began to regain its predominance in the migration flow as economic opportunities in Russia, itself rapidly recovering from a post-Soviet slump thanks to high world fuel prices, began to beacon again. Importantly, this new labour migration flow now links two sovereign nations. While citizens of Armenia, like those of most countries constituting the Commonwealth of Independent States, do not need a visa to enter Russia, securing employment there becomes increasingly challenging due both to the convoluted legislation and rising popular xenophobia. Yet, despite the economic and socio-political changes on both the sending and receiving ends of the migration flow, khopan remains widespread generating a sizeable share of Armenia’s national income (OSCE 2006; Roberts and Banaian 2005). It is sustained primarily by considerable wage differentials between Armenia and Russia. Thus, according to the World Bank estimates, Armenia’s and Russia’s Gross National Income per capita in 2008 was $3350 and $9660, respectively (The World Bank 2008), and the gap has not changed much in recent years. Although official estimates for the city of Moscow and the surrounding areas,
the migrants’ main magnet, are not available, incomes and wages in the Russian capital are much higher than elsewhere in Russia. Notably, labor migration remains a predominantly male phenomenon: the share of women among Armenian labour migrants was only 6.5% in the middle of the first decade of the century (Minasyan et al. 2007: 21).

**DATA AND METHOD**

**Data**

We use two data sets from rural Armenia; data collection was designed and directed by the authors of this study. The first data set is from a survey of 1040 rural married women conducted in 2005 in 52 villages of two marzes (provinces) of Armenia—Ararat and Tavush. The second data set is from a survey of 1240 married women conducted in 2007 in 31 villages of another marz, Gegharkunik. The Ararat marz is located in the fertile Ararat Valley, close to the capital city of Yerevan, and is the most economically developed of the three marzes. Tavush, located in the north-eastern part of the country at the border with Georgia and Azerbaijan, was home to a large number of small state-owned rural industries in the Soviet era that were almost completely wiped out after the collapse of the U.S.S.R, plunging the province into poverty. Although Tavush economy has managed to recover somewhat thanks to the region’s rich agricultural potential, it remains one of the poorer marzes of Armenia. Finally, Gegharkunik, a marz in the eastern part of the country, with its climate and soil generally unfavourable for agriculture, is also a poor marz and has traditionally had among the highest rates of labour out-migration in the country (Yeganyan and Shahnazaryan 2004).

The cluster sampling design in both surveys was chosen so as to achieve a more or less balanced representation of women married to migrants and women married to non-migrants. In both surveys, at the first stage villages were selected with a probability proportional to their population size. At the village level, the specific sampling procedures differed somewhat. In the 2005 survey of Ararat and Tavush, in each selected village twenty households with at least one married woman aged 18-40 were selected through a random walk algorithm: once the number of households in either of the migrant categories reached ten, the remainder of the village sample was to be drawn for the other categories (by skipping further households belonging to the saturated category). In the 2007 Gegharkunik survey, the village rosters were
available and households from the roster were divided into two separate lists—those with at least one woman aged 18–40 married to a migrant and those with married women aged 18-40 married to non-migrants (households that did not have a married woman of eligible age were excluded) and then 20 households were randomly sampled from each list. Although in both cases probability sampling was used, we acknowledge that the resulting samples may have been somehow different between the two surveys. To minimize the effect of these potential differences, we control for marz in the multivariate analyses.

Both surveys collected detailed demographic and socioeconomic information on respondents and their households, including respondents’ work, their husbands’ work and migration history in the five years preceding the survey, agricultural and household assets, and social ties and interactions. While some of the instrument questions differed between the two surveys, for the statistical analyses presented below we only use the variables that were derived from the identically formulated questions in both surveys.

**Method**

In all the multivariate statistical models, husband’s migration status is the predictor of interest. However, migration can be both a product of household economic and social conditions and a determinant of changes in these conditions. In fact, if we indeed find that migrant households possess fewer resources than non-migrant households, it may reflect lingering effects of the migrant households’ disadvantage that predated migration—and probably triggered it—rather than divestment of those households from the community resulting from or following migration. To remedy this problem, we further subdivide the migrants’ wives subsample into two groups: those whose husbands had been in migration three or fewer years and those whose husbands have been labour migrants for four or five years.3 Then, if migration is used as a means to build local assets by households in which these assets are scarce, we should see an increase in the quantity of assets as the duration of migration lengthens. Alternatively, if the ownership of assets decreases with duration of migration, then we can be more confident that migration indeed leads to divesting from the community.

**Economic attachment.** Based on the reviewed literature, for measures of economic attachment to the community we use household productive and major non-productive assets.
The productive assets are represented by two variables: 1. Size of agricultural land owned by household; and 2. Quantity of cattle owned by the household. We do not consider agricultural productivity because reliable measures are lacking (the ratio of the number of cattle to the size of landholding would not furnish such a measure as investments in land and cattle in the rural Armenian context are separate parts of household subsistence diversification strategy). Also, we do not consider non-agricultural productive assets because in rural Armenian settings such assets are very rare.

In addition to the two agricultural assets, two indicators of non-productive assets are examined: 1. Number of household residents per room (only rooms that are used for sleeping are counted). Because the multivariate model controls for the number of children and co-resident kin, this indicator is essentially a measure of the relative size of the dwelling in which the household lives; and 2. Whether or not the household owns a functioning automobile. Automobile is a major consumer commodity requiring investment of considerable family resources. It is also an important marker of family status and prestige. At the same time, the purchase of an automobile is driven by practical consideration such as its depreciation, maintenance and fuel costs. Finally, because in this patriarchal setting men are the ones who typically drive cars, the presence of actual and potential drivers is also an important consideration.

The last measure of economic connectedness to the community is wife’s outside-the-home remunerated agricultural or non-agricultural employment at the time of the survey (subsistence farming, in which the vast majority of rural Armenian women are involved, at least to some degree, is not considered here). It is a dichotomy that takes the value of 1 if the woman reports doing any work that generates or is intended to generate an income, and the value of 0 otherwise.

Social engagement. Four measures of social engagement are used: 1. Time spent socializing with relatives, friends, or neighbours. Both surveys included two batteries of questions on time use—one for the last Wednesday and the other for last Sunday preceding the survey interview. For the statistical test we average the time spent socializing on both days. 2. The number of households visited in the week preceding the survey. The actual number reported by respondents is used. 3. The number of celebrations attended in the village since the beginning of the year. Again, the number reported by respondents is used. 4. Cooperation with other
village women in any of the following activities: farming, tending livestock, selling produce in the market, cleaning house or yard, doing laundry, doing repairs around the house, and after-school activities with children. This variable is operationalized as a dichotomy, which takes the value of 1 if in the three months preceding the survey the respondent cooperated with other women in any of those activities at least once, and the value of 0 if she did not. In sum, the measures of social engagement used in this study are not proxies for social capital in general (e.g., existence or number of relatives and friends in the village) but rather of women’s involvement in daily social interactions that may be influenced by their husbands’ migration. In this sense, these measures differ from the measures of material possessions but are somewhat akin to the measure used for outside-the-home remunerated employment as the latter almost always includes a social interaction component.

Desire to migrate abroad. Finally, to measure respondents’ desire to emigrate we create a dichotomous variable from two consecutive questions of the survey instrument. The first question asked whether the respondent would like to move permanently out of the village. In the case of affirmative response, the following question asked about preferred destination of the desired move. Because in this study we compare wives of international labour migrants to wives of men who were not working abroad at the time of the survey (i.e., working in the village or elsewhere in Armenia), we focus only on desires to migrate internationally (in almost all cases, to Russia). The variable therefore takes the value of 1 if the respondent wished to migrate abroad and 0 otherwise.

Statistical model

Regression models for quantitative outcomes assume that these outcomes are normally distributed. For dichotomous outcomes, binary logistic regression models are fitted. In all models, husband’s migration status, a three-level variable, is the predictor. All models control for selected characteristics of the respondents, their spouses, and their households, and of their communities. Thus all models control for wife’s and husband’s age and education. At the household level, the models control for the number of children under 18 and for co-residence with in-laws. These two characteristics represent both the size and the social configuration of the household and as such may be relevant to household’s and respondents’ economic
and social outcomes. All models control for village size because individual and household-
level economic and social dynamics may vary between larger and smaller villages. All models 
also control for marz to account both for possible differences in the sampling design and 
for variations in marz socioeconomic characteristics. Finally, because the respondents were 
clustered within villages and therefore respondents living in same villages may share some 
unobserved characteristics, the standard error estimated may be biased downward. To remedy 
this problem, we use a random-intercept approach allowing the intercept to vary randomly 
across villages. All the statistical models are fitted using the GLIMMIX procedure in SAS.

RESULTS

Table 1 displays the distribution of the dependent variables and of the median household 
income. These distributions are provided for illustrative purposes; the differences across husband 
migration status categories are tested more rigorously in the subsequent multivariate tests. The 
table shows that migrants’ households have a much higher median income than households of 
non-migrants, and the income advantage of migrant households increases with the duration of 
migration. The pattern that emerges for measures of economic attachment generally conforms 
 to the uprooting argument. Thus households with migrants tend to have less land, and are less 
likely to own cars. Migrants’ homes appear to be slightly more crowded than non-migrants’ 
homes. Wives of migrants are less likely to work outside the home than wives of non-migrants, 
with the likelihood of employment diminishing with the cumulative length of migration.

Table 1 here

The distributions of the indicators of social engagement are less consistent. Women married 
to migrants attended fewer celebrations on average than did non-migrants’ wives but seemed 
to spend a little more time socializing. Women whose husbands had been in migration for a 
long time seem to be more inclined to visit other homes in the village than respondents in 
either of the two other groups. Finally, the desire to migrate is less prevalent among non-
migrants’ wives than among migrants’ wives, and it becomes more common among the latter 
as duration of husband’s migration lengthens.
Multivariate results

Economic attachment. Table 2 presents the results of five models predicting respondents’ and their households’ economic attachment to their communities. All the results are presented as regression parameter estimates with standard errors in parentheses. All five models control for the same set of socio-demographic individual and household characteristics, as well as for village size and marz. In addition, the first four models include household monthly income (logged to smoothen the distribution) as a control because the association between husband’s migration status and possession/acquisition of productive and non-productive assets is likely to be mediated by household income (which in migrants’ households is largely composed of remittances). Household income is not controlled for in the model predicting the wife’s employment because the direction of causality there is problematic. Also, the wife’s employment model controls for respondents’ self-rated health (bad health vs. good or average health).

Table 2 here

The first two pairs of models predict the size of agricultural land (Section A) and the quantity of cattle (Section B) owned by the household. The results are partially reminiscent of the bivariate pattern displayed in Table 1. Thus the coefficients for both shorter- and longer-migration status are negative. Households with shorter-duration migrants own on average .19 hectare less farmland than households of non-migrants; this difference is statistically significant. The difference between non-migrant and longer-duration migrant household is smaller (and almost exactly replicates the difference in Table 1), pointing to the anticipated investment of some migration income in land acquisition. However, it is also statistically significant: even households of longer-duration migrants own less land than non-migrant households. In fact, the difference between the two categories of migrant households is not statistically significant (not shown). We can conclude, therefore, that although with longer duration of migration the size of owned land may increase, largely due to rising income, husband’s migration in general is associated with smaller agricultural land holdings.

A similar pattern emerges in the next pair of models which estimate differences in the quantity of household-owned cattle. Households with both shorter- and longer-duration
migrants own significantly fewer heads of cattle, 0.17 and 0.11, respectively, than do non-migrant households. As in the case of land ownership, the difference between the two migration categories is not statistically significant (not shown). The results suggest a similar conclusion: migrant households are less likely to invest in cattle ownership than are their non-migrant counterparts.

The next two models shift the focus from productive to large non-productive assets. The regression model for the number of residents per room used for sleeping (Section C) confirms the tendency suggested in the bivariate comparison: migrant households tend to have smaller dwellings (more persons per sleeping room) and the coefficients for shorter and longer migration duration households are statistically significant. Section D presents the results of a binomial logistic regression of automobile ownership. Again, the already familiar pattern transpires: both shorter-duration and longer-duration migrant households are significantly less likely to own a car. Expressed in terms of odds ratios (obtained by exponentiating the parameter estimates), these results indicate that the odds of owning an automobile among households with longer-duration migrants are only 72% (OR=exp(-0.332)=0.72) of the corresponding odds among households with no migrants, regardless of income and other factors. Still, the relative odds among households with shorter-duration of migration were considerably lower—45% of those in the reference group. Unlike the previous tests, the difference between the households with shorter and longer cumulative duration of migration is large and statistically significant (not shown). In sum, then, the model also points to lesser investment into large non-productive assets among migrants’ households, compared to non-migrants’ households, although the gap between the two may narrow as migration continues.

The last test in this section—a binomial logistic regression predicting the likelihood of the respondent engaging in gainful outside-the-home employment—further reinforces the general impression of reduced economic attachment to community among migrants’ households. The results presented in Section E, echo the pattern observed at the bivariate level but also underscore the differences between the two extremes of the migration-status spectrum. Thus being married to a longer-duration migrant decrease by almost half the odds of employment, compared to having a husband who is not a migrant (OR=0.55). The difference between the shorter migration duration group and the wives of non-migrants is in the same direction but it is much smaller (OR=0.80) and is not statistically significant, suggesting that the negative
effect of husband’s migration on wife’s employment increases with cumulative duration of migration.

Social engagement. Table 3 presents the results of the four tests that model women’s social engagement in the village. The results are inconsistent. Thus husband’s migration status has no effect on the number of hours spent daily on socializing with others. Women whose husbands were shorter-duration migrants had slightly lower odds of having visited other households in the week preceding the survey than did wives of non-migrants but the difference is not statistically significant. In contrast, wives of longer-duration migrants had a higher likelihood of paying visits to relatives, friends, or neighbours than women in the reference category (even though the difference is only marginally significant statistically). With regard to the number of celebrations attended since the beginning of the year, the pattern is quite different: this number among wives of shorter-duration migrants is significantly lower than that attended by wives of non-migrants. The differences between non-migrants’ wives and women married to longer-duration migrants is in the same direction but is not statistically significant. Finally in the model predicting the likelihood of having engaged in joined activities with other women in the past three months, none of the differences are statistically significant.

Table 3 here

Desire to move abroad. Table 4 presents the results of three logistic regression models. The first model is the baseline model with husband’s migration status as the only predictor (Section A). The baseline model essentially replicates the bivariate pattern. The odds of wishing to emigrate are 50% higher among women whose husbands had been in migration for three or fewer years, relative to women married to non-migrants (OR=1.50); in comparison, the corresponding odds for women whose husbands had been in migration for a longer period are twice as high as those among the women in the reference category (OR=2.02). The difference between the estimates for wives of shorter- and longer-duration migrants is statistically significant at p<.05.
Section B of Table 4 presents the results of a model that controls for the woman’s, household, and village characteristics introduced in the previous models. The model controls for women’s self-rated health, whether or not a woman was born in the village of current residence, and the number of relatives living or staying abroad. Yet, the addition of these controls barely changes the effect of shorter-duration migration and only slightly diminishes the effect of longer duration migration. Both migrant-husband groups remain statistically different from non-migrants’ wives, although the difference between shorter- and longer-term migrants is no longer statistically significant.

Finally, to test whether the effects of men’s migration status on their wives’ desire to migrate abroad is mediated by their economic attachment to and social engagement in the community, in the last model (Section C) we add the corresponding outcomes from the earlier tests as covariates. Their addition does not change the effects of migration status: the odds ratios corresponding to the shorter and longer duration categories—1.47 and 1.83, respectively—are indistinguishable from those in the second model and only slightly different from those in the baseline model. Although the difference between the two migrant-husband categories is not statistically significant at a conventional threshold, it remains large in magnitude, suggesting that the effect of husband’s migration on wife’s desire to emigrate may increase with migration duration.

DISCUSSION

The growing literature on the effects of international labour migration on origin communities has produced complex and often conflicting evidence. The debate about the nature, direction, and magnitude of these effects continues. Our study has engaged this debate by examining the consequences of male labour migration abroad for the migrant men’s wives and their families in rural Armenia. While migration dynamics in Armenia and other parts of Central Eurasia may have some unique features, our analysis produced universally relevant insights into the consequences of migration for sending areas.

When we looked at the economic dimension of the embedding vs. uprooting dilemma, we found fairly convincing (even if indirect) evidence that migrants’ families invest less into both
productive and major consumer assets than do non-migrants’ families. With the exception of automobile ownership and outside-the-home employment, cumulative duration of migration showed no effect. Although our list of economic attachment indicators is by no means exhaustive, the results generally lend support for the uprooting argument.

With respect to women’s social engagement, our results are less consistent and do not offer clear support for either the uprooting or embedding theses. This ambiguity may owe, at least partly, to the nature of the available indicators of social engagement. These indicators were measured over a relatively short period of time and are more ambiguous in nature and definition than are the indicators of economic attachment. It is also possible that men’s migration has mutually countervailing effects on women’s social interactions: for example, a man’s absence may both encourage and facilitate his wife’s search for emotional and leisurely companionship but, at the same time, may also diminish her dependence on others and therefore reduce the need for utilitarian interactions.

Finally, we found that women married to migrants were significantly more likely to express a desire to move abroad regardless of where they stood on the measures of economic attachment to and social engagement in their communities. In fact, the association between husband’s migration status and wife’s desire to migrate abroad was not mediated by any other indicators, including household income, the number of relatives living abroad, and a host of other individual- and community-level characteristics, and the likelihood of wishing to emigrate appeared to increase with the cumulative duration of husband’s migration (although the difference between the two migration duration categories was not statistically significant in the full model). This finding provides a forceful illustration of the potential for socioeconomic and demographic disruption that international labour migration can cause in sending areas.

It should be emphasized that the excessive proclivity of migrants’ wives in rural Armenian women to move abroad, primarily to the Russian Federation, is due more to the opportunity to do so rather than to a particularly strong discontent with life in their villages. Russia’s labour demand, heightened by that country’s export-driven growth and the shrinking of its population, stimulates migration from much of Central Eurasia, and despite arcane immigration laws, convoluted bureaucracy, and growing grassroots-level hostility toward foreign workers, especially toward those from the southern rim of the former Soviet empire, relocating to Russia is still relatively easy for Armenian citizens. The psychological costs of a permanent move are
further reduced by a long established tradition of Armenian migration and the presence of more than two million ethnic Armenians on the Russian territory (Armenian Diaspora 2010).

Yet while arguing that migration does not help to retain families in rural communities, we do not imply that migration and remittances are the root cause of rural underdevelopment. As Cohen et al. (2005) noted, rural development is contingent on a variety of structural factors of which migration may itself be a consequence. Thus as was mentioned in the introduction, lack of adequate infrastructure may discourage local investment of migrant remittances (e.g., Durant and Massey 1992; Taylor 1999). At the same time, as it has long been observed, economic development in migrant-sending countries and regions, at least at early stages, may, in fact, catalyze further migration (Martin et al. 2002; Massey 1988). Moreover, in small countries like Armenia, where national urban destinations are few and economically unattractive, international migration may be driven by the same rural-urban imbalances as is much of internal migration in countries with larger and more numerous urban labour markets.

It is also important to stress, however, that Armenian rural women’s emigration desires are not driven solely by the financial cost-benefit calculations or considerations. In fact, as an earlier analysis of qualitative data collected at some of the same research sites demonstrates, the desires of many migrants’ wives to join their husbands abroad are greatly influenced by their concerns about prolonged separation from their husbands as a result of migration. This concern has both an emotional and pragmatic aspects: women yearn for companionship and sexual intimacy disrupted by migration; at the same time, they are also concerned that the husbands’ long absence can lead to the breakdown of their marriages and thus the cessation of the financial lifeline for them and their children (Menjívar and Agadjanian 2007).

We should also note that the data used in this study were collected before the onset of the global financial and economic crisis. The crisis had a strong negative impact on Russia’s economy, reducing employment opportunities and wages for both natives and migrant workers and leading to a substantial drop in migrant remittances (O’Hara et al. 2009). In addition, the economic slowdown translated into stronger anti-immigrant sentiment and more restrictive immigration and work authorization regimes (IOM 2009). These changes could have adversely affected employment of at least some of the migrant men whose wives participated in the surveys and, in turn, could have altered the women’s own migration preferences. However, when speculating over possible effects of the economic downturn in places of migration destination
on migration preferences in sending communities, we should also realize that even the greatly reduced employment prospects in Russia are still more appealing to a sizeable portion of the rural Armenian population than any income-generating opportunities, in agriculture or otherwise, available in most villages and even in the nation’s capital Yerevan or other urban areas. Besides, the crisis and its economic and legal and social fallout in Russia are likely to be seen as a temporary and reversible predicament while the Armenian village economy is perceived by local residents as hopelessly stagnant. The persistently large differentials in employment opportunities and wages combined with the ease of entry into Russia, and massive networks of potential social and economic support in that country built through decades of large-scale migration, will continue uprooting families from origin communities and thus limiting the kind of conversion of migration earnings into local economic development that has been documented in other migrant-sending settings (e.g., Crush and Frayne 2007; Durand et al. 1996b).

With the cross-sectional data at hand, we, of course, cannot examine whether and how women translate their migration intentions into action. As is typical of migration intentions, not all of them are eventually realized (De Jong 2000; De Jong et al. 1985; Gardner et al. 1986). Accordingly, not all of the study participants of our study who expressed intentions to move abroad would eventually migrate. The fluctuations of personal and family fortunes as well as macro-economic and macro-political shifts in the transitional societies of Central Eurasia may alter and re-alter individual and family migration preferences, plans, and actions. It seems likely, however, that as long as the relative economic stagnation of sending areas continues and the inter-country employment and income imbalances persist and even grow, men’s labour migration will continue to exert its paradoxical influence on families left behind—providing them with extra financial resources and yet, at the same time, also uprooting them from their communities.

NOTES

1 The Armenian word *khopan* literally means “virgin land,” an allusion to the Khrushev-era state-sponsored migration mainly to Kazakhstan’s steppes to promote agricultural and industrial development of that vast and sparsely inhabited area.

2 We considered several alternative specifications of migration duration within the five-year span for which information on husband’s migration status is available and all of them yielded comparable results. The specification used in the study was chosen as both substantively meaningful and statistically parsimonious. We should also note that because international migration is a long-term employment path, both surveys contained very few cases of current non-migrants who were migrants in any of the five years preceding the survey.
REFERENCES

Airola, J.

Amuedo-Dorantes, C., and S. Pozo

Armenian Diaspora

Aysa, M. and D. S. Massey

Bever, S. W.

Binford, L.

Boehm, D. A.
Cohen, J., et al.

Crush, J. and B. Frayne

Damon, A. L.

Davis, B., et al.

De Brauw, A.

De Haas, H.

De Jong, G. F.

De Jong, G.F., et al.
Durand, J., et al.

Durand, J., et al.

Erman, T.

Gardner, R.W., et al.

Goodson-Lawes, J.

Hadi, A.

Heleniak, T.

IOM (International organization for Migration)
2009 “The impact of the economic crisis on migration trends and migration policy in

Khaled, L.

Lokshin, M. and E. Glinskaya

Lucas, R. E. B.

Maphosa, F.

Martin, Ph. et al.

Massey, D. S.

Menjivar, C., and V. Agadjanian
Miluka, J., et al.

Mines, R. and de Janvry, A.

Mooney, M.

Nyberg-Sørensen, N., et al.

O’Hara, S., et al.

OSCE

Pribilsky, J.
Quisumbing, A., and S. McNiven

Reeder, L.

Roberts, B. W. and K. Banaian

Rozelle, S., et al.

Sadiqi, F., and M. Ennaji

Salgado de Snyder, V. N.

Taylor, J. E., and A. Lopez-Feldman
Taylor, J. E., et al.


Yeganyan, R., and N. Shahnazaryan
Table 1. Descriptive statistics (means, except for income)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Husbands’ migration status</th>
<th>Not migrant</th>
<th>Migrant, 1-3 years</th>
<th>Migrant, 4-5 years</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monthly household income, in US$ (median)*</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of household-owned land (ha)</td>
<td>3.76</td>
<td>3.51</td>
<td>3.51</td>
<td>3.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of household-owned cattle</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>1.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of household members per room</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>2.81</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td>2.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households owns a car</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife works outside the home</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of visits to other homes</td>
<td>2.18</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>2.37</td>
<td>2.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of celebrations attended</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>1.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participated in collective activities</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hours per day spent socializing</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>1.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife wants to move abroad</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent in sample</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Based on exchange rates: $1=AMD460 in 2005 and $1=AMD350 in 2007
Table 2. Economic attachment, random-intercept model parameter estimates
(standard errors in parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictors and controls</th>
<th>A. Size of owned land</th>
<th>B. Number of cattle owned</th>
<th>C. Household dwellers per room</th>
<th>D. Household owns car</th>
<th>E. Wife works outside the home</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Husband’s migration status</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant for 1-3 years</td>
<td>-0.193 (0.068)**</td>
<td>-0.165 (0.045)**</td>
<td>0.146 (0.058)*</td>
<td>-0.798 (0.125)**</td>
<td>-0.237 (0.166)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant for 4-5 years</td>
<td>-0.159 (0.078)*</td>
<td>-0.110 (0.051)*</td>
<td>0.143 (0.065)*</td>
<td>-0.332 (0.130)*</td>
<td>-0.559 (0.200)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Not migrant)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife’s age</td>
<td>0.005 (0.008)</td>
<td>-0.006 (0.006)</td>
<td>-0.006 (0.007)</td>
<td>-0.027 (0.015)+</td>
<td>0.079 (0.020)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife’s education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational and higher</td>
<td>-0.041 (0.061)</td>
<td>-0.080 (0.040)*</td>
<td>-0.132 (0.051)*</td>
<td>0.323 (0.102)**</td>
<td>1.272 (0.146)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Secondary and less)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband’s age</td>
<td>0.010 (0.008)</td>
<td>0.011 (0.005)*</td>
<td>-0.005 (0.007)</td>
<td>0.003 (0.014)</td>
<td>-0.012 (0.019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband’s education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational and higher</td>
<td>0.147 (0.062)*</td>
<td>0.049 (0.040)</td>
<td>-0.164 (0.052)**</td>
<td>0.383 (0.105)**</td>
<td>0.363 (0.141)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Secondary and less)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of children under 18</td>
<td>-0.067 (0.027)*</td>
<td>-0.138 (0.018)</td>
<td>0.281 (0.023)**</td>
<td>-0.171 (0.047)**</td>
<td>-0.021 (0.064)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-residence with in-laws</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-resident in-laws</td>
<td>0.476 (0.062)**</td>
<td>0.396 (0.041)**</td>
<td>-0.031 (0.052)</td>
<td>0.507 (0.108)**</td>
<td>-0.109 (0.144)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(No co-resident in-laws)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HH monthly income (logged)</td>
<td>0.149 (0.034)**</td>
<td>0.144 (0.022)**</td>
<td>-0.081 (0.028)**</td>
<td>0.426 (0.058)**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of HHs in the village</td>
<td>-0.046 (0.013)**</td>
<td>-0.041 (0.006)**</td>
<td>-0.010 (0.004)*</td>
<td>0.007 (0.007)</td>
<td>0.004 (0.013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marz</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ararat</td>
<td>-0.203 (0.203)</td>
<td>-1.166 (0.089)**</td>
<td>-0.080 (0.074)</td>
<td>0.648 (0.131)**</td>
<td>-0.309 (0.209)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tavush 0.027 (0.209)</td>
<td>-0.869 (0.092)**</td>
<td>0.062 (0.077)</td>
<td>0.398 (0.137)**</td>
<td>0.242 (0.203)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Gegharkunik)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-2 Res Log Pseudo-Likelihood</td>
<td>7741 5822 6907 10160 11903</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of cases</td>
<td>2261 2262 2261 2262 2263</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Reference categories in parentheses; significance levels: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
Table 3. Women’s social engagement, random-intercept model parameter estimates (standard errors in parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictors and controls</th>
<th>A. Hours spent socializing per day</th>
<th>B. Number of visits to other homes</th>
<th>C. Number of village celebrations attended</th>
<th>D. Engaged in collective activities with other women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Husband’s migration status</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant for 1-3 years</td>
<td>0.059 (0.052)</td>
<td>-0.063 (0.051)</td>
<td>-0.187 (0.075)</td>
<td>-0.121 (0.122)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant for 4-5 years</td>
<td>0.023 (0.059)</td>
<td>0.113 (0.058)</td>
<td>-0.099 (0.085)</td>
<td>0.017 (0.138)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Not migrant)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife’s age</td>
<td>0.006 (0.006)</td>
<td>0.018 (0.006)</td>
<td>0.0002 (0.009)</td>
<td>0.029 (0.015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife’s education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational and higher</td>
<td>-0.014 (0.047)</td>
<td>-0.077 (0.046)</td>
<td>0.016 (0.067)</td>
<td>-0.102 (0.109)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Secondary and less)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband’s age</td>
<td>0.001 (0.006)</td>
<td>-0.003 (0.006)</td>
<td>-0.002 (0.009)</td>
<td>0.006 (0.014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband’s education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational and higher</td>
<td>0.049 (0.047)</td>
<td>0.081 (0.046)</td>
<td>0.179 (0.068)</td>
<td>0.140 (0.108)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Secondary and less)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-residence with in-laws</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-resident in-laws</td>
<td>-0.195 (0.047)</td>
<td>-0.094 (0.046)</td>
<td>0.024 (0.067)</td>
<td>-0.114 (0.106)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(No co-resident in-laws)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of children under 18</td>
<td>-0.091 (0.020)</td>
<td>0.003 (0.019)</td>
<td>-0.021 (0.029)</td>
<td>0.154 (0.047)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife’s self-rated health</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bad health</td>
<td>-0.039 (0.051)</td>
<td>0.101 (0.051)</td>
<td>-0.143 (0.074)</td>
<td>0.239 (0.116)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Good or average health)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife’s work outside the home</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currently working</td>
<td>-0.212 (0.065)</td>
<td>0.099 (0.063)</td>
<td>0.247 (0.093)</td>
<td>0.457 (0.141)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Currently not working)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household monthly income in USD (logged)</td>
<td>0.106 (0.026)</td>
<td>0.041 (0.025)</td>
<td>0.190 (0.037)</td>
<td>-0.020 (0.061)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of kin in the village</td>
<td>0.003 (0.002)</td>
<td>0.011 (0.002)</td>
<td>0.012 (0.003)</td>
<td>0.003 (0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of households in the village</td>
<td>-0.001 (0.004)</td>
<td>0.006 (0.052)</td>
<td>-0.015 (0.006)∗</td>
<td>-0.013 (0.012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marz</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ararat</td>
<td>0.174 (0.067)∗</td>
<td>0.067 (0.083)</td>
<td>-0.082 (0.111)</td>
<td>0.651 (0.192)∗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tavush</td>
<td>0.293 (0.069)∗</td>
<td>0.221 (0.085)∗</td>
<td>0.691 (0.115)∗</td>
<td>0.499 (0.199)∗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Gegharkunik)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-2 Res Log Pseudo-Likelihood</td>
<td>6446</td>
<td>6345</td>
<td>8064</td>
<td>10219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of cases</td>
<td>2261</td>
<td>2261</td>
<td>2258</td>
<td>2261</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Reference categories in parentheses; significance levels: ∗∗ p<0.01, ∗ p<0.05, + p<0.1
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictors and controls</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Husband’s migration status</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant for 1-3 years</td>
<td>0.403 (0.127)**</td>
<td>0.227 (0.157)</td>
<td>0.389 (0.133)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant for 4-5 years</td>
<td>0.702 (0.134)**</td>
<td>0.615 (0.141)**</td>
<td>0.612 (0.143)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Not migrant)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife’s age</td>
<td>-0.002 (0.017)</td>
<td>-0.002 (0.017)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife’s education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational and higher</td>
<td>-0.337 (0.120)**</td>
<td>-0.323 (0.123)**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Secondary and less)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband’s age</td>
<td>-0.002 (0.016)</td>
<td>-0.002 (0.016)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband’s education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational and higher</td>
<td>-0.057 (0.122)</td>
<td>-0.055 (0.123)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Secondary and less)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-residence with in-laws</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-resident in-laws</td>
<td>0.151 (0.119)</td>
<td>0.105 (0.124)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(No co-resident in-laws)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of children under 18</td>
<td>0.003 (0.052)</td>
<td>-0.020 (0.054)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife’s place of birth</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village of current residence</td>
<td>-0.247 (0.154)</td>
<td>-0.231 (0.156)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Elsewhere)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of kin in the village</td>
<td>0.004 (0.006)</td>
<td>0.002 (0.006)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of relatives outside the country</td>
<td>0.228 (0.052)**</td>
<td>0.244 (0.053)**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife’s self-rated health</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bad health</td>
<td>0.415 (0.125)**</td>
<td>0.402 (0.126)**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Good or average health)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household monthly income in USD (logged)</td>
<td>0.081 (0.065)</td>
<td>0.085 (0.067)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Economic attachment*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Size of owned land</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heads of cattle owned</td>
<td>0.108</td>
<td>(0.063)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HH residents per room</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>(0.048)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HH car ownership</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owns a car</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Does not own a car)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.122)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social engagement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hours wife spent socializing per day</td>
<td>-0.0131</td>
<td>(0.056)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife’s work outside the home</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currently working</td>
<td>0.094</td>
<td>(0.168)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Currently not working)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of wife’s visits to other homes</td>
<td>0.161</td>
<td>(0.056)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of village celebrations wife attended</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife engaged in collective activities with other women</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.121)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(No)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of households in the village</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marz</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ararat</td>
<td>0.369</td>
<td>(0.159)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tavush</td>
<td>0.122</td>
<td>(0.1707)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Gegharkunik)</td>
<td>0.266</td>
<td>(0.183)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-2 Res Log Pseudo-Likelihood</td>
<td>10577</td>
<td>10701</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of cases</td>
<td>2268</td>
<td>2261</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Reference categories in parentheses; significance levels: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
Contraception and Abortion in a Low-Fertility Setting: The Role of Seasonal Migration

Authors:

Arusyak Sevoyan, PhD
Victor Agadjanian, PhD

a University of Adelaide
b Arizona State University

2013
Contraception and Abortion in a Low Fertility Setting: The Role of Seasonal Migration

Abstract

This study adds to the limited research on migration and fertility regulation by looking at the effects of male seasonal labor migration on left-behind women’s use of medium-and long-term contraception and induced abortion in a low-fertility high-migration setting in rural Armenia. It uses combined data on 2280 women married to labor migrants and to non-migrants from two surveys conducted in 2005 and 2007. The analyses support previous research reporting a negative association between seasonal migration and contraception but also provide evidence that this association is moderated by household wealth. Differential effects of economic wellbeing between migrants’ and non-migrants’ households are also found in the analysis of abortions. Overall, the probability of a pregnancy ending in abortion is not statistically different between migrants’ and nonmigrant’s wives. However, among non-migrants’ wives pregnancy is more likely to end in abortion as the households’ affluence increases, while no effect of affluence is present among migrants’ wives. We offer possible interpretations of these findings in the context of dramatic societal transformations in Armenia and similar settings of post-Soviet Eurasia.
Contraception and Abortion in a Low Fertility Setting:  
The Role of Seasonal Migration

Background

Research on the association between migration and fertility regulation remains scarce. A few studies that have looked at permanent migration and contraception found this association to be positive\(^1,2,3\). In contrast to these studies, spousal separation due to temporary migration of one of the partners has been found to have a negative association with contraceptive use. For example, DaVanzo and Goldstein in their study of female migrants in Malaysia reported that migrants were in general significantly less likely to use contraception than non-migrants\(^4\). They explained this negative association by the fact that migrant women were more likely to be separated from their spouses before and after migration. In their study of Guatemalan migrants, Lindstrom and Munoz-Franco also found that women separated from their husbands due to migration (or for other reasons) were less likely to use any contraceptive methods than those who were not separated.\(^2\) Evidence from South Africa also supports the negative impact of men’s temporary migration on women’s contraceptive use. As Kaufmann explains, women are less likely to use birth control not only because of lower coital frequency and therefore lower risk of pregnancy but also because the absence of men may increase the demand for children among women in unstable relationships as an insurance of support in the future\(^5\). A different explanation of lower use of contraceptives among migrants’ partners was offered by Hughes, Hoyo and Puoane\(^6\). The authors found that women were less likely to communicate about contraception with their spouses the less frequently they saw them. Spousal communication can be an important determinant of contraceptive use in settings where women socially and economically depend on their husbands\(^7,8,9\).

Along with contraception, induced abortion is a major proximate determinant of fertility. The determinants of induced abortion vary across countries depending on prevailing individual and institutional attitudes toward this practice. Ping and Smith, for example, found abortion rates to be strongly affected by the official family planning policy and regulations in China, while socioeconomic status had a relatively insignificant role\(^10\). In comparison, in Nigeria, woman’s age, education and use of family planning methods were among the significant predictors of abortion\(^11\). Ahmed, Rahman and van Ginneken reported that the likelihood of induced
abortion in Bangladesh was associated with parity, pregnancy interval, maternal education and high rate of contraceptive failure\textsuperscript{12}.

However, to our knowledge, no study examined the relationship between seasonal migration and abortion. This relationship is of particular interest in settings where both migration and abortion are widespread. The former Soviet Union is a part of the world that has seen massive flows of both permanent and seasonal migration, primarily directed from the former Soviet republics in the Caucasus and Central Asia toward the Russian Federation\textsuperscript{13}. It is also a region, where abortion has been a primary method of fertility control for many decades. Thus, Remennik reported that the demographic transition in the U.S.S.R. was mainly accomplished through induced abortions, which accounted for about 80 percent of the fertility decline in that country\textsuperscript{14}. The U.S.S.R. had the highest induced abortion rate in the world\textsuperscript{15}. The high abortion rate was mainly explained by the low availability and use of modern contraceptive methods, biased message on contraceptives from the physicians and the media, and the lack of effective family planning programs\textsuperscript{14, 15}. Although abortion rates appear to have declined in the post-Soviet era, abortion remains widespread through the region\textsuperscript{16}.

**Conceptual framework**

Despite the massive migration movement in the post-Soviet world, no study has attempted to examine the connections of migration with fertility, contraception and abortion there. To fill this gap in the literature, this study looks at the effect of male seasonal migration on use of medium-and long-term contraception and practice of abortion among left-behind women in rural Armenia, a nation that gained independence after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Earlier analyses of the association between seasonal migration and fertility in this setting have shown that the yearly pregnancy rates, lifetime fertility and fertility preferences are not significantly different between women with migrant and non-migrant husbands, once socio-economic characteristics at the individual, household and community level are controlled for\textsuperscript{17}. Thus, there is no evidence to support the disruptive effect of seasonal migration on fertility in this low-fertility setting as suggested in the literature from high-fertility areas. To better understand the link between seasonal migration and reproductive behavior in the context of below-replacement fertility we look at the effect of male seasonal migration on women’s use of contraception and abortion.
The importance of understanding the determinants of fertility regulation have been stressed in the economic theory of fertility\textsuperscript{18, 19}. It has been suggested that fertility regulation is shaped by both motivation to limit the number of children and the costs fertility regulation imposes to the household\textsuperscript{18}. The latter involve three types of costs--the social cost, or the perceived risk of violation of the social norm, psychic cost, or personal fears of health effects, and economic cost, or the time and money required to obtain contraceptive methods\textsuperscript{19}.

Using this framework we first examine the effect of seasonal migration on current use of medium-and long-term modern contraceptive methods. Based on previous research on migration and contraceptive use, we assume that women married to migrants have much lower motivation to regulate fertility as they may consider themselves at a lower risk of pregnancy than those married to non-migrants. At the same time, separated couples may have less motivation to control fertility because they want to compensate for the time they spend apart to achieve their preferred number of children. It is also possible, that spousal communication about contraception in a culturally conservative, patriarchal setting is less common for women with migrant husbands than those married to nonmigrants.\textsuperscript{6} Therefore, we hypothesize that husband’s seasonal migration will be negatively associated with contraceptive use.

In addition, we explore possible moderating effects of economic wellbeing on the relationship between seasonal migration and contraceptive use. Based on the economic framework of fertility regulation, better access to contraceptives and family planning services afforded by increased affluence is expected to increase contraceptive use among women. However, among migrants’ wives use of medium and long-term contraceptives is likely to be more strongly influenced by the low motivation for fertility regulation due to husbands’ absence than by availability of contraceptives. Therefore, we propose that increased affluence will result in a higher contraceptive rate among non-migrants’ wives but it will not strongly affect contraceptive use among migrants’ wives.

We also look at the effect of seasonal migration on abortion. In the absence of contraceptives, or equal use of them by migrants’ and non-migrants’ wives, one would expect that the rate of unwanted pregnancies and therefore of abortions would be lower among women with migrant partners, due to less frequent intercourse, compared to non-migrants’ partners. However, assuming that the use of medium-and long-term contraceptives is lower among migrants’ wives than among non-migrants’ wives, it can be expected that the reduction of the
likelihood of pregnancy due to husbands’ absence among migrants’ wives is comparable to the reduction of the likelihood of pregnancy due to use of long-term contraceptives among non-migrants’ wives, resulting in approximately equal chances of unwanted pregnancies. We therefore hypothesize that the two groups of women will have similar abortion rates. We should note that in the cultural context of rural Armenia, where married women’s sexual partnerships outside of marriage are extremely uncommon\textsuperscript{20}, extramarital pregnancies are rare and unlikely to have any appreciable effect on abortion rates among either migrants’ wives or non-migrants’ wives.

As in the case of contraception, we also explore whether household economic wellbeing differently affects recourse to abortion among migrants’ and non-migrants’ wives. As mentioned above, abortion has been a primary method of fertility regulation in the post-Soviet area. Hence, the determinants of contraception – motivation and costs – can be applied to abortion as well. Thus, on the one hand, increased affluence is likely to increase access to abortion services. But on the other hand, the impact of increased access to abortion services on abortion use is likely to be cancelled out by the low motivation for fertility regulation among couples with a seasonal migrant either because of higher fertility preferences due to greater optimism about the future\textsuperscript{6}, or as a result of low exposure to pregnancy risk. Therefore, we expect that increased affluence and therefore better access to abortion services, should be associated with increased abortion rates only among non-migrants’ wives.

**The setting: Armenia**

Migration in Armenia. Labor migration has been common in the Republic of Armenia, a nation of some three million people with a Gross National Income per capita estimated at $3,100\textsuperscript{21}. Today, two main patterns of international migration can be distinguished: permanent emigration mainly from Yerevan, Armenia’s capital and by far the largest city, to Europe and the U.S., and seasonal labor migration from rural areas to Russia and, to a lesser extent, other countries of the former Soviet Union\textsuperscript{22}. There are no official data on the volume of seasonal labor migration from Armenia. According to some estimates, the share of Armenian households involved in labor migration was around 8-9 percent between 2002 and 2007\textsuperscript{23}. The absolute majority of seasonal migrants were men of economically active ages, 21-55, and three-fourth of them was married\textsuperscript{23}.
Minasyan et al. also studied the duration and seasonality of labor migration\textsuperscript{23}. They reported that over 75 percent of migrants leave home by the end of spring and return between October and December. The average duration of labor migration estimated in their study was about eight months. Similar seasonality of labor migration in Armenia was observed by Heleniak, who noted that there is a well-developed seasonal pattern of migration mostly to Russia whereby people leave from January to August for seasonal work in construction and agriculture and return between the months of September and December\textsuperscript{13}.

Seasonal migration in this setting has a high likelihood of morphing into permanent one, especially as the economy in rural Armenia stagnates. Agadjanian and Sevoyan reported that seasonal migration in this setting was negatively associated with economic attachment to the community\textsuperscript{24}. Moreover, they found that migrants’ wives were more likely to wish to move abroad than were non-migrants’ wives, regardless of economic attachment, social engagement or any other individual-, household- or community-level indicators, and this difference increased with the cumulative duration of husband’s migration.

**Contraception and abortion in Armenia.** Armenia is among the countries in Eastern Europe and Asia with very low levels of fertility\textsuperscript{25}. Armenia’s total fertility rate\textsuperscript{1} (TFR) declined from 2.6 children per woman in 1990 to 1.2 in 1999, which was among the lowest levels in the world; it slightly rose after that reaching 1.4 by early 2000s\textsuperscript{26}. Importantly, the low levels of Armenian fertility did not result from widespread contraceptive use\textsuperscript{25}. Reliable data on contraception in Armenia are limited and mostly come from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS). According to the 2005 Armenia DHS (ADHS)\textsuperscript{2}, about 40 percent of married women had ever used a modern contraceptive method and only 19 percent of them were using one at the time of the 2005 ADHS (16 percent of women in rural areas). The most widely used modern method among married women was the IUD (9.4 percent), followed by male condom (8.1 percent). More than one-third of married Armenian women were relying on traditional methods to regulate fertility, among which withdrawal was the most common. The reasons for choosing traditional methods over modern methods varied somewhat between urban and rural women. While only about 33 percent of urban women found costs to be a

\textsuperscript{1} The total fertility rate of a population is the average number of children that would be born to a woman over her lifetime if she were to experience the exact current age-specific fertility rates through her lifetime.

\textsuperscript{2} Although data from a more recent ADHS, conducted in 2010, are now available we use the 2005 ADHS because it was closer to our data collection time.
barrier and about 50 percent feared side effects, among rural women 42 percent preferred traditional methods due to costs and another 42 percent because of fear of side effects. Limited availability of modern methods was also a more frequently mentioned reason among rural women than urban ones.

Both modern and traditional methods were used to limit fertility (18 percent of all married women started using contraception after having one child and 21 percent after two children), rather than to delay the start of childbearing (less than two percent report use before the first birth).

According to the 2005 ADHS, 47 percent of married women were not doing anything to prevent pregnancies, and half of them did not intend to use any method in the future. Notably, almost all of those women did not want to have more children. Among the reasons for not intending to use contraception, the most frequently mentioned were subfecundity/infecundity (36 percent), menopause (18 percent), woman being opposed to contraception (15 percent), and infrequent sex (10 percent).

Low modern contraceptive use was paralleled by widespread use of induced abortions. According to the 2005 ADHS, 37 percent of all women had at least one induced abortion, with the mean number of abortions per woman being about 2.6. Notably, abortion rates were much higher in rural than in urban areas. Abortions were used mainly to limit fertility and less often to space births. According to the 2005 ADHS, less than one percent of abortions occurred before the first birth, 21 percent after the first birth, and 64 percent occurred after the second birth. A study based on the first ADHS, conducted in 2000, found that more than half of women who had an abortion reported having used a traditional method before conceiving their last aborted pregnancy, and only nine percent reported having used a modern method. According to that study, the reported failure rates of male condom and the IUD were about five and one percent, respectively. Because the rate of modern contraceptive failure is quite low, induced abortion for the purpose of this analysis is considered as an alternative method to modern contraception.

Data and Methods

Data. The study uses combined data from two surveys of women in marital union (registered or unregistered) in rural Armenia. Although, having sexual intercourse before marriage is not
uncommon among men, women, especially in rural areas, usually experience sexual debut at marriage. According to the 2005 Armenia DHS, women’s age at marriage and age at first intercourse correspond almost exactly, indicating that the fraction of unmarried women who might be exposed to risk of pregnancy is very small.

The first survey, “Migration, Social Capital, and Reproductive Behavior and Outcomes,” was conducted in 2005 in 52 villages of two marzes (provinces) – Tavush and Ararat. In each village, twenty households (1040 households in total) with women 18 to 45 years old, married to migrants and non-migrants, were selected through a random walk algorithm. The second survey, “Labor Migration and STD/HIV Risks,” was carried out in 2007 in rural areas of Gegharkunik province. In that survey, a three-stage sampling procedure was used to select a sample of 1,240 women aged 18 to 45 years, married to migrants and non-migrants. In both surveys the definition of seasonal migrant was the same: if the husband had left for seasonal work outside of the country since the beginning of the year and worked there for at least three months, he was considered a migrant. Both surveys were conducted during the migration season, when most of the men were still away.

The sampling procedure in both surveys was designed to assure a balanced representation of women from migrant and non-migrant households. However, smaller villages did not have enough eligible or available women with migrant husbands; in such cases, additional randomly selected women married to non-migrants were interviewed to assure that the sample size in each village was the same. As a result, the number of non-migrant households exceeded the number of migrant households in both surveys: 63 percent vs. 37 percent respectively in 2005, and 56 vs. 44 percent respectively in 2007. It should be stressed that the sampling procedure used in both surveys was not meant to produce a province or village-level representative sample of women married to migrants and non-migrants but rather to afford sound comparisons between the two categories of rural women.

Both survey instruments included identical questions on household structure and individual socio-demographic characteristics; marriage and husband’s characteristics including husband’s migration history; health and reproductive history; social capital and community; household economic characteristics and living conditions; and gender attitudes. Husband’s migration history was collected for the period of 2000-2005 for the 2005 survey, and for the period of 2001-2007 for 2007 survey, or since marriage if it happened after 2000/2001.
Method. We fit two statistical models to test the hypotheses. First, a model predicting woman’s current contraceptive use from husband’s migration status at the time of the survey is fitted. In the second model, woman’s use of induced abortion is predicted from husband’s migration status during the entire period for which this status is known. Women who were pregnant at the time of the survey are excluded from the analysis of current contraceptive use. Since the rate of contraceptive use in Armenia is extremely low before the first birth, only women with at least one prior birth are included in this analysis. Similarly, since the abortion rate was shown to be less than one percent among women with no live births, only pregnancies following at least one live-birth are included in the analysis of abortion.

Migration and current contraceptive use. To test the hypothesis on the effect of husband’s migration on woman’s current contraceptive use, binomial logistic regression is employed. We focus only on medium-and long-term modern contraceptive methods. Use of short-term contraceptives such as male condoms and diaphragms can easily be started and discontinued upon husband’s return and departure; therefore use of these methods is difficult to relate to the separation of the spouses. In contrast, IUD and pills, for maximum effectiveness, require continuous use even when the spouses are separated. Therefore, the outcome variable in this analysis is whether or not the woman currently uses either of the two contraceptives—hormonal pills or the IUD (coded 1 if yes, and coded 0 if otherwise). The main predictor is husband’s migration status at the time of the survey (coded 1 if husband is a seasonal migrant, and coded 0 if non-migrant).

The model controls for several socio-demographic and economic factors that are likely to affect women’s reproductive behavior and outcomes. The socio-demographic controls include woman’s age (which was also tested for non-linear relationship with the outcome variable), age difference between husband and wife, woman’s age at marriage, woman’s and her husband’s education (coded 1, if specialized vocational or higher education; coded 0, if secondary or less education); whether or not the woman is currently working outside of the home (coded 1 if yes, and coded 0 otherwise); and whether or not she would like to have more children in the future (coded 1 if wants more, and coded 0 if does not want or unsure).

The model also controls for the number and sex composition of living children. Following the fast decline in fertility in the beginning of the independent period, Armenia, along with the neighboring countries in the Caucasus, registered a drastic increase in sex ratio at birth.
(i.e., the ratio of male to female newborns), suggesting preference for male children or for having at least one son. To account for both the size and sex composition of offspring, a set of dummy variables is used: only one boy, only one girl, two or more girls only, two or more boys only, two or more children of both sexes (the reference category). To create measures of household economic wellbeing responses to the 6-item survey question on goods ownership (household ownership of the following items in working condition: color TV, stereo system, video or DVD player, refrigerator, gas or electric stove, and automobile) were subjected to Principal Component Analysis. Three items (having a stereo system, video or DVD player, and a car) were found to load on the first component. This component was labeled as ‘secondary necessity assets component’. Three items (having a TV, fridge and a stove) also loaded on the second component, which was labeled as ‘primary necessity assets component’.

The model also controls for village population size (measured as the number of households in the village in hundreds), which is a proxy for the level of socio-economic development, as larger villages usually have more developed economies and infrastructures than smaller villages. Finally, the model controls for the marz (province) of the survey — Ararat, Tavush, and Gegharkunik (reference), which accounts for differences across the marzes and as well the differences in the design between the two surveys. To account for village-level clustering and to protect against deflated standard errors that might bias the hypothesis testing, the random-intercept approach is used, allowing the intercept to vary randomly by village. The model is fitted using GLIMMIX procedure for binary distribution in SAS.

Migration and abortion. To test the effect of husband’s seasonal migration on abortions, we use random-intercept logistic regression predicting the probability of a pregnancy ending in abortion. Thus, the unit of analysis here is pregnancy. The dependent variable is a dichotomy, coded 1, if a given pregnancy ended in abortion, and coded 0, if otherwise. As mentioned before, the analysis is restricted to higher order pregnancies following at least one live birth. Because husband’s migration history is available only since 2000/2001 (depending on the survey), the analysis is limited to pregnancies that occurred during that period, or since marriage if it started after 2000/2001. Although this is a limitation of the study, one should

---

3 In PCA we used ones as prior communality estimates. The principal axis method was used to extract the components, and this was followed by a varimax (orthogonal) rotation. To determine the households’ standing on each of the wealth components, factor scores – the linear composite of the optimally-weighted observed variables – were calculated for each of the two components. The details of PCA can be provided upon request.
keep in mind that more recent events are more accurately reported. Besides, a focus on a relatively recent past allows us to include some controls measured at the time of survey. The main predictor is the husband’s migration status in the year of pregnancy (coded 1 if husband was a seasonal migrant in a given year, and coded as 0 otherwise).

The control variables in this analysis include: woman’s age in the year of pregnancy, age difference between husband and wife, woman’s age at marriage, woman’s and her husband’s education (measured as in the previous model), whether or not the woman was working in the year of pregnancy, and number of children born before the given pregnancy by sex composition (measured with the same categories as above). Household economic wellbeing is measured through the same household assets components as in the analysis of contraception. Although household affluence was measured at the time of survey, it is still an adequate proxy for household wellbeing in this model, considering the relatively short observation span as well as the fact that assets are usually accrued over a period of time and represent the cumulative wealth of the household. The model also controls for the number of households in the village (in hundreds) as a proxy for the level of socio-economic development and the year of the survey as a control for the survey design differences.

The GLIMMIX procedure for binary outcomes in SAS is used to fit this model as well; here it allows the intercept of the outcome variable to vary randomly not only by village but also by woman because pregnancies are also clustered within women.

**Results**

**Migration and current contraceptive use.** The results of the multivariate analysis of migration and current contraceptive use are displayed in Table 1. The results are presented as odds ratios: a value above unity signifies a positive effect whereas a value below unity means a negative effect. Model 1 shows the effect of migration on current contraceptive use without controlling for other factors. In this model, the odds of using a long-and medium-term modern contraceptive are about 47 percent lower among women with migrant husbands than women married to non-migrants. This difference is statistically significant. The addition of controls in Model 2 barely changes the strong negative effect of husband’s migration status on contraceptive use (OR=.55). These results support the hypothesis that husband’s seasonal migration negatively affects the use of long and medium-term contraceptives.
When interaction between husband’s migration status and household assets is added to the analysis in Model 3 (Table 1), the results show that the significant negative effect of seasonal migration on contraceptive use does not change noticeably. The conditional effect of husband’s migration status on contraceptive use now shows that the odds of using an IUD/pills are lower among migrants’ wives by about 44 percent. The conditional effect of the household assets components, which now represents the effect of affluence on contraceptive use for women in non-migrant households, is positive: one unit increase in the secondary-needs assets component increases the odds of using an IUD or pills by about 29 percent, and one unit increase in the primary-needs assets component by about 22 percent. However, for migrants’ wives, the effect of household economic wellbeing—represented by the combined effects of household asset components and the interaction terms—tells a different story.

For an easier understanding and interpretation of the relationship between husband’s migration, household economic wellbeing, and wife’s contraceptive use, Figure 1 shows graphically the predicted probabilities of current contraceptive use by husband’s migration status for different values (2 standard deviations (s.d.) below the mean, 1 s.d. below the mean, at the mean, 1 s.d. above the mean and 2 s.d. above the mean) of the household asset components (the graph should be interpreted in conjunction with the statistical significance of the estimates presented in Table 2). We can see that the predicted probability of contraceptive use among migrants’ wives is higher than among non-migrants’ wives at the lowest end of the household asset scale. However, with higher values of the household asset components, the predicted probability of contraceptive use gradually increases for non-migrants’ wives while declining slightly for migrants’ wives. Thus, at one standard deviation below the mean of household asset components, the predicted probability of contraceptive use is equal for women with migrant and non-migrant husbands (about 0.09). However, as affluence increases, women with non-migrant husbands are more likely to use contraception than are women with migrant husbands. Thus the results provide statistical evidence supporting our hypothesis about the moderating effect of household affluence on the association between husbands’ migration and women’s use of medium- and long-term contraception.

For simplicity and for understanding the overall effect of household affluence on contraceptive use, the x-axis represents both components of household assets: each value on the x-axis represents the values of both components.
Migration and abortion. The results of the multivariate analysis of the effect of migration on the probability of abortion are presented in Table 2. Model 1 is the baseline model in which no other variables are controlled for. The results show that the odds of a pregnancy ending in abortion increase by about 24 percent if the husband is a seasonal migrant in the year of pregnancy. However, the effect is only marginally significant (p<.09). When socioeconomic controls are added in Model 2, the effect of husband’s migration on the likelihood of terminating a pregnancy is negative and no longer statistically significant. Thus, providing support to our hypothesis, the odds of a pregnancy ending in abortion are not significantly different between women with migrant and non-migrant husbands when socio-economic factors are controlled for.

To test the hypothesis on the moderating effect of economic wellbeing on the association between migration and the probability of a pregnancy termination, interaction term between husband’s migration status and the household asset components is added to the analysis in Model 3. The conditional effect of husband’s seasonal migration on the odds of an abortion does not change much in magnitude and remains statistically non-significant. The conditional effect of the household asset components (which now stand for the household wellbeing effect for non-migrants’ wives) is positive at a statistically significant level: each unit increase in the household asset components corresponds to a rise in the odds of an abortion by about 30 and 45 percent for the secondary and primary assets components, respectively. The interaction terms do not show a significant association with the outcome. However, to understand the interrelationships between household wealth, seasonal migration and the odds of an abortion we need to look at the combined effect of household economic wellbeing including interaction terms.

Figure 2 helps to better visualize this interaction. It shows the predicted probabilities of a pregnancy ending in an abortion by husband’s migration status at different values of the household asset components. We can see that across the spectrum of different values of household assets components the probability of abortion is about the same for migrants’ wives. In comparison, the predicted probability of a pregnancy ending in abortion slowly rises for non-migrants’ wives as affluence increases. At the lowest end of the household economic

---

5 The large values of the predicted probabilities of abortions are due to the fact that they are calculated considering the woman has two or more children of both sexes, which is the modal value and probably the most desirable completed fertility outcome in this setting; after which couples are most likely to limit their fertility.
wellbeing, the probability of abortion is slightly higher among migrants’ wives; however, the difference between the slopes for migrants’ wives and non-migrants’ wives is negligible.

Discussion

Research on migration and reproduction has been mostly focused on the effects of permanent migration and/or on high-fertility settings. Research on the effects of seasonal migration on reproductive behavior and outcomes in the former Soviet Union, where vast societal and demographic changes have occurred in the past two decades, is particularly limited. Our study contributes to the literature on temporary migration and fertility regulation from a former Soviet country with below-replacement fertility, low contraceptive use, widespread abortion and high levels of male seasonal migration.

Adding to the evidence from mostly high-fertility areas, the results of our study point to a negative association between temporary migration and contraceptive use in the low-fertility context of rural Armenia. As expected, the use of medium- and long-term modern contraceptives, such as the IUD and hormonal pills, is significantly lower among migrants’ wives than among non-migrants’ wives, net of other factors. The reduced perceived need for continuous protection from pregnancy due to migrant husband’s absence is most likely to explain this negative effect. However, our findings add a new perspective on the migration-contraception relationship. We find that the effect of seasonal migration on contraceptive use is moderated by the level of household economic wellbeing. In non-migrant households, greater affluence is associated with higher contraceptive use. This association is most likely explained by better access to family planning services and greater availability of modern contraceptives afforded by increased wealth. In comparison, in migrant households, no such increase in women’s use of long- and medium-term contraceptives with rising affluence can be observed and, in fact, contraceptive use declines slightly as wealth increases. What accounts for this pattern? Several tentative explanations can be proposed. It is possible that motivation to use contraceptives is very low among migrants’ wives, so that increased access to modern contraceptive methods does not affect their contraceptive use. Moreover, wealth in migrants’ households may be a proxy for longer history and duration of the migrant husband’s absence. Longer history and duration of husbands’ absence may lead to lower perceived
pregnancy risks and correspondingly lower need for contraception among migrants’ wives. Longer migration has also been found to decrease communication between the spouses on the subject of contraception and sexual health.

Although the national data show that the duration of the migration season is more or less uniform in rural Armenia, the possibility of a cumulative effect of the duration of husband’s absence on contraceptive use appears plausible. Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to measure the duration of husband’s absence directly.

Alternatively, or in addition, the perception of lower pregnancy risk among migrants’ wives may also be related to higher secondary infertility or subfertility due to sexually transmitted diseases (STDs): the likelihood of STDs was found to be positively associated with increased household affluence among migrants’ wives. Increased wealth can also mean better ability to afford the costs of termination of a possible pregnancy, the risk of which during husbands’ short return spells may be seen as lower than the perceived health risks stemming from continuous use of “unnatural” contraceptive methods for most of the year. Finally, it can also mean better ability to afford the costs of having an additional child, which, as we argued, might be a more acceptable scenario for migrants’ households, especially those contemplating the prospect of permanent migration, than for non-migrants’ families.

Our findings on induced abortion show that while the overall probability of terminating a pregnancy does not significantly differ between women with migrant and non-migrant husbands, the effect of household’s economic wellbeing on pregnancy termination is different between the two groups of women. For migrants’ wives, the likelihood of abortion does not change across the affluence spectrum. However, as household affluence rises, the probability of abortion increases among non-migrants’ wives. With increased affluence, we reason, abortion services become more affordable to women married both to migrants and non-migrants. However, rising affluence may also promise a better future to migrants’ families, who are more likely to associate it with a prospect of a move to a more prosperous country, than to non-migrant households. Couples that are more optimistic about their future may feel less inclined to terminate a pregnancy. Greater optimism about the future in more affluent migrant households may thus offset the effect of increased ability to pay for abortion services as affluence rises.

However, the possibility of reverse causation between economic wellbeing and abortion rates must also be acknowledged, as the household wealth in our study was measured at the
time of the survey rather than at the time of pregnancy. It is possible that abortion, by limiting the household size, increases household savings, which in turn are more likely to be invested in household assets in non-migrant families, than in migrant families, who are usually less economically attached to their communities than are non-migrants\textsuperscript{24}. It is also possible that the timing of the survey may have had some influence on the results. As the data were collected at the peak of migration season, when the perceived risks of conception are lowest, women who typically use an IUD or hormonal pills only during their husbands’ short visits home may not have been using those methods at that time. However, whereas this would be a possible scenario in case of hormonal pills (the use of which is very low both among migrants’ and non-migrants’ wives in the study to affect the results), the use of the IUD, by far the most popular contraceptive, requires considerable investment of time and money in this rural setting to time its insertion with the husband’s short visits. Thus we do not think that the survey timing greatly biased the results of our study.

The study’s limitations notwithstanding, its findings provide support to the negative associations between migration and contraceptive use found in the literature from high-fertility settings. They also indicate that migrants’ and non-migrants’ wives are equally likely to abort a pregnancy, which in the context of very low contraceptive use means equally high abortion rates in both groups. Hence, despite the low risk of conception due to their husbands’ absence for most of the year, migrants’ wives may have similar rates of unwanted pregnancies as non-migrants’ wives. And while improved access to modern contraceptive methods is likely to increase their use among non-migrants’ wives, increased availability does not affect the motivation to use these methods among migrants’ wives. These findings point to a great need in Armenia for programs raising the awareness of health risks of abortions and promoting the benefits of modern contraception, particularly targeting seasonal migrants’ families.
Figure 1 Predicted probabilities of medium- and long-term contraceptive use by husband’s migration status at selected values of household asset component scores.
Figure 2 Predicted probabilities of a pregnancy ending in abortion by husband’s migration status at selected values of household asset component scores.
Table 1 Random-intercept logistic regression models predicting current use of long- and medium-term contraceptive methods (IUD and hormonal pills) (odds ratios).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Husband’s migration status</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non migrant (ref.)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant</td>
<td>0.526 **</td>
<td>0.547 **</td>
<td>0.560 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman’s age</td>
<td>1.293 *</td>
<td>1.278 *</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman’s age (squared)</td>
<td>0.996 *</td>
<td>0.996 *</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age difference between husband and wife</td>
<td>1.008</td>
<td>1.008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman’s age at marriage</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.999</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman’s education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary and less (ref.)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational and higher</td>
<td>0.953</td>
<td>0.945</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband’s education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary and less (ref.)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational and higher</td>
<td>1.342 †</td>
<td>1.339 †</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman’s work outside the home</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not working (ref.)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working</td>
<td>0.872</td>
<td>0.852</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of children by sex composition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 or more, children of both sexes (ref.)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One boy</td>
<td>0.586</td>
<td>0.581</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One girl</td>
<td>0.499</td>
<td>0.501</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 or more, boys only</td>
<td>1.180</td>
<td>1.198</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 or more, girls only</td>
<td>0.600</td>
<td>0.604</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman wants to have more children</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No (ref.)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>0.744</td>
<td>0.749</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household asset component- Secondary assets</td>
<td>1.176 *</td>
<td>1.287 **</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household asset component – Primary assets</td>
<td>1.132</td>
<td>1.221 *</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant* Secondary assets</td>
<td>0.720 *</td>
<td>0.780</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant* Primary assets</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of households in the village (100s)</td>
<td>0.938 **</td>
<td>0.937 **</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey location (year)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gegharkunik (2007) (ref.)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ararat (2005)</td>
<td>1.101</td>
<td>1.086</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tavush (2005)</td>
<td>0.995</td>
<td>1.028</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-2 Res Log Pseudo-Likelihood</td>
<td>10794.4</td>
<td>11143.9</td>
<td>11144.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of cases</td>
<td>2078</td>
<td>2078</td>
<td>2078</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Significance level: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1
(ref.) – the reference category
Table 2 Random-intercept logistic regression models predicting the termination of a pregnancy through induced abortion (odds ratios)*.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Husband’s migration status</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non migrant (ref.)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant</td>
<td>1.242 †</td>
<td>0.945</td>
<td>0.983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman’s age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age difference between husband and wife</td>
<td>1.084 **</td>
<td>1.083 **</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman’s age at marriage</td>
<td>0.984</td>
<td>0.983</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman’s education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary and less (ref.)</td>
<td>1.242 †</td>
<td>0.945</td>
<td>0.983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational and higher</td>
<td>0.929 †</td>
<td>0.930 †</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband’s education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary and less (ref.)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational and higher</td>
<td>0.978</td>
<td>0.965</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman’s work outside the home</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not working (ref.)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working</td>
<td>1.586</td>
<td>1.578</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of children by sex before pregnancy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 or more, children of both sexes (ref.)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One boy</td>
<td>0.019 **</td>
<td>0.018 **</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One girl</td>
<td>0.019 **</td>
<td>0.019 **</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 or more, boys only</td>
<td>0.942</td>
<td>0.945</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 or more, girls only</td>
<td>0.164 **</td>
<td>0.161 **</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household asset component – Secondary assets</td>
<td>1.224 *</td>
<td>1.298 **</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household asset component – Primary assets</td>
<td>1.380 **</td>
<td>1.452 **</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant* Secondary assets</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.787</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant* Primary assets</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.769</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of households in the village (100s)</td>
<td>1.020</td>
<td>1.020</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey location (year)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gegharkunik (2007) (ref.)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ararat (2005)</td>
<td>0.759</td>
<td>0.751</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tavush (2005)</td>
<td>0.560 *</td>
<td>0.576 *</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

-2 Res Log Pseudo-Likelihood                                    | 8990.8  | 10044.2 | 10057.4 |
Number of pregnancies                                            | 2055    | 2055    | 2055    |

Notes: a Only pregnancies in five years before the survey or since marriage (if married less than five years before survey) are considered.
Significance level: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1
(ref.) – the reference category
References

1 Moreno L, Residential mobility and contraceptive use in northeastern Brazil, DHS Working Papers No. 9, Calverton, Maryland, USA: Macro International Inc, 1994.


RESEARCH PROJECT
THE DEPOPULATION CRISIS IN ARMENIA

KEY RESEARCHERS:
Russian-Armenian (Slavonic) University Research Team
Research and Business Center of the Faculty of Economics of Yerevan State University
Research Group: Arshak Balayan, Armen Gakavian, Avetik Mejlumyan
Hrayr Maroukhian Foundation

www.depop.am

Funding provided by: Kololian Foundation

Presented at the UNFPA conference
October 8, 2013, Yerevan, Armenia
The Depopulation Imperative

***

We are losing villages – one of the key sources of natural demographic reproduction and growth. If the situation does not change within the next 5-7 years, for the first time in the history there will be no natural demographic growth and reproduction in Armenia, i.e. the number of deaths will be higher than the number of births... The context of emigration is different now and the existing trend is that mainly intellectual people are emigrating; there is a huge “brain drain.” The only people that stay are the ones that work for the government and those that cannot emigrate.

− Bagrat Asatryan, former President of the Central Bank of Armenia, June 2013

***

My country is facing an internal genocide. The government leaves no chance to young people, stifling them till they flee the country. The problem is now past the political one – it turned into a universal issue to be addressed immediately. The government won’t stir a finger to help common people.

− Charles Aznavour, Philanthropist, Chansonnier, Ambassador of Armenia to Switzerland and UNESCO, December 2011

***

The greatest problem of our country is not with the people, is not with the corruption, and nor with the criminals; our country’s greatest problem is the grim attitude. This grim attitude must go. Help us to get rid of that attitude. It’s not the sole responsibility of the authorities. Emigration is predominantly the authorities’ problem but not solely, because people leave Armenia not, as it is often said, because of the shortage of justice or jobs. The core reason for emigration is this grim atmosphere, people don’t see light in the end of the tunnel, they have no hopes... What can I do, if there is no civil activity? Please help, I urge you all, let’s change this atmosphere...

− Serzh Sargsyan, President of Armenia, March 2013
OPEN LETTER FROM THE SPONSOR OF THE RESEARCH PROJECT, VAHN KOLOLIAN

October, 2013

Dear Compatriots:

Re: The Study on the de-population crisis in Armenia

The shrinking population of Armenia is a very serious issue. “One day we shall have a free and independent Armenia” had become the battle cry of all Armenians for 70 years, following the genocide and the Bolshevik revolution. At the time of Armenian independence in 1991, the population of Armenia stood at 4.0 million. Today it is below 3.0 million. A free, independent Armenia was achieved, and yet today we are witnessing the dissipation of Armenia, resulting from unprecedented levels of emigration. This exodus is now at crisis proportions. It represents an existential threat to the country. Armenia’s adversaries are watching. They continue their blockade, and watch with satisfaction as Armenia empties itself.

Background of this Research Project

While it would be easy to lodge criticism at current government policy, particularly from the diaspora, we felt that a more constructive and researched based approach was called for. It was felt that a research project should be launched from within Armenia on the demographic trends and the de-population of Armenia.

In co-operation with the International Centre for Human Development (“ICHD”) in Yerevan, a selection process was conducted, resulting in four research institutions or groups being selected:

− Russian-Armenian (Slavonic University) Research Team
− Research and Business Center of the Faculty of Economics of Yerevan State University
− Research Group of Arshak Balayan, Armen Gakavian and Avetik Mejlumyan
− Researchers from Hrayr Maroukhian Foundation

The role of the Kololian Foundation has been to fund the research and its related costs. The independence of the researchers has been maintained throughout the project.

Objective

It was felt that an academic and disciplined approach needed to be taken, to search for the root causes of population decline.
Limitations of the Study

The real desire of those supporting this study, and of the researchers themselves, is for this paper to be a catalyst for a robust national dialogue, not resulting in finger pointing, but consisting of real self-examination of what needs to be done by all state and non-state actors in Armenia and the Diaspora. Only when the taboos come down and we bare our souls to one another, can we begin the process of addressing the fundamental issues which are driving citizens out of Armenia.

Some Positive Developments

There are some initiatives being taken by the current government that are commendable. One such initiative is the Ministry of the Diaspora’s Syrian-Armenian resettlement project. It is early days, but one hopes that Syrian Armenians will stay in Armenia, long after Syria returns to a post-war calm.

There are also some positive signs where the private sector is participating in nation building activities. Micro Lending is being developed by certain banks as an active way to make loans to job creating enterprises and projects. Artsakh Bank is a good example of Micro Lending where micro loans are increasingly a part of its commercial activities. Artsakh Bank reports good take up of its micro lending program, in agriculture, processing and small scale manufacturing. And most importantly it reports a very low failure rate, where their portfolio has performed above expectations.

Follow on Work Required

This paper does not pretend to address all issues or offer all solutions. The issues not addressed in depth in the current paper, which need to be examined are:

− the need for organized and effective parliamentary opposition;
− a study of citizens’ purchasing power, where basic goods and services in Armenia are 3 to 4 times more expensive than neighbouring countries. Blockades and other trade barriers such as tariffs need to be studied. The question must be asked, “is there a section of Armenian society that benefits from such restricted trade by driving and maintaining higher prices?”
− the need to review Armenia’s post high school education where more emphasis could be put on trades and less on the arts and humanities;
the need for private ownership of land, in combination with expansion of an agricultural policy, where land grants are made (similar to “Homesteading” in North America, 1800 – 1900), to families who show capability to farm such lands. Such a program can be supported financially by the Diaspora.

- better co-ordination of diaspora support. Since independence, diaspora organizations such as “The All Armenia Fund” have donated money to bricks and mortar projects, schools, clinics, and hospitals. Is it time for the state to take over funding infrastructure and the diaspora to fund programs in health, housing, job creation, relocation, and most importantly, enticing and integrating of immigrants?

The sponsor and the researchers of the current paper, invite others to take up these issues and join us in bringing forward ideas for the betterment of Armenia.

**Let’s be Positive**

It is important that we approach the issues afflicting Armenia with a sense of optimism. Negative tone and negative attitude produce negative results. Let’s remember the words of William Saroyan:

“Go ahead, destroy Armenia. See if you can do it. Send them into the desert without bread or water. Then see if they will not laugh, sing and pray again. For when two of them meet anywhere in the world, see if they will not create a new Armenia.”

The resilience and determination of Armenians is legendary. Let’s turn these attributes to addressing and conquering the social issues of Armenia.

Respectfully,

Vahan Kololian
The Kololian Foundation
Toronto, Canada
vk@kololianfoundation.com
Entities involved in this project

The project is funded by the Kololian Foundation, Canada, and conducted by the organizations below:

International Center for Human Development
Manager of selection process, in selection of research teams:
Tevan Poghosyan, Vahan Asatryan

Research Teams
Russian-Armenian (Slavonic) University
Research Team: Ani Avetisyan, Elena Muradyan, Elina Sahakyan, Veronica Aghajanyan, Tatevik Hovhannisyan, Elena Kozhemyakina

Contact details:
123 Hovsep Emina str., 0051, Yerevan, Armenia.
E-mail: rau-research@gmail.com
Tel.: +37410.22.92.54
Fax: +37410.28.97.01

Research and Business Center of the Faculty of Economics of Yerevan State University:
Haik Sargsyan, Kristine Antonyan, Karlen Khachatryan

Research Group:
Arshak Balayan, Armen Gakavian, Avetik Mejlumyan

Contact details:
Abovian str. 52,
0025, Yerevan, Armenia
Tel: +37410.54.41.00

Hrayer Maroukhian Foundation:
Dr. Khatchik Der Ghougassian

Contact details:
12/1 Mher Mkrtchyan,
0010, Yerevan, Armenia
E-mail: info@hrayrmaroukhian.com
Tel: +37410.52.18.90
Fax: +37410.52.14.53

Coordination of reports on behalf of the Kololian Foundation: Kamo Mailyan
Executive Summary

Introduction

Emigration from Armenia has reached unprecedented levels. According to a recent Gallup report, 40 percent of adults want to leave the country—the highest rate of would-be emigrants among the 12 former Soviet Union countries covered. This trend poses major threats to Armenia’s well-being. ‘Brain drain’ saps the country of intellectual resources that could be used to produce and export knowledge-based products and foster economic growth. As well, the recent phenomenon of family emigration, together with a low national birthrate and aging population, endangers Armenia’s demographic prospects.

This report analyzes Armenia’s demographic situation, with the aim of identifying reasons behind current trends and possibilities for their reversal. Drawing on statistical data, other research sources, media reports, focus groups and surveys, researchers in Yerevan assembled various analyses to show common patterns. They also undertook case studies of successful strategies for repopulating remote areas and attracting diaspora immigrants. Together, these sources have produced a set of policy recommendations through which the Armenian government and other stakeholders could take action to reverse population decline.

Contributors to this project include six researchers from the Russian-Armenian (Slavonic) University; three researchers from the Research and Business Center of the Faculty of Economics at Yerevan State University; three independent researchers from Armenia; and one researcher from the Hrayr Maroukhian Foundation.

Subjective reasons for emigration

Despite enjoying periods of strong economic growth following the collapse of the USSR in 1991, Armenia lacks good governance and properly functioning markets. Its spending on health, education, and public investment is among the lowest in the world (as a percentage of

GDP). The presence of monopolies or oligopolies as powerful players in imported goods limits growth and production opportunities, leading to higher prices and reduced opportunity for small business. Roughly a third of Armenia’s population lives below the poverty line.

Given these factors, it is not surprising that according to 2010 data from the National Statistical Service of Armenia, the leading motivations for Armenians’ decision to emigrate are economic. Finding or improving one’s income, are the most common reasons cited, followed by family reunification and various other factors.

Surveys undertaken for this report shed further light on reasons for emigration.

- One survey of relatively young and well-educated Armenians found that in addition to economic factors, the desire to emigrate is driven by concerns with professional growth and development, and by the desire to live in a society with high standards of rights, democracy and governance.
- A second nation-wide survey found that a third of respondents are considering emigration within the next two years. Many of the currently-employed respondents look to emigrate in search of higher income in jobs that make better use of their professional qualifications. The desire to emigrate is predominantly connected with long-term goals which motivate emigration or permanent residence in other countries (most often Russia, EU countries or the United States).

Systemic factors driving emigration

Individual choices and perceptions driving emigration are rooted in larger systematic features of Armenia’s economic, political and social situation. Examination of those conditions can shed light on the background informing individual choices, and highlight reforms that might lead Armenian’s citizens to invest in a future for themselves and their families inside the country.

Problems in the economy and business environment include:

- Business centralization and monopolies: Business throughout the country is run by a small number of business groups who are also directly involved in state administration, with each group controlling a specific sector and region. This system of monopolies
makes small competitors vulnerable (and often non-viable), fosters unemployment, and produces marked inequalities in wealth. Investment and growth cannot thrive in these unfair market conditions.

- **Business-related procedures:** Many procedures in areas such as tax reporting, regulations, import/export, finance, property protection, and contract enforcement are inefficient and unfair.

- **Independence of the judiciary** is a major concern. The Judiciary must be totally independent of the government and powerful economic interests. An independent judiciary is required to preserve the civil rights of citizens and to give foreign investors assurance that they will be treated fairly in commercial disputes.

- **Lack of effective economic institutions:** Existing institutions, such as the State Committee for Protection of Economic Competition, are ineffective at regulating the economy and supporting free competition; small businesses lack influence; and civil society and the media are unable to exercise oversight and participatory governance.

- **Educational system:** Higher education institutions are not adapted to market demands for trained specialists, and do not provide adequate professional development opportunities for graduates in technical fields.

Problems with the rule of law mostly concern the application of existing law in the judicial and law enforcement systems. The investigative and pre-trial phases of criminal procedures are susceptible to corruption and police abuse, with lawyers having little power to intervene.

Armenia’s governance system is seen to be weak by International observers. Popular participation is limited to elections, and decision making is non-participatory and opaque. Independent organized civil groups are still underdeveloped and ineffective. Parliamentary opposition continues to be fragmented, lacking in structure and organization.

Top-down efforts by the Armenian government to improve national shortcomings can be effective over the long term only through the development of institutions at all levels.

- Institutions, such as coalitions of lawyers’ and human rights organizations, non-profit organization and media, must be created and strengthened to improve the rule
of law, secure property rights, advance equal economic opportunities and public services, and foster transparent and participatory decision-making.

- Better economic institutions are required, such as, for example, an institute of economic ombudsman and/or coalition of organization for protection of economic competition and property rights, to provide equal access to markets and free competition, prevent manipulation of markets, stimulate innovation and growth, and protect investors from risks.
- Transparent media and a stronger civil society will help to develop institutions faster and to hold the government accountable for improving incomes, access to health care, education, public services, with economic and social opportunities.

Learning from the Israeli experience
Because part of the solution to Armenia’s demographic problems must consist in attracting and retaining diaspora migrants, lessons can be taken from Israel’s success at this enterprise. Even prior to gaining independence in 1948, Israel began repatriation planning to populate a new country. Large financial inflows from the global Jewish diaspora enabled the development of infrastructure and agricultural projects; and settlers were given housing and citizenship upon arrival. A well-planned strategic approach, sound policies, and good governance led to Israel’s success. Today, Israel’s Ministry of Absorption manages the arrival and absorption of immigrants from around the world, starting with their decision to migrate through the entire subsequent process.

Israel and Armenia share significant features: locations in a conflict zone, small territories with few resources, and a large globally dispersed diaspora. However, unlike Israel, where the diaspora actively cooperates with the government and invests in the economy, the Armenian diaspora currently refrains from investing in Armenia (due to the business environment and issues connected with rule of law).

Armenia should follow Israel’s model in key areas:
- Undertaking business and governance reforms, and attracting diaspora investment, in order to move toward an innovation-driven economy aimed at importing new ideas,
technologies, and investments. For this to happen, enshrining the Rule of Law is critical. Without such Rule of Law, the political risk of investing in Armenia will remain high;

- Investing in infrastructure and ensuring that funds donated or invested by the diaspora are properly spent;
- Coordinating Diasporan grant making bodies, (All Armenia Fund; AGBU; etc.) to financial support repatriation programs; and
- Actively encouraging diaspora repatriation through the Ministry of Diaspora.

**Repatriation from the Middle East**

Some members of Armenian diasporas caught up in recent conflicts in Middle East countries were surveyed to find out what factors led them to repatriate to Armenia and what factors would lead them to stay. Though the vast majority had visited prior to immigrating, most experienced significant difficulties in relocation (notably a lack of a coordinated welcome and integration program). A real example for Armenia to follow is that of Israel's emphasis on its Ministry of Absorption.

**Recommendations**

Based on its analysis of current conditions and potentials in Armenia, the report gives recommendations for action by Armenia's government. The following are some highlights of these recommendations:

- **Employment and the educational system**
  - Jobs could be created by promoting investment in Armenia’s economy—which in turn requires reforms to make the business environment more friendly to small firms
  - The educational system must be reformed to produce skilled workers suited to labour market demands. New programs are needed offering training in trades and technical fields.

- **Business environment**
  - Small and medium businesses must be provided with a better operating environment through reforms in business procedures, tax reporting, customs, and the implementation of previous reform measures.
- **Economic and Judicial reform**
  0 The current ineffectiveness of commercial law to address business disputes should be addressed through new mechanisms such as mediators or financial ombudsmen capable of protecting the rights of businesses and investors.

- **Rule of law and the legal system**
  0 The legal system needs to be reformed to ensure that all businesses, large or small, are treated equally under the law. All individuals must receive fair treatment under the law, with no impunity for wrongdoing by police or persons of influence.

- **Government accountability**
  0 Government institutions must become more transparent and more consultative in decision-making. The pace of current government reforms must be accelerated to produce visible results improving citizens’ lives.

- **Diaspora relations**
  0 The Armenian government must be more receptive to seeking cooperation with the diaspora, using the Ministry of Diaspora to conduct active forums with diaspora representatives. The Government must also demonstrate protection of property rights and investment so as to attract diaspora investment.

- **Repatriation strategy and immigrant settlement**
  0 The Ministry of Diaspora needs to develop a clear strategy and action plan for repatriation and resettlement, along with appropriate policies and programs to attract immigrants and ensure successful settlement.
Chapter 1: Demographic Crisis in Armenia

1.1 Introduction

According to official government statistics, the population did not grow during the last 10 years because of a low birth rate and high emigration rates.

‘Brain drain’ and family emigration, a more recent phenomenon, acutely threaten the country’s demographic prospects. In past decades, people would leave Armenia to work in other countries and then return home with money. Even though in many cases they established themselves in their host countries and took their families with them later, this trend was not large-scale. In more recent years, however, people have started to emigrate with their families.

In 2009, Russia introduced its ‘Compatriots’ immigration program aimed at bringing immigrants to the Russian North. The program offered a grant, job and privileged conditions to buy property, along with the prospect of Russian citizenship. According to the data from the Armenian Migration Service, a total of 26,000 Armenians applied to the program during the past four years, of whom 1,500 gave up their Armenian citizenship and moved. The overwhelming majority of these applications was filed for emigration with families, and included skilled young people of working age (which was one of the program’s requirements). The demand for emigration through this program was so high that the Armenian government urged the Russian government to close the program office in Armenia. Armenian Prime Minister Tigran Sargsyan said “the program that effectively encourages outward migration is unacceptable for Armenia.”

The program was suspended in Armenia in 2013. Radio Liberty Armenia reports that “the term of the immigration program agreement with Armenia finished on April 1, and the agreement was not renewed.”

The dramatic increase in emigration trends has caused concern not just within the Armenian government but among international organizations as well. In 2013, for instance, the European Union Delegation and UNICEF, in cooperation with the Ministries of Labor and Social Issues and Territorial Administration of Armenia, launched a three-year project aimed at mitigating the social consequences of labor migration for families and communities in Armenia.
1.2 Demographic trends

According to recent official census data, the resident population of Armenia was 3,041,000 in 2011. According to the CIA World Factbook, the population of Armenia was 2,970,495 in 2013. As Chart 1 below shows, the population declined by 11% from 1991-1998.

Chart 1: Population dynamic, 1988-2011 (World Bank)

However, that data is in conflict with data provided by the National Statistical Service of Armenia, according to which the population grew steadily until 2000. In 2001 alone, Armenia suffered from a nearly 15% slump in population. No significant growth occurred from 2001-2010.


The ongoing tendency toward emigration is exacerbated by a low birth rate. In 2010 the birth rate was 1.7 children per woman, which signals demographic decline.\textsuperscript{9} Chart 3 below shows that natural population growth in Armenia has been insignificant since 2000, while the mortality rate is almost at the same level as at the beginning of 2002.

\textit{Chart 3: Population dynamics indicators, per 1000 people}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.8\textwidth]{chart3}
\caption{Population dynamics indicators, per 1000 people}
\end{figure}

As Chart 4 below shows, 72\% of Armenia’s population is now of working age. However the dynamics of demographic change is moving toward populating aging, which will create additional pressure on social expenses and decreased savings.

\textit{Chart 4: Age structure of Armenia’s population, 2012 (Source: National Statistical Service of Armenia, Yearbooks, “Population”)}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.8\textwidth]{chart4}
\caption{Age structure of Armenia’s population, 2012}
\end{figure}

1.2.1 Tracking migration flows

It is difficult to measure real migration flows from Armenia, since discrepancies exist between data from the National Statistical Service of Armenia and the World Bank. Statistics on total numbers of arrivals and departures are provided by the State Migration Service of Armenia, which does not classify specific types of migration. For that reason, information provided by

---

the National Statistical Service of Armenia was taken as the most authoritative data source for this chapter. The analysis also draws on data from reports provided by organizations such as United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and International Labor Organization (ILO), as well as academic studies.

**Chart 5: Migration flows, 1995-2010 (sources: Source: Statistical Yearbook of Armenia, 2010)**

While it is difficult to calculate the exact number of emigrants, rough estimates exist of migration inflows and outflows. Table 6 below shows that the negative balance of migration (i.e. the difference between the number of people leaving and arriving) from 1988–2001 was about 1.3 million people, which equals 40 percent of the current size of the Armenian population.
Table 6: Migration flows, 1989 - 2001 (Source: “Migration and Human Development: opportunities and challenges”, UNDP Armenia, 2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflow</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outflow</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evacuation of the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>earthquake zone</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>population</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflow</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outflow</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public - political</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>emigration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflow</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outflow</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass migration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflow</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outflow</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another means of estimating emigration is to look at the difference between arrivals and departures by air. According to data from the General Department of Civil Aviation, in 1992-2000 the difference between the number of people leaving from Armenia and arriving by air was 644,000.

According to the UN Human Development Report on Armenia, in 1988-2001 up to 1.1 million people emigrated from the country. According to the same report, in 2002-2007 the difference between numbers of departures and arrivals was 150,000. In this period the average difference between the number of departures and arrivals was 25,000, with 9,000 having ceased their registration in Armenia and moved to another country permanently. Since 2008 the emigration flow has increased, and the average annual difference of the numbers of departures and arrivals is 35,000 (see Table 7 below).
Table 7: Ridership in 1992-2011 (thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Arrivals</th>
<th>Leavers</th>
<th>Migration saldo (+,-)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>636.9</td>
<td>865.5</td>
<td>-228.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>689.9</td>
<td>831.0</td>
<td>-141.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>470.0</td>
<td>597.8</td>
<td>-127.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>469.5</td>
<td>507.0</td>
<td>-37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>496.9</td>
<td>517.4</td>
<td>-20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>473.6</td>
<td>504.9</td>
<td>-31.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>415.3</td>
<td>439.7</td>
<td>-24.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>311.4</td>
<td>318.6</td>
<td>-7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>399.7</td>
<td>457.2</td>
<td>-57.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>508.2</td>
<td>568.6</td>
<td>-60.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>590.7</td>
<td>593.4</td>
<td>-2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>618.3</td>
<td>628.5</td>
<td>-10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>739.9</td>
<td>737.8</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>845.8</td>
<td>833.3</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>983.7</td>
<td>962.0</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1293.6</td>
<td>1296.8</td>
<td>-3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1397.2</td>
<td>1420.2</td>
<td>-23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1432.0</td>
<td>1457.0</td>
<td>-25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1754.2</td>
<td>1800.9</td>
<td>-46.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>1945.1</td>
<td>1988.9</td>
<td>-43.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Non-official research by Armenian academic Vladimir Khodjabekyan suggests that in 1991-2000 the Armenian population decreased by nearly 1.27 million, including both legal (official) and illegal emigration (see Table 8 below).\textsuperscript{11}

\textsuperscript{10} The table was prepared based on publications of the RA National Statistical Service and the State Migration Service, RA Ministry of Territorial Administration. Ridership refers to total numbers of passengers across all transportation modes. Retrieved from <http://www.smsmta.am/?menu_id=3> <http://www.armstat.am/en/> (accessed July 16, 2013)

Table 8: Ridership in 1992-2000 (thousands).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Outflow</th>
<th>Inflow</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>865.5</td>
<td>636.9</td>
<td>-228.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>831</td>
<td>689.9</td>
<td>-141.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>597.8</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>-127.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>507</td>
<td>469.5</td>
<td>-37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>517.4</td>
<td>496.9</td>
<td>-20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>504.9</td>
<td>473.6</td>
<td>-31.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>439.7</td>
<td>415.3</td>
<td>-24.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>318.6</td>
<td>311.6</td>
<td>-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>318.5</td>
<td>292.8</td>
<td>-25.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While the main source of tracking emigration trends remains the difference between departures and arrivals by air, there is a huge outflow of people from Armenia to Russia by bus, and no way exists for tracking emigration by land. Emigrants to Russia from northern Armenia prefer leaving for Russia by bus. Levon Barseghyan, a journalist and head of Asparez (a nonprofit organization in Gyumri, the second largest city in Armenia), writes:

The population of Gyumri is at 40-45% of that number in 1988. Every second person in Gyumri is poor, i.e. 13,000 children go to bed hungry every day. Every third citizen in Gyumri is unemployed. Every day 1-4 buses full of emigrants are leaving from Gyumri[12]

On June 10, 2013, a news agency representative met with emigrants at the border with Georgia who were going to cross the border by bus to find employment in Russia. People in the bus were frustrated and said that they did not want to leave; they were forced to leave as they had no hope or chance to change anything in Armenia.[13]

In 2013 the emigration trend has accelerated, reaching its highest point in recent years. According to the State Migration Service information, in January-February 2013 the number

---


of departures was 272,918 and the number of arrivals was 250,796. The difference between the number of departures and arrivals was 22,122\textsuperscript{14}.

Chart 10: Difference between departures and arrivals in January-February in 2000-2013 (number of people)\textsuperscript{15}

1.2.2 Reasons for emigration

As Chart 11 shows, in the period 1991-1998 most men left Armenia because of unemployment and the difficulty of earning enough money to cover basic needs. Those reasons apply to women as well, but 40% of women reported leaving for the purpose of family reunification.

\begin{itemize}
\end{itemize}
Table 12 shows that those motivations are relatively unchanged as of 2010 (for a group of respondents of which 37.6% of respondents had a higher education, and the rest had a secondary or vocational education).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason for Emigration</th>
<th>Number of Answers</th>
<th>Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Looking for a job</td>
<td>762</td>
<td>22.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of work by specialty</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Looking for a high-paid job</td>
<td>814</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family reunification</td>
<td>691</td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social, economic and political instability</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncertainty about the future in Armenia</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>733</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3372</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1.2.3 Birth Rate

According to UN Population Fund research from 2009, 68.3 percent out of 1139 Armenian households surveyed do not plan to have a second child, 16.4 percent said that they were going to have a second child, and 13.6 percent could not answer the question. The survey shows that the main reasons for reluctance to have children are financial issues and uncertainty about the future. In addition, according to polls, more and more women in Armenia tend to choose career growth over childbearing. The sex ratio in Armenia is 0.89 males to females, meaning that Armenia has more women than men. The number of childbearing-age women born in the 1990s is smaller than those born in the 1980s. All these factors reduce the birth rate.

The government of Armenia has made a decision to offer free medical services for pregnant women, child birth and children up to seven years old. Even though this is a significant improvement, many families still have difficulties taking care of their newborn children. There are reports of many families having difficulty affording baby food, and there have been accounts about children taken to hospital because of malnutrition. Even though women receive social payment for pregnancy leave, the amount is not significant and cannot cover many expenses.

Creation of a fund for supporting families to have children by providing financial support, baby food and other items for child care could help to encourage child birth and the upbringing of healthy children. For example, in 2007 the Russian Federation introduced a program called

---


“Maternity Capital,” according to which families are paid a lump sum for having babies or adopting children. This program has proven to be successful.\textsuperscript{18}

In Armenia, families are paid 50,000 AMD ($120) for the first baby and second baby, and 430,000 AMD ($1036) for every baby after the third one inclusively.\textsuperscript{19} The basic social payment amount to families that qualify for social assistance is 16,000 AMD ($40$). Families with teenaged children receive an additional 6,500 AMD ($16$) for every child (or 7,000 AMD ($17$) for families living in remote mountainous areas). Creation of a fund to support families in need, especially those with small children, could help to pay for childrearing and perhaps be an incentive to have more babies.

### 1.3 Macroeconomic indicators

As Chart 14 below illustrates, Armenia had stable growth till 2008, when its economy was hit by the global financial crisis.

![Chart 14: GDP per capita; Purchasing Power Parity; Inflation Rate\textsuperscript{20}.](image)

Since the national currency was adopted in 1993, there has been drastic growth in inflation. In 2006, the Central Bank of Armenia began being implementing a policy of targeted inflation rate, mainly in the range of 5-7%.


Since 1990, Armenia has become a part of global political and economic processes, focusing on transitioning to a market economy. Multilateral relationships are expanding the openness of the Armenian economy and society. However, this positive phenomenon has led to some negative consequences, primarily a very high cost of living, which is a contributing factor to emigration.

Some of the reasons of emigration are suggested by economic freedom indices in Armenia. As the charts below show, the worst indices are in the categories of property rights and corruption.

Chart 15

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a) Economic Freedom and Globalization</th>
<th>b) Components of Economic freedom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><img src="chart15a.png" alt="Economic Freedom and Globalization" /></td>
<td><img src="chart15b.png" alt="Components of Economic freedom" /></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another important shortcoming in the economic system is the tradition of informal relations: many processes and policies in the economy and business sector are governed not by laws and markets but by relations between groups and individuals. This malformation distorts the functioning of the economic system as a whole and worsens the welfare of the society. Chart 16 below illustrates Armenia’s GDP per capita dynamics, a key macroeconomic indicator.

![GDP per capita dynamics](chart16.png)

---


1.4 From independence to the present

Armenia’s return to growth in 1994—the first among the former Soviet republics still recovering after the collapse of the USSR—was a significant achievement, since the economy was still coping with the shocks of a devastating earthquake and full-blown war with Azerbaijan. Economic growth and activity were undermined by speedy and largely unsuccessful privatization of small and medium-sized state-owned enterprises and lands.

Since then, key impediments to progress have been created by the failure to create conditions for proper functioning of the market and by the lack of a meaningful and efficient role for the state. The legacy of an industrialized economic structure did not help, as facilities were outdated and in most cases lacked efficient management. Many factories and other buildings with inherited facilities were sold in parts, resulting in a shortage of jobs and production.

Even though the period after the collapse of the USSR was followed by reports about double-digit growth of GDP and macroeconomic stability, the country still lacked good governance and properly functioning markets. The construction sector absorbed huge amounts of credit and labor resources, driving interest rates, exchange rates, and wages up throughout the rest of the economy. Because the main investment flows were directed to the construction sector and there was not an efficient intervention policy on the part of the government, the economy failed to diversify investment flows. Even so, there were very strong signs for development prospects in some other sectors (mainly IT and the processing of agricultural products).

As a result of this failure to diversify investment flows, GDP declined dramatically in 2009 following on the first blows of economic crisis to construction and real estate. Remittances and other transfers from abroad, which fueled this construction boom, complicated macroeconomic management and created adverse dependence at the microeconomic (household) level.

On the budgetary side, the period was characterized by a highly pro-cyclical fiscal policy, with the budget being in deficit even during the years of double-digit growth. Notwithstanding this growth, however, Armenia’s spending on health, education, and public investment continued to be among the lowest in the world as a percentage of GDP. Tax policy was poor too, and failed to provide efficient budget inflow. Monopolies had established themselves.

---

in the market and become the main players in import and production, which limited growth opportunities and resulted in higher prices. Unemployment and higher prices steadily created social tensions.

The number of people living in poverty remains very high, with almost a third of Armenia’s population below the poverty line as of 2010. In December 2012, the Minister of Finance said that poverty had remained unchanged during the past two years at the level of 35.1 percent and “no significant change is expected, with an estimated drop of poverty at 2-3 percent in 2013”24.

Table 17: Poverty indicators25

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Poor</th>
<th>Not poor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>46.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>72.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>65.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>64.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.5 Survey outcomes: Framework 1

This section draws on a survey aimed at revealing the main reasons behind the decision of young (and mostly high-skilled) people to emigrate. For survey purposes 445 people were selected: 392 Armenian citizens who had always lived in Armenia, and 53 who had studied abroad and returned to Armenia. The survey targeted people within the age group of 18-30 from different sectors and with different levels of education. The geographical distribution of respondents encompassed the three largest cities of Armenia (Yerevan, Vanadzor and Gyumri). A separate survey also collected opinions of students who left for another country to study and did not want to come back.

Round table discussions showed that the older respondents are more interested in high-paid jobs. Younger respondents, by contrast, are very enthusiastic about inspiring work, opportunities for self-realization, and possibilities for studying abroad. They intend to return

---

in order to use their skills and improve their country’s social environment. Despite the fact that most younger respondents are concerned about issues such as social security, corruption, and the protection of human and property rights, this younger cohort does believe in potential improvement. They may constitute a powerful force capable of changing the social and economic situation in Armenia.

Summarizing the answers of respondents and focus group discussions, below are the main reasons behind decisions to emigrate (in addition to economic reasons and the lack of jobs):

- Lack of favorable conditions for human development and challenges with human rights (about 40 percent of respondents);
- Absence of democracy and rule of law (about 60 percent of respondents);
- Psychological complexes (about 20 percent of respondents).

In answer to the question of what would be the primary consideration(s) for their career/work, 40 percent of respondents said that professional growth was their most important priority and 27 percent said interesting and inspiring work was their primary concern; only 20 percent noted salary as most important. The survey also found that 65 percent of respondents are concerned about having a high enough salary to save for the future.

All the points mentioned above are very important for the group of potential migrants. Some are students who leave Armenia for better education temporarily with the intention of returning, but later decide to stay abroad as they see more opportunities for professional and personal growth, physical mobility, multiculturalism and a number of other values in Western societies.

The survey also targeted a group of 53 people who had obtained their higher education mostly in Western countries. The goal of this survey was to find out the motives behind their wish to resettle to another country, since they have had experience in the West and can compare both sides of the coin. Only 5 respondents said that their motivation to study abroad was to find a well-paid job and stay there, while the vast majority (37) said that they had planned to get a good education and become experts in their field. At the same time, in answer to a question of what would still motivate them to leave if they had a well-paid job in Armenia, only 17 said that they would not leave, while 50 percent said they would leave because they preferred working in an international environment and in larger organizations (12 respondents), or because they like the social and cultural environment abroad (15 respondents). The answers
of respondents show that even though international students may not plan to stay in a foreign country, after coming back to Armenia almost half of them want to emigrate\(^{26}\). Financial compensation is not a priority, as only 11 out of 53 respondents emphasized it as the main reason for wanting to emigrate. Furthermore, 19 respondents said that the biggest obstacle they had faced upon returning to Armenia was re-adaptation to life back home.

In answer to the question what types of changes they wanted to see that would make life good enough for them to stay in Armenia, the majority (28) of respondents named political and social reforms, along with the development of 'open society' values. Only 3 respondents emphasized competitive salary as priority. Most of the respondents (37) indicated that they had returned to Armenia because they either did not want to leave their families (10) or because they wanted to contribute to the development of their country (27).

### 1.6 Survey outcomes: Framework 2

The section includes results from another survey drawn from the entire territory of Armenia.\(^{27}\) Initially respondents were divided in two groups: a group termed Residents, who were 18-50 years old; and a group termed Returned Emigrants, who had previously left Armenia at the age of 18 or older, worked in a foreign country consecutively for at least three months, and returned to Armenia no more than ten years ago. In the Residents group, 35.6 percent of respondents were male and 64.4 percent were female. Those with no intention to emigrate from Armenia made up 66 percent of the group, while 34 percent said they wanted to emigrate (see Chart 18).

**Chart 18: Intentions to emigrate among the Residents group**

---


\(^{27}\) The survey was initiated by the European Training Foundation (ETF, www.etf.eu) and implemented by CRRC/Armenia (www.crrc.am). The survey covers the entire territory of Armenia. Based on a predefined methodology, the sample included 2630 and 1426 respondents in separate groups.
Even though two-thirds of those who had never emigrated expressed no general intention to leave Armenia, one-third responded that probably they would emigrate during the coming two years. In other words, 79.3 percent of those who expressed an intention to leave (33.9%) considered emigration possible during the coming two years. Based on the respondents’ answers above, a new category was added to the research: Potential Emigrants, who expressed an intention (very or quite likely) to leave Armenia within the coming two years. Chart 19 shows that 32.9 percent of respondents reported an intention to leave the country. The difference between the responses of the entire group of Potential Emigrants and the subgroup of employed Potential Emigrants is only percent, which means that employment is not a high priority in their decision to emigrate.

_Chart 19: Intention to emigrate among employed respondents in the Residents group (%)_

Respondents were also asked questions about salaries and their motivations connected with payment. Almost half of all respondents with secondary and higher education said that they thought they were overqualified for the job they were doing (49 percent and 45 percent respectively). Meanwhile, 31 percent of respondents with higher education said they thought they were overqualified for the job they were doing.

Russia was the favored destination for most (57%) potential emigration; other top preferred countries were the US (13%), France (6%), Germany (5%), Great Britain (4%) and Spain (3%). The majority of respondents who had plans to emigrate during the next two years mentioned Europe and the US as their destination; families with real plans for emigration target European countries or North America for the sake of better opportunities and a secure life. Most of the potential emigrants are aged 18-30, and plan to leave for countries with long-term opportunities for growth. The second-largest group of Potential Emigrants, those aged 41-50, mostly target Russia for emigration due to its cultural similarity and the lack of language barriers present in other countries.
Chart 20: Reasons for emigration according to countries for Potential Emigrants, aged 18-30.

The survey and analysis of responses reveal that those who have jobs are concerned about the low level of salaries. Respondents with higher education make plans for emigration because they cannot fully use the skills and knowledge they have.

Another survey group consisted of Returned Migrants, who had migrated and returned to Armenia. As Chart 24 shows, two-thirds of persons in this group were planning to emigrate.

Chart 24: Intentions to emigrate among Returned Migrants (%)

Chart 25: Age structure of Returned Migrants who intend to emigrate (%)

The survey found that 33.2 percent of Returned Migrants had jobs, while 42.8 percent were having challenges finding a job, and 37.5 percent of those who were employed said they thought they were overqualified for the work they were doing. Chart 26 illustrates the relation between salaries of Returned Migrants and their intention to emigrate.
Chart 26: The relationship between salaries of employed Returned Migrants and their intention to emigrate during the coming two years (%)

Since the respondents' willingness to emigrate increases in parallel with their salary levels, it follows that increased salaries do not affect the decision to emigrate.

A distinct group within the Returned Migrant category were Seasonal Migrants (39.6 percent of the total), who had been abroad for two or more times with durations over three months, mostly for working purposes. Of the Seasonal Migrant group, 84.7 percent had spent time in Russia earning money. They mainly choose Russia for migration because of cultural similarities (primarily the language) as well as easy access without an entry visa. Chart 27 illustrates the classification of countries for seasonal migrants.

Chart 27: Classification of countries for Seasonal Migrants and the frequency of trips (% according to the countries)
The overwhelming majority of focus group respondents were men, since they are usually the ones in Armenian families who leave for longer times to work and bring money home. The survey found a trend toward emigration among all focus groups. Though salaries and income level, age, employment, and education are not the only factors influencing their decision to emigrate, they were the main factors discussed.

The results of the surveys can shed light on Armenia’s future demographic structure. Through the use of probit regression models, different scenarios were analyzed and compared for the purpose of drawing the most realistic conclusions. It appears that in all target groups, educational level and salary/income level changes did not have a significant impact on the decision to emigrate. Permanent employment is not an essential factor in the Potential Emigrants group, but it may affect the Returned Migrants’ decision whether to re-emigrate in the future or not. Since in most cases people in this group were mostly middle-aged and above, the research group considered that the people in that category were already familiar with difficulties related to moving and working abroad.

The research group also observed a gender pattern: most of the people willing to emigrate were either young men or older women. The majority of respondents who expressed intention to emigrate were men, and most of those were young men seeking stable jobs, salaries, and quality of life. In other words, their intention to leave assumes long-term planning and goals. Women’s intention to leave is conditioned by the opportunity of reunion with their families, and secondly by finding a stable and well-paid job in the host country. Because Armenia’s demographic structure changed due to massive emigration in early 1990s and the war, in most cases these women are not married.

1.6.1 General observations

The focus group discussions and survey revealed a willingness to emigrate among the majority of respondents in the groups of Returned Migrants and Potential Emigrants. In recent years, priorities and attitudes about emigration have changed. While in the early post-independence period most emigrants left for other countries mainly to make money and

28 A probit model is a type of regression where the dependent variable can only take two values. The purpose of the model is to estimate the probability that an observation with particular characteristics will fall into a specific one of the categories, which are compared against scenarios with most likelihood.
take care of their social needs, now people have different motives for emigration connected with long-term goals. Accordingly, people have started seeking opportunities for long-term emigration or permanent residence in other countries.

Most of the focus groups involved young people as the main target, with the goal of understanding the main factors that ‘force them’ out of the country and attract them to other countries. The survey found that the ‘push’ factors that force people out of the country and the ‘pull’ factors that attract them to other countries are two sides of the same coin, being negative in one place and positive in another place.

Informational influence has a major role in this process. For example, young people may be concerned about the lack of jobs in Armenia and aware of attractive information about the availability of many jobs in another country. Specifically, respondents had the impression that there were no jobs and opportunities in Armenia at all, and so many jobs in other countries that they would make a very good living anywhere else. Both of these viewpoints are exaggerated. The main target destinations for potential emigrants are Russia, EU countries and the US. Young people mostly tend to go to European countries and the US. There were significant differences between the understanding of prospects for emigrants in European countries and the US, on the one hand, and Russia, on the other. Young people have a ‘myth’ about the West, and it seems to them that everything is good in those countries. This ‘myth’ has formed among the youth mainly due to globalization, the availability of information, and stories told by people they know.

The main reasons for emigration specified by respondents are:

**Jobs:** Most of the respondents want to work in other countries out of the belief that there are not many jobs in their own country—and that even if there are, they need connections to help them find employment. They think better opportunities to find jobs exist in other countries.

**Education:** Young people think that the education system is better in Western countries, and want to study in those countries in order to achieve more in their lives.

**Social protection:** Respondents mentioned two main factors resulting in bad social protection: (i) a lack of connection between the labor market and education, and (ii) ‘social traditions’ in the society. Referring to ‘social traditions’, respondents explained it with the term ‘social justice’, conveying the idea that while in developed countries people are promoted
according to their skills, merits and the benefit they can bring, in the Armenian government and organizations people are promoted due to influential contacts (cronyism).

Perception of welfare: There is an exaggerated perception of life in Western countries among youth. They think that everything is much better there, people live better, have more opportunities, life is easier and people have more fun. Mostly this information is highly exaggerated, causing them to neglect opportunities existing in their own country and raising higher expectations for emigration. In many cases this is a wrong perception, especially since following emigration people have to start anew in a strange place. After leaving their career and status in Armenia, many people are unable to succeed in their new countries, since they are not young and lack sufficient enthusiasm.

Rule of law: Respondents (mostly younger ones) often mentioned their desire to live in countries where there is strong rule of law and legal protection. Respondents often compared Armenia with Western countries to show how Western governments and societies would protect their citizens.
Chapter 2: Reasons and Solutions for Armenia’s Demographic Crisis

2.1 Introduction

The previous chapter presented the facts of Armenia’s demographic crisis, outlining research findings about the scope of emigration and the perceptions informing Armenians’ choice to emigrate. Those individual choices and perceptions are rooted in larger systematic features of the country’s current economic, political and social situation. This chapter examines those systematic realities to shed a fuller light on the background informing individual choices, and to highlight reforms that might lead Armenians to invest in a future for themselves and their families inside their country.

The reasons for current emigration trends are a mosaic of state violations and malfeasance that have accumulated over many years, coupled with the inability of citizens to speak out and effect change through social institutions. Among the reasons of emigration are a lack of jobs and economic opportunities, underdeveloped infrastructure, unsecure property rights and poor rule of law.

On January 25, 2001, Armenia became a fully-fledged member of the Council of Europe. In so doing, it committed to accept the main principles and values of the Council, to implement reforms that would develop democracy, and to make progress in peacefully resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. It also promised to introduce reforms strengthening the rule of law in spheres including political parties, the media, and non-governmental organizations. These reforms included securing the full independence of the judicial branch of power, respecting prisoners’ rights, and turning the national television channel into a public channel managed by an independent administrative board.

Among the main reforms implemented in the period from 1999-2001 were ones related to the role of the private sector in the framework of market relations (for instance, through adoption of the Civil Code of RA in 1998)\textsuperscript{29}; economic policy (e.g. laws related to tax and customs policies)\textsuperscript{30}; and definition of state policy in the scientific and educational sectors (for


instance, through the Law on Education). The new codes and laws improved a number of sectors in Armenia to bring them in consistency with Council of Europe requirements. However, many state sectors and institutions remain considerably deficient in ways that continue to inform the emigration decisions and intentions of Armenia’s citizens.

2.2 The economy and business environment

One of the main challenges facing Armenia’s economy is the centralization of business markets and the monopolization of profitable businesses, which are coordinated by oligarchs and groups entrenched in the political elite. Business throughout the country is run by a small number of groups, each controlling a specific sector and region. These oligarchic groups are directly involved in the state administration process, since most of the owners are members of the National Assembly.

This type of economic system, which lacks functioning economic institutions to control free competition in the market, is one of the main reasons for unemployment and emigration. By centralizing businesses through giving privileges to the largest monopolies, the system makes small competitors vulnerable and often non-viable. The rights to import certain types of goods are reserved to these oligarchic groups, accruing lucrative profits for them and driving competitors out of the market. (For example, one of the largest companies in the food industry, which holds a monopoly for the import of sugar and many other products, built a chain of supermarkets; other small businesses were not able to compete, leading to the loss of many jobs.) The system enriches a small group of people at the expense of many, producing a highly unequal distribution of wealth.

In May 2013, the International Monetary Fund’s office in Yerevan issued a statement calling for liberalization of the business sector:

Armenia should implement series of activities to stimulate the private investments, being the main engine for economic growth. Specifically, efforts should be made to protect investors’ right of earning profits. Still there are widespread precedents when privileged market conditions are provided to businesses with connections, or businesses are losing their incomes in unfair competition. As far as there is no decisive policy and adequate

---

stimulus to take a risk, there will not be good investments, jobs and hope for the future of Armenia.[32]

Subsequently, the U.S. Ambassador to Armenia, John Heffern, commented that “[f]or Armenia’s economy the transparency of the tax and customs sectors, and free market competition are important…. This is an economic rule, according to which competition reduces prices and improves qualities [and] services… This principle is true both for sugar import, airline transportation and any other business sector.”[33]

In 2012, Armenia placed in 32nd place in an international “Doing Business” ranking by the IFC and World Bank.[34] This represented a breakthrough, since the country advanced from 55th place to 32nd in one year. However, the report noted that Armenia still needs improvement in areas such as business registration, international trade and provision of loans. Performance in categories such as property registration, contract enforcement and resolution of insolvency remained unchanged. In other categories such as building permits, connection to the power supply system, taxation and investor protection, significant improvements have been achieved.

### 2.2.1 Burdens on business

Recently Armenia introduced a new procedure for business registration, which has made it easy and fast to register a business. The government has switched to a system of electronic tax reporting. While these changes are positive, many complaints remain about the difficulties of conducting business in Armenia. For instance, frequent unannounced in-person check-ups by tax officers are intimidating, and force businesspeople to spend undue time on paperwork and relations with representatives of tax bodies.

Companies surveyed in the World Economic Forum’s 2012-2013 Global Competitiveness Report[35] identify tax regulations and inefficient government bureaucracy to be among the most problematic obstacles (other than corruption) to conducting business in Armenia. This is also
supported by the World Bank and IFC’s 2009 Enterprise Surveys\textsuperscript{36}, which found Armenian companies reporting that senior management spent more than 10% of their time dealing with government regulations. According to the 2008 Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey by the EBRD and World Bank, 12% of senior management time is spent in dealing with public officials about the application and interpretation of laws and regulations, and in maintaining access to public services. Nearly two-thirds of companies reported that regulatory policies were a problem for doing business in Armenia.

\subsection*{2.2.2 Foreign investment}

According to the Armenian Development Agency, foreign investors are given incentives such as tax holidays and the ability to carry forward losses indefinitely.\textsuperscript{37} The Law on Foreign Investment protects foreign investors against land nationalization, expropriation and confiscation (except in cases of state emergency, in which case, the Constitution of Armenia provides for compensation to be paid in advance). However, foreign investors encounter problems with regulatory changes.

\subsection*{2.2.3 Import/export}

Businesses wishing to import or export goods face obstacles in the form of bureaucratic procedures as well as obscurely-formulated and often-changing laws. For example, although the government has declared the development of IT sector a priority for economy, a 32% import tax currently exists on laptops and other equipment.\textsuperscript{38} As well, many import procedures lack a

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{38} Laptops and a number of other electronic devices shipped by post arrive at the customs centralized storage near Zvartnots airport in Yerevan, and recipients are notified about delivery by mail. Even for one laptop a recipient has to go to the customs storage at his or her expense and go through a customs clearance process. For example, to receive a laptop, one has to pay a 10% fee (according to the price of the product in the customs system) for import established by the Customs Code of the Republic of Armenia (adopted on July 6, 2000, retrieved from <http://www.customs.am/Shared/Documents/_CL/RA_Customs_Laws/or_2000_ho83.pdf>), 20% VAT and commission fees (in total 32%). In the customs office the clearance process takes place...
centralized transparent database, instead being carried out manually by customs officers. For a company to move a product it has imported out of customs storage, for instance, a company representative must go from window to window talking with various customs officers who exercise discretion in defining the customs fees of imported items. The prices of imported products are set at the highest applicable rate of import—meaning that a business seeking to import a laptop produced two years ago will have to pay a 32% customs fee based on the fixed price established when that item was first imported (which may be higher than the real price the importer has now paid). Such procedures create difficulties for businesses and increase the risk of corruption, since they leave room for customs officers to define the import price.

2.2.4 Public budgeting / misappropriation of funds

Public budgets in Armenia are not transparent, and often funds are spent without going through a budgeting procedure. According to media reports, state institutions spend considerable funds on trips and expensive hotels, as well as on corrupt procurement tenders. On the threshold of the 2013 presidential election, Armenian president Serzh Sargsyan criticized his own government for permitting unfair tenders and allowing state officials to earning huge kickbacks from these tenders. While the wide broadcast of his criticisms by the media led to the dismissal of some officials for embezzling public money and receiving kickbacks, the state administration of these matters has not been systematically reformed. A recent IMF report criticized the government for using state funds to bail out badly-managed companies. To prevent malfeasance, Armenia needs economic structures that operate systematically regardless of the political elite in charge, bringing transparency to financial transactions and the spending of public money.

---

2.2.5 Commercial law

Armenia’s business environment also suffers from the low level of efficiency, independence and professionalism in its courts. By law, disputes may be brought before any court, provided that the Armenian government is not a party to the dispute. The Economic Court of Armenia was established in 2008 to deal with matters including commercial disputes. Armenia’s Law on Arbitration Courts and Arbitration Procedures provides rules for the settlement of disputes by arbitration⁴⁰; and Armenia is a signatory to several international conventions regulating the mutual acceptance and enforcement of foreign arbitration, including the 1958 New York Convention⁴¹ and the 1965 Washington Convention⁴². Nonetheless, enforcing a commercial contract in Armenia requires a company to go through 49 procedures, taking 440 days at a cost of 19% of the claim.⁴³

Armenian citizens are generally reluctant to go to court because the judicial system is considered to be corrupt, inefficient and vulnerable to political influence. Respondents in the 2010 Armenia Corruption Survey of Households by Caucasus Research Resource Centers⁴⁴ named the judicial system as the institution with the highest level of corruption in Armenia. At a government meeting in April 2012, Prime Minister Tigran Sargsyan compared the notary system to an “oligopoly” in which citizens are charged an unreasonably high rate; subsequently, the head of the notary department adjacent to the Ministry of Justice and its entire department was dismissed. A new inspectorate has been established to combat judicial corruption, and the European Integration Department at the Ministry of Justice has been given increased authority.⁴⁵

Despite the government’s reform efforts, however, the majority of businesspeople and investors still do not consider the court system a viable resource. Business executives believe that corruption and nepotism largely determine the outcome of court decisions. Given the lack of trust in the court system, alternative dispute resolution methods are very important for foreign investors. However, international arbitration options are excluded in disputes involving the Armenian government; only bilateral investment treaties provide for international arbitration.

Insufficient protection of property rights and enforcement of contracts also cause risks for businesses, investors and individuals. In the construction sector, for instance, companies have sold the same properties multiple times to different buyers without incurring significant punishment. Armenia needs professional institutions that could prevent such practices by analyzing the sector, developing recommendations for improving laws, and monitoring the operation of state institutions involved in enforcing contracts.

2.2.6 Small businesses lack influence

Armenia’s economic growth and attractiveness to investment are also hampered by the lack of a stable business environment within public administration. Without institutions that control decision-making transparently, the government often issues abrupt orders affecting various economic sectors, making the business environment unstable and risky.

In 2011, for example, arbitrary decisions by successive mayors of Yerevan to demolish, retain or relocate sidewalk kiosk businesses led to the closing of a popular café and a wave of youth protests. The café owner (an expatriate who had returned to Armenia to open her business sixteen years previously), left for France, saying:

Countries with small economies should encourage their taxpayers to stay in the country. I cannot stay in Armenia because there are no favorable conditions for business here.... For 16 years, I invested all that I had in Armenia, and I am considered one of the first investors, but so far our government has created only obstacles for both me and the companies I manage.... My example will be a lesson for many who will be careful in investing in Armenia.


While small and medium businesses are trying to survive, monopolies find it very easy to navigate or bypass market regulations due to their influential government contacts. Large businesses owned by oligarchs use aggressive market tactics that suppress smaller firms. Securing free competition and equal rights for all market participants is crucial to foster economic development.

The goal of stimulating economic growth and innovation is also currently hampered by Armenia’s poor protection of patents and intellectual property rights. Although the government has identified information technology and science as priority economic sectors, growth in these areas will be hindered without an efficient policy for protection of intellectual rights.

2.2.7 Effective economic institutions are lacking

Though a number of institutions exist aimed at regulating the economy and supporting free competition, these are not yet efficient in practice. For instance, the State Commission for Protection of Economic Competition was established in 2001, but partial implementation and loopholes in the law are preventing this institution from exercising its potential. Although it has investigated reports about fake products and food being sold in Armenia, the negligible fines imposed on a violating company were too small to deter future offences. Another example of abuse in the economy is price manipulation: egg production companies have colluded to raise prices several times before New Year and Easter (when egg consumption volumes are high), in violation of the law.

Such examples have resulted in a lack of entrepreneurial initiative in Armenia. The widespread opinion that all businesses are government-controlled and small ones cannot thrive has created an environment with few incentives rewarding work. A society in which a bodyguard earns fifty times more than a scientist or teacher is one in which people wanting to exercise their potential will emigrate to do so.

Changing this situation calls for not just the improvement of existing laws and institutions, but also the collaboration of nonprofit organizations and media. To develop an efficient and

functioning system of sustainable economic growth, civil society and media should become more active, and the government should let a broader range of social groups participate in the governance process.

### 2.2.8 Agriculture

Developed economic institutions make economic growth sustainable and reduce risks. In their absence, Armenia’s government deals haphazardly with crises. For example, in May 2013, several regions of Armenia were hit by heavy hail that damaged farms and crops. Farmers organized protests and closed the national highway in the north, demanding that the prime minister and president compensate them for their loss. Because most of the farmers had taken loans from banks, they had to leave their villages and work elsewhere to pay off the loans. The highway remained closed for several days. Following the crisis, the Armenian government initiated a fundraising campaign and suspended the farmers’ bank loans to compensate them for their loss. Despite this stop-gap solution, however, institutional measures for effective management and security should have been in place to secure both the economy and government from potential risk.

Agriculture is one of the most important economic sectors in Armenia—and given that the country is under blockade and the threat of war, it is crucial that industry and agriculture be better developed to meet local demand and be more resistant to external threats. By contrast, the banking sector is one of the most developed economic sectors in Armenia, with institutions protecting the interests of banks and their customers (namely, a security fund to compensate bank customers in case their deposits are lost due to bankruptcy or other reasons). Similar institutions should be created for agriculture and other sectors as well. This could boost agricultural productivity, which would later be taxed to generate state revenues.

Given that the financial system is advanced, banks should be encouraged and supported to provide financial products that could provide security to non-financial sectors such as agriculture. One such product would be crop insurance.

---

2.2.9 A transitional economy

Currently Armenia’s economy is service-oriented, with active private investments in the construction and mining industries. A major part of Armenia’s exports in 2009 (40%) consisted in mining exports. In 2012, Armenia’s GDP distribution by sector was 19.2 percent in agriculture, 40.8 percent in industry and 40 percent in services.52

In recent years, the construction sector has been hit by economic crisis, and the service sector largely depends on market conditions. Armenia needs to diversify its economy to create wealth and value, which could be done by boosting manufacturing and industry. The government should do this by encouraging small and medium businesses, and by attracting foreign investments through improvements to the business climate and economic institutions.

2.2.10 Unemployment

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the achievement of independence in 1991, Armenia has faced high rates of structural unemployment. This has been caused by the closing of many factories and companies, poor economic conditions due to war with Azerbaijan, blockade (by Turkey and Azerbaijan), and an inherited system of poor economic conditions.

Some of these causes are difficult for the government to address effectively: the legacy of war and an insecure geopolitical environment; blockade; an inherited system of economic relations lacking institutional regulation; a bad privatization policy that closed factories; and high transportation costs. However, many other reasons for unemployment are within the government’s power to reform: monopolies, lack of substantial control over economic relations by nonprofit organizations and media, and inefficient tax and customs policies.

Reports about unemployment rates in Armenia are controversial, as different sources have published different data. According to the Armenian National Statistical Service (NSS), the rate of unemployment was 17.3 percent in 2012, 18.4 percent in 2011, 16.4 percent in 2008, 28.7 percent in 2007, and 38.4 percent in 2001.53 That information is based on a

survey among 5,184 households;\textsuperscript{54} however, the rapid reduction in the unemployment rate from 2007-2008 could be caused by change of analysis methodology used by the State Statistical Service. According to another survey based on a different methodology, the current unemployment rate in Armenia is 27.5 percent.\textsuperscript{55} This report suggests that “unemployment is a bigger challenge especially in rural communities, where about 61.5 percent of people have left their places of residence seeking temporary jobs abroad.” A report published by the European Commission in 2011 states that one in four economically active people in Armenia are unemployed, and two-thirds of the employed depend on incomes from low-productivity agriculture and trade.\textsuperscript{56}

Citizens of Armenia are entitled to receive unemployment benefits subject to a number of conditions. The amount of the benefit payment is 60 percent of the minimum monthly salary amount, payable for a maximum of 12 months after layoff.\textsuperscript{57} Minimum monthly salary in Armenia is equal to $108 (in AMD), and the amount of the unemployment benefit payment is $65 (in AMD). Even though this procedure is established by the government, in practice it very is difficult to apply for and receive unemployment benefits due to bureaucratic difficulties.

\textbf{2.2.11 Education}

Most of Armenia’s unemployed are young people between the ages of 15-35. A major reason for their situation is a lack of jobs, connected mostly with the low capacity of the domestic market and limited access to foreign markets due to the transport blockade. A second reason, however, lies in the education system, which is not adapted to market demands for trained specialists.

Most of the country’s 13 higher educational institutions offer a limited range of academic fields that do not provide marketable skills. The most popular majors are in areas such as international relations, political science, history, economics, management, marketing and

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\end{thebibliography}
law. There is high demand for professionals in construction and engineering, and the State Engineering University does offer professional programs in those fields—but those graduates fail to find jobs due to a lack of professional development opportunities (e.g. training, internships, foreign experience, and field placement).

2.3 Rural poverty in post-earthquake Gyumri

With a high level of urbanization (officially reported at 64%) and an aging population, Armenia suffers from rural poverty. Most companies are concentrated in Yerevan, although recently the government has compiled an industry development strategy aimed at expanding IT activities and infrastructure to Armenia’s regions (primarily focused on Gyumri)\(^58\). Armenia is experiencing shortage of skilled workers (including health and education workers) in rural areas; most of them are based in the capital city, which does not reflect the country’s population distribution\(^59\).

Armenia’s poorest people are concentrated along the nation’s borders, in mountain areas and earthquake zones. Shirak in north-eastern Armenia, and Lori and Kotayk in the central part of the country, are among the poorest provinces\(^60\). The highest level of poverty, homelessness and unemployment was registered in Gyumri. According to official information, the poverty rate in Gyumri is 47.7%\(^61\). (By comparison, the child poverty rate in Armenia stands at 41.4%)\(^62\).

Even though 25 years have passed since the devastating 1988 earthquake in the Shirak region, an estimated 6,500 families there are still living in temporary trailer homes or makeshift housing.

The 1988 earthquake took at least 25,000 lives, which was an exceptional loss for an


earthquake of a moderate size. Some 514,000 people were left homeless, and 31,000 were injured. Even though 25 years have passed since the earthquake, Gyumri—once a developing industrial city and one of the main cultural centers of the South Caucasus—has not yet recovered. More than half of the 6,500 homeless families in the Shirak region (some 3,500 families) are not eligible for new housing, since the government does not consider them direct victims of the earthquake.

According to research by the Shirak Center, a nonprofit organization, in 2009 the official list of people who were homeless as a result of the earthquake in Gyumri included 4,270 families. Most of these families received housing during the past three years. However, 1034 families are still on the waiting list. Some 300-400 families have been refused housing, and 300 families were not able to submit the required documents even though they had lost their houses as a result of the earthquake. In addition to the official list, some 3,500 families are not registered for housing. Currently there are over 4,500 families with ‘homeless’ status in Gyumri; this number includes families that are not eligible for new housing but are waiting for emergency improvements to their buildings.

According to the Shirak Center, 22,000 apartments and houses collapsed as a result of the 1988 earthquake. However, just 18,000-19,000 apartments were built since then; and in 2001-2008 only 3,000 apartments were built. In the same period, 13,347 families received funding from different sources to reconstruct or improve their housing conditions (USAID: 6,596 families; Linsy Foundation: 4,126; government of Armenia: 2,282; community budget: 251; Jon M. Huntsman Foundation: 64; and Armenia Pan-Armenian Fund: 28 families).

In June 2008, the government of Armenia adopted a strategy committing to end earthquake-related homelessness in Gyumri by 2013. However, the deadline was missed and was extended till 2014. In March 2013, the city council of Gyumri submitted an official letter to the

---


66 Housing Construction Stopped in Shirak Region. (2013, 31 July). Shirak Center non-for-profit organization.
Prime Minister of Armenia stating that housing and poverty problems in Gyumri were fueling emigration and social crisis, which could become an irreversible trend. According to the government’s official response, there are 30,000 people residing in makeshift shelters and with a status of ‘homeless’ in Armenia, and the government would treat those 4,300 homeless families in Gyumri in accordance with the national “Poverty Reduction Strategy”.

Even though 25 years have passed since the earthquake, many people still live in extremely poor conditions in Gyumri, in the same shacks they occupied immediately after the earthquake. Infrastructure and 85% of roads in Gyumri are in extremely poor condition. These unacceptably poor circumstances, together with the government’s failure to solve longstanding problems, are among the main causes of emigration from the North of Armenia. Many people have fled to different countries in order to earn a living for their families. The emigration level from Gyumri continues to be high. Even though no official emigration records from Gyumri exist, various accounts agree that people mainly leave the region via bus to Russia. According to the Asparez journalists’ club, every day between one and four buses full of people (including both seasonal workers and emigrants) depart for Russia from Gyumri.

After a visit to the North of Armenia, Hrant Bagratyan, Member of Parliament and former prime minister of Armenia, shared his concerns with the media:

Visiting the North of Armenia and crossing the Georgian border on Sunday [April 21, 2013], I saw something that shocked me. Hundreds of people were crossing the border on foot, leaving Armenia and carrying along with them their luggage and beds. I was terrified by the number of people who crossed the border in Bagratashen. On April 21, 6000 people crossed the border, while normally this number should be below 1000. Usually 400-500 people leave through this border point every day.

---


2.4 Rural communities and security

Unemployment, poverty and emigration are a bigger challenge in rural communities. This report suggests that “in rural communities about 61.5 percent of people have left their places of residence seeking temporary jobs abroad.” Most of these people are young men. The security of Armenia’s borders is a national preoccupation, when two of its neighbors are hostile to it. It is imperative that Armenia maintains its population, where today it is already the smallest country in the Caucuses in terms of population. It is painful to read the words of the President of Azerbaijan who has not hidden his delight at the de-population issues facing Armenia:

We must continue to keep Armenia in isolation from all international projects. This tactic and policy are bearing fruit… If we look a little bit ahead – the demographic situation will also play and plays a positive role. Today Azerbaijan’s population reaches 9.5 million people. Less than 2 million people live in Armenia. If our population grows at this pace, and the Armenian population declines, then after about 5-7 years, our population will be ten times more. This is itself a source of strength. If we take into consideration our successful economic policy, energy policy of Azerbaijan, I think we will achieve what we want.71

It is essential for Armenia to improve its performance in economy, protection and law, as well as make more efforts to attract investments from diaspora and foreign investors to rural communities.

2.5 Rule of law

The rule of law is one of the main elements providing wellbeing and protection in any society. While there may be loopholes in the laws of developing countries such as Armenia, the real challenges concern the application of law. Armenia suffers from corruption due to the selective application of laws, and citizens receive unequal protection under the law. The 2012 Freedom House report on political rights and civil liberties in Armenia says:

Corruption is believed to be a serious problem in law enforcement. A five-year initiative to combat graft, announced in 2008, has not made meaningful headway against the

---

country’s entrenched culture of corruption… The judiciary is subject to political pressure from executive branch and suffers from considerable corruption. Police make arbitrary arrests without warrants, beat detainees during arrest and interrogation, and use torture to extract confessions\(^\text{72}\).

Institutional weaknesses in the judicial and law enforcement systems produce abuses and violations of human rights during the investigation process and in courts. In recent years Armenia has started to lose more cases in the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). Most of the applications sent to the ECHR concern the 6th provision of the European convention, protecting the right to fair trial. The ECHR has issued rulings requiring the Armenian government to pay compensation to citizens who mostly suffered from abuse in violation of the European Convention on Human Rights Article 3 (prohibition of torture) and Article 5 (the right to liberty and security)\(^\text{73}\).

### 2.5.1 Judicial and police abuse

A former judge and now president of a legal NGO, Pargev Ohanyan, believes that the majority of ECHR cases filed by citizens of Armenia concern illegal actions on the part of investigative bodies in the pre-investigation phase:

The problem is that during initial investigation, the lawyer and advocate is not even entitled or allowed to see his client and talk to him, and has no right to raise objections till the end of the investigation. This means that the accusation is already made and confirmed at the time when the advocate starts working…. Even when an advocate submits objections before the start of the judicial proceeding, the failure to follow due procedure, the investigators’ arbitrary behavior and independence, and the prosecutor’s ‘patronage’ make it impossible to be effective in this phase\(^\text{74}\).

In the existing system, investigators even have a right to suspend cases (a right that should be reserved for the court, which is charged with deciding guilt or innocence). Because investigators have


the right to make accusations in the preliminary investigation phase, they have room to maneuver, which creates corruption risks. The system makes it easier to fabricate cases from the very beginning; and it is very difficult to protect people being investigated because from the outset of the investigation process, suspected persons can be called criminals (in violation of presumption of innocence).

The system would be improved if the right to issue investigation conclusions and to question witnesses were removed from the pre-investigative phase, giving the former right to the investigation body and the latter one to the court. Georgia’s more efficient investigation system could be adopted as a model for Armenia.

Throughout the whole process of investigation and trial, moreover, the role of lawyers is limited. Investigation bodies have the right to accuse any suspected person in any phase of investigation, which narrows the role of lawyers and weakens legal protections. In 2012 and 2013, Armenian lawyers went on strike to protest against arbitrary, biased and negligent rulings by the state Court of Cassation.75

Other judicial mistreatment occurs when investigation bodies and police violate human rights by beating and torturing detainees before trial in order to obtain confessions or information. In May 2007, for instance, Yerevan restaurant owner Levon Gulyan was brought to the police station as a witness in a murder case and died in custody (from what many suspect was a beating at the hands of police). International human rights watchdogs and Armenian organizations condemned the Armenian police for the murder, and the government for failure to punish the culprits.

That failure to punish has created an environment of impunity in which further high-profile episodes of police brutality have occurred. And while it is mostly fatal incidents that get reported in the media, there may be many cases of torture and human rights violations by police that stay secret under threats and pressure.

Recently the ECHR ruled that the Armenian government must pay opposition activist Grisha Virabyan 31,000 Euros in moral and monetary compensation for a beating he received from Ararat Regional Police in 2004.76 In 2013, the person who committed the human rights violations, Ashot Karapetyan, was appointed chief of Yerevan police. This appointment caused

massive criticism and distrust of the police among Armenian youth. The episode shows how the legal and judicial systems are malfunctioning. Citizens pay taxes to have security services who commit violations—and then taxpayers must pay the costs for those violations.

In June 2012, Armenian doctor Vahe Avetyan was beaten to death by bodyguards of Ruben Hayrapetyan (then a member of parliament) inside Hayrapetyan’s restaurant. Social networks and electronic media were used to mobilize massive demonstrations, mostly consisting of youth activists demanding justice and punishment. In a Nouvelles d’Arménie interview, Hayrapetyan responded by saying that “those who had bothered his family by terrorizing and threatening them would suffer with their families.” This led to the launch of a public initiation that filed a case against Hayrapetyan in Yerevan’s Court of General Jurisdiction.

These examples demonstrate the outright corruption, the lack of efficient administration, control and punishment in Armenia’s police and judicial systems. Atrocities recur even though the government and officials revise policies and aim to impose stricter controls. In a recent visit to Armenia, the Estonian minister of justice said, “conditions to move forward with judiciary reforms in Armenia are good. The question for me, and probably the European Union, is not legislation but implementation”.

2.5.2 Civil society support

If reforms are made and law enforcement is improved by the government, the process will be made faster and more effective through the involvement of civic institutions and groups. Today Armenia is developing responsive civic groups; but to make their activities more focused, these groups should have greater legal awareness and train people to know their rights and act in cooperation with the media to bring about institutional changes. Such cooperation will not only help the government to develop democracy, reforms and governance efficiency faster, but may also develop an institutional platform for monitoring and reporting.

2.6 Governance system institutions and a need for better organized parliamentary opposition

Armenia’s political system consists in a representative republic with a president as head of government, and a multi-party system. Executive power is exercised by the government, while legislative power is vested in the parliament. The Armenian parliament (National Assembly) is a unicameral body comprising 131 members elected for five-year terms. There are 41 members elected by proportional representation, and 90 members elected by majoritarian representation.

Political powers currently represented in the parliament are the Republican Party of Armenia (RPA) with 70 seats, the Prosperous Armenia Party (PA) with 36 seats, the Armenian National Congress (ANC) with 7 seats, the Rule of Law Party (RL) with 6 seats, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) with 5 seats and the Heritage Party with 5 seats. There are two independent parliamentarians in the National Assembly

The RPA holds most seats in parliament and most portfolios in national government, regional administration and positions in local government. The president, prime minister and Speaker of the National Assembly are representatives of RPA. PA is the second largest political power represented in the government and parliament. It brands itself as an ‘alternative political power’ and neither pro-government nor a pro-opposition party. PA, RPA and RL comprise the political elite group of the country, and act in consensus in relation to political and governance issues


Currently the opposition of Armenia (the ANC, ARF and Heritage parties) is not widely represented in the parliament, and the only venues to make the voice of people heard are parliamentary sessions, media, and demonstrations. The economy is dominated by oligarchs with close ties and political leverage in the government and par-

The vast majority of parliamentarians are “wealthy businesspeople heavily reliant on governmental levers and financial resources”\textsuperscript{84}.

The government’s stated aim is to build a Western-style parliamentary democracy. However, international observers have questioned the fairness of Armenia’s parliamentary and presidential elections and its constitutional referendum since 1995. Violations of the most recent elections include polling deficiencies, lack of cooperation by the Electoral Commission, use of administrative resources by parties represented in the government, intimidation, bribery, poor maintenance of electoral lists and polling places, as well as procedural violations.\textsuperscript{85}

In a recent report about Armenia, the Freedom House said:

Arménia’s political system operates on the basis of consensus among elite groups that control economic and political resources. Society has little leverage over legislative processes or political decision making; consequently, trust in governing institutions is very low. Results of every national election since 1995 have been challenged by the opposition, which is personality-driven and passive between elections\textsuperscript{86}.

It is believed that the only fully fair election in the history of independent Armenia was the first presidential election in 1991\textsuperscript{87}. Each subsequent election was said to be unfair by opposition parties, causing public protests and demonstrations. The most vigorous protests followed the 2008 presidential election, resulting in the death of ten people due to excessive use of force by police against anti-government protesters\textsuperscript{88}.

Since its independence, Armenia has chosen a policy that enriches political elites at the expense of the rest of the society, entrenching a system of non-formal administration based on money

\begin{thebibliography}
\end{thebibliography}
and power, and sustained by monopolies and privileged treatment. Power is preserved by buying
the support of crucial groups to get votes during elections, by giving privileged conditions to
elites in business, and by strongly controlling the judicial system and media in periods between
elections. Elections are coordinated not only at presidential and parliamentary levels but at the local
government level as well, sometimes with oligarchs and local elites controlling electoral processes
personally. There have been reports about voter intimidation, use of administrative resources
during electoral campaigns, bribe-taking by voters, and other forms of electoral violations.\(^89\) After
each election cycle, international observers have reported modest improvements, but the electoral
system in Armenia still needs improvement to be able to provide free and fair elections.

Given that local institutions are weak and fail to demand accountability effectively,
international organizations such as the Council of Europe, the World Bank and the IMF are
the main institutions demanding governance policy changes. In a May 2013 visit to Armenia,
the mission chief of an IMF delegation said:

> The Armenian government must end the privileged treatment of some businesspeople,
improve tax collection and embark on other “deep and swift” reforms… Decisive
changes, made quickly and comprehensively, should persuade Armenians and others
abroad that society rewards those who work and that the game is fair, open and reaching
for the best solutions for ordinary Armenians… It is still common for well-connected
parties to have privileged market position, or for profits to be wrongfully lost. Until a
more decisive approach and proper incentives for risk-taking are well established, there
will not be enough investment, jobs, or hope in Armenia’s future.\(^90\)

In April 2011, the United States announced it was cutting aid to Armenia through the
Millennium Challenges program, since Armenia’s government had failed to meet conditions
related to democracy and market liberalization. The cancellation of the next phase of provision
(to the amount of $235.6 million) was explained by the U.S. Ambassador to Armenia: “The
reason for the decision…was Armenia’s failure to show progress in good governance areas
such as freedom of press and assembly.\(^91\)

---


On the level of governmental commitment, Armenia is cooperating with international organizations to improve the quality of public services. In 2010 it received a credit from the World Bank to improve provision of public services, and in 2011 it joined the Open Government Partnership initiative by committing to promote greater transparency and accountability in providing public services to its citizens. In 2011, it adopted a Law on Public Services establishing rules on ethics, the prevention of corruption and the declaration of assets by high-ranking officials. The year 2012 saw the establishment of the Ethics Committee of the National Assembly and the adoption of a decree on setting up the procedure of reporting about corruption related offences within the public service.

Notwithstanding these measures, however, the only tangible institutional improvement is an electronic government system enabling the provision of various public services through one online portal. Even though this is a significant improvement, Armenia still has to implement a number of reforms, and lacks monitoring and reporting mechanisms for the prevention and punishment of violations. Consequently, there are many loopholes in the law and much abuse on part of officials.

According to the Nations in Transit 2012 report by Amnesty International, Armenia’s political system operates on the basis of consensus among elite groups that control economic and political resources. Civil society has little leverage over legislative processes or political decision-making, trust in governing institutions is very low, and the political opposition is personality-driven and passive between elections. The Armenian National Congress, once a consolidated opposition party that was a coalition of 13 non-parliamentary opposition parties and played a key role in 2008 mass protests, lost the support of many parties following its leader’s decision not to run for president. The Heritage party became active and led the opposition movement following the refusal of major political opponents of the incumbent president to participate in

---


elections. Currently, opposition parties have few seats in parliament and no major influence on public policy and decision-making. Non-parliamentary opposition is weak, too, as it lacks consolidation and collaboration with other political powers. There is a need to consolidate many opposition powers into a few parties that are not personality-driven and that can serve as an umbrella group for many political parties otherwise excluded from power.

### 2.6.1 Tackling corruption

Corruption in Armenia exists at different levels of governance and is a major factor in relations with government bodies and business regulation. According to Transparency International, Armenia improved its index of corruption perception in 2012 but the level of corruption still remains high, placing the country at 105th out of 176 countries surveyed. “Despite legislative revisions in relation to elections and party financing,” the report states, “corruption either persists or has re-emerged in new forms.”

The main anti-corruption institutions of the Armenian government are an Anti-Corruption Council (headed by the prime minister) and the Anti-Corruption Strategy Monitoring Commission, which was established in 2004 to strengthen the implementation of anti-corruption policy. To function efficiently, these anti-corruption institutions should: 1. be apolitical/nonpartisan, 2. not be a political office, 3. involve Transparency International.

The government adopted an Anti-Corruption Strategy and Implementation Action Plan in 2003, focusing on organizational and legal tools to combat corruption in areas such as banking, taxation, customs, health care, education, environment, licensing, public procurement, public administration, and the judiciary system. The government has since revised the strategy, and the existing Anti-Corruption Strategy 2009-2012 focuses on the implementation of existing laws, particularly taxation and customs services (which are considered to be most affected by corruption). Other priorities include improvement of legislation and infrastructure to combat money laundering, increased transparency in the public sector, and enhancement of

---

accountability in all branches of government. In 2008, Armenia’s Criminal Code was amended to provide better mechanisms for combating corruption. In 2011, some measures to combat corruption were carried out in several state ministries and agencies: revised procedures were introduced for obtaining drivers’ licenses, passports, and business registration in order to discourage the acquisition of such documents through bribery.

However, these anti-corruption efforts are not proving sufficient or effective. While the reforms are achieving significant improvements, according to the Council of Europe Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO) Evaluation Report on Incriminations 2011, legal provisions should be further amended to comply with the Council of Europe’s Criminal Law Convention on Corruption. This would enable Armenia to prosecute requests for bribes as well as all corruption offenses committed by citizens abroad. Nevertheless, in recent years the number of high-ranking officials arrested and convicted on charges of bribery and corruption in Armenia has increased. Prime Minister Sargsyan initiated a series of top-level dismissals in November 2011, focusing on the ministries of agriculture, finance, education and health.

The strong links between the government and business within the Armenian governance system do not allow the government to be independent. By law, government officials are banned from engaging in business activities, but in practice they often have extensive business interests and many parliamentary deputies and state officials run companies on the side. Reports about high-ranking officials holding properties include a general prosecutor building a power plant despite the protests that a nearby village would lose its water source, and a multi-million dollar deal involving high-ranking officials (including a representative of the church), resulting in confiscation of another businessman’s properties. Reports about such malfeasance, including the involvement of church representatives in business and political activities, shatter the popular trust in the state and church.

2.6.2 Civic activism and participatory governance

Much of the current tension in Armenian society is due to citizens’ alienation from the government. Popular participation in the process of governance is limited to elections, since no other mechanisms and institutions exist to provide for participation of larger groups in governance. Decision making is non-transparent and non-participatory. Even at local levels, decisions about major issues affecting community life are made without prior discussions or community participation. The level of accountability is very low, which gives people the feeling that they are not the owners of their communities.

Examples of such non-participatory governance include the government’s decision to take down the Youth Palace of Yerevan\(^{103}\), to permit demolition and new construction in the Pak Shuka (an indoor market on Mashtots avenue),\(^ {104}\) and its modification of historical buildings such as the one at 25 Pushkin.\(^ {105}\)

Recent years have seen increasing demonstrations by different groups demanding social justice. This trend has gone so far that even former freedom fighters in the Karabakh war have resumed protests demanding solutions to their “social problems.” They demand justice and law, and claim that they are in extremely poor condition and ignored by the government.\(^ {106}\) Many experts believe such issues constitute the crux of social disappointment in Armenia. If demands are ignored and the struggle for justice and improvement is unsuccessful, the only alternative people may find is emigration.

While civic activism and consciousness is not at a high level in Armenia, it has become significantly more noticeable. Every year, more people are involved in demonstrations calling for justice and good governance. In 2012, the mass protests demanding justice related to Vahe Avetyan’s case were larger than the protests over Levon Gulyan’s case in 2007. The majority


of people in these demonstrations are the same ones fighting for environmental and human rights issues. For example, the Mashtots Park movement\textsuperscript{107} was spontaneous, mobilizing many young people from different political and civic groups without centralized coordination. It points to social energy and tension that have accumulated through many years as a result of popular alienation from the government.

Nonetheless, civic activism is not solving institutional problems, as it is uncoordinated and spontaneous. The trend of non-participatory decision making, and the gap between the society and government, contains potential dangers for the government, society and state.

\textbf{In order to reduce the high emigration trend and potential risks for future mass spontaneous demonstrations in Armenia, the government should bring leaders and groups otherwise excluded from power into the decision-making process, empowering a broad segment of the population.}

The Armenian government has achieved some degree of centralized order and is able to ensure that social movements challenging the existing regime do not immediately descend into lawlessness. Existing political institutions may coordinate the demands of the population in a manner that neither lets opposition movements easily be crushed by current elites, nor turns into a vehicle for another group to take control of existing extractive institutions and continue similar policies. \textbf{The government should allow political groups and civic movements grow and fight for their liberties and establish institutions, to the extent that such movements are controllable and do not descend into lawlessness.}

This is possible to achieve only through participatory governance and enabling power to vest in a broad group of society through civic and other institutions. The government should have an interest in the development of such institutions as malfeasance is committed at lower levels that are not controlled by top elites. Developed civic institutions can promote governance at lower levels of the bureaucracy, thus taking some of the responsibility for power from the top elites and distributing it among wider groups in society.

This process may start at all levels in the civic sector, and at the municipal level in the government. The Armenian government should encourage participatory budgeting, which is a

mechanism for involving ordinary citizens in the formulation of community spending priorities. Village and city councils should adopt budgets through public discussions, and municipalities and ministries should make their budgets and spending transparent. State institutions and departments should be open to media and civic groups to discuss budgets and issues related to state administration.

2.6.3 Mass media

The role of media is very important in spreading information that can spur empowerment, nation-building, and development. Armenia’s media (especially TV) continue to be strictly controlled by the government, but newspapers and electronic resources with some level of independence do exist. Social networks such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube have become major tools for sharing information and mobilizing groups. The government should improve media independence and transparency, bringing more people into decision making. There is also a need to improve professionalism and media ethics.

2.6.4 Institutionalized civic activism

Armenia lacks institutions to bring more groups into decision-making and exercising meaningful influence over the government. When the government exercises strict centralized vertical order, governance and accountability cannot be efficient in the absence of horizontal control of all levels of government by institutions and civic groups.

Civil society organizations in Armenia currently consist of groups supported by international organizations and donors, government-organized non-governmental organizations, self-organized nonprofit organizations, and grassroots initiatives and activist groups. Organizations supported by international donors have higher levels of institutional development and focus on specific topics. Such organizations may be efficient in relation to advancing goals supported by international organizations and other countries. However, these organizations are not a driving


engine for the natural development of Armenian civic institutions; their operation depends on continued external funding, and they do not generally consider the interests of other civic groups in making decisions.

Government-organized non-governmental organizations receive funding mainly from governmental sources, and pursue specific goals related to the interests of separate governmental divisions. Such organizations may be efficient for the government as a short-term tool to reach its own goals, but they cannot be considered an engine for the empowerment and development of Armenia’s civic sector. Due to their connection with the government, such groups are not seen to be independent.

Self-organized nonprofit organizations consist of two types: ones established to operate in specific areas (such as sociology, polls, etc.), and unions. The first group raises funds from private sources for research on specific issues. Unions generate funds mainly from membership fees, and aim to protect the interests of their members in a specific sector. Even though unions are essential as economic institutions to protect rights and other interests, neither of these two types of organizations add value to the development of civic movements.

Grassroots initiatives and activist groups mobilize people for different issues such as environmental and human rights concerns. Even though these groups do not have institutionally developed organizational forms, they use social networks and electronic media to share information and mobilize, and are effective in fighting against violations. These groups can be an engine for the development of a better civic sector in Armenia. However, although they mobilize against specific cases and individuals, they do not act for the purpose of developing platforms and institutions to reform the system. A protest that results in an individual’s dismissal from the parliament or other such punishment does not guarantee that similar violations will not happen in the future. For that reason, such organizations should also seek systematic reforms and the development of viable institutions that would make it possible to address minor violations of human rights as well as high-profile ones, and to prevent impunity from growing. This would help to root out the causes of state abuse instead of only fighting against the consequences.

Other platforms emerging in Armenia hold the potential to become institutions for the protection of rights and improvement of social relations. For example, a web site was created by a group of youths for monitoring and reporting abuse and violations in universities and
Further development of such initiatives, through integration with social media and cooperation with mass media, may turn into a platform that could encourage other institutions emerge. The role of mass media is essential in order to disseminate information and bring more groups into civic activism.

In the existing political system in Armenia, top-down efforts to improve shortcomings will not be effective over the long term unless institutions are developed at all levels. Such institutions are necessary to improve the rule of law, secure property rights, advance equal economic opportunities and good public services, and bring about transparent and participatory decision-making. Economic institutions are necessary to provide equal access to markets and free competition, prevent manipulation of markets, stimulate innovation and growth, and protect investors from risks. Transparent media and civil society will help to develop institutions faster and to improve incomes, access to health care, education, public services, and economic and social opportunities.

http://www.ankashar.am/
Chapter 3: Lessons for Armenia in Israel’s experience with migration

Looking at the experience of Israel’s development through migration can shed light on potentials for Armenia. Of course, many factors in the two countries differ, such as their history, quality of governance, rule of law, and economic opportunities. However, there are similarities too: insecure geographical environments prone to warfare and external hostility, historical tragedy uniting a far-flung diaspora, and the existence of diaspora organizations around the world sharing common ideologies and goals. For these reasons, comparison with the Israeli experience may reveal lessons for Armenia’s efforts at encouraging development by repatriating its diaspora.

3.1 Israeli statehood and repatriation

Israel became independent on May 14, 1948—but activity towards the formation of an independent state and the prerequisites for repatriation had begun long before that. From the start, repatriation was recognized to be crucial for Israel’s success.

According to the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs\textsuperscript{111}, Israel received 687,000 immigrants from 1948-1951. In ten years the population of Israel almost doubled, from 1,174,000 in 1949 to 2,150,000 in 1960. Because most immigrants came from Arab countries and lacked money and shelter, the Israeli government created housing programs and granted citizenship to all Jewish immigrants upon arrival.

3.2 A solid foundation and effective policy

Unlike many other countries that faced deep social and economic problems upon acquiring independence, Israel was able to make policy and build institutions immediately. Large flows of funds, coming mostly from the Jewish diaspora, were directed to projects for building draining and irrigation systems as well as agricultural developments.

At the 1951 World Zionist Congress, Jewish diaspora representatives expressed their willingness to support Israel’s absorption of immigrants. Israel is the only country in the world with a Ministry of Absorption, which manages the process of arrival and absorption of immigrants from all over the world. Israel begins to work with immigrants from the moment they decide to repatriate. The state supports them in finding jobs and settlement, and helps them to be fully involved in the social and cultural life of their homeland.

During its first decade state independence, the Israeli government was able to organize the allocation of imported resources and to invest in capital assets to improve infrastructure and create the foundation for an innovative economy. This was achieved even amid warfare and unprecedented immigration flows. Due to these measures, as well as to the existence of democratic governance and a commitment to building infrastructure and institutions, the Israeli economy has skyrocketed in recent decades. Today it is considered one of the world’s most innovative and advanced economies in diverse sectors.

In 2005, the Israeli government adopted a Master Plan\textsuperscript{112} calling for the achievement of ambitious demographic goals by 2020:

- Israel’s population shall be over 9 million, and about 14 million Jewish people shall be living in the territory between Jordan and the Mediterranean;
- In connection with such population growth, it will be necessary to build 50,000 new homes; and
- Investments in human capital shall be increased by 13 percent annually, amounting to $1 billion per year.

The successful repatriation of Jews to their historic homeland and the development of the state of Israel were made possible by recruiting immigrants who possessed a high level of human capital and who were committed to the mission of national unification, growth and prosperity. It also required good governance, huge investments on the part of the diaspora and—crucially—targeted and efficient spending of that investment, which in turn sustained future donations and investments. A well-planned strategic approach, sound policies and good governance became guarantors of Israel’s success.

3.3 Armenia and Israel: similarities and differences

While there are many differences between the two countries, some similarities provide lessons that Armenia can apply to its own future. The following similarities are central:

a. **Situations of conflict:** Both Armenia and Israel have been conflict zones under the threat of war, and the environment in both countries has been insecure since gaining independence. The maintenance of the army and military equipment in both countries constitutes a considerable share of the state budget. A main difference between Armenia and Israel in this context, however, is that Armenia does not have a locally-developed production of armaments, while Israel produces new-generation weapons and is able to supply its own army.

b. **Scarcity of resources and small territory:** Unlike Israel, which imports raw materials from abroad and processes them into final products, Armenia exports resources (mostly mining resources) to other countries.

c. **Large diaspora:** Since Israel’s declaration of independence, and especially after the adoption of its Law on Return, many Jews repatriated to their historic homeland. The population of Israel’s 20,770km² territory is 7.7 million as of 2013, while Armenia’s population on 29,743km² is less than 3 million. One of the main differences between Israel and Armenia lies in the area of diaspora-state cooperation. The Jewish diaspora actively cooperates with Israel’s government and invests in its economy; by contrast, cooperation between Armenia’s government and its diaspora is reflected only in diaspora charity projects.

Due to cooperation and support on the part of the Jewish diaspora, the economy of Israel has flourished. Investments from the diaspora do not bring money only; when foreign companies are encouraged to invest, they bring technologies, business practices and connections, and training for local residents. These connections and business practices spread into the local market. Even if such companies close down their businesses in several years and go, the vacuum can be filled by other companies who can draw on trained workers.

In Armenia’s case, diaspora participation in the national economy and business life is limited to financial support and charity. Although many individuals are committed to helping Armenia in these ways, Armenia does not draw on the potential of human capital in the form of higher
and mid-level professionals from the diaspora. The experience and contacts of Armenians from different parts of the world could potentially bring much enrichment and innovation to Armenia, as would investments in small or medium size projects. This is possible, and Armenia can use the full potential of the diaspora only in case of establishing rule of law.

The main reason why diaspora members currently refrain from investing in Armenia is the business environment and issues connected with rule of law. Even though the Armenian government has made a number of reforms to improve business conditions during the past three years, still there are many problems to solve. The main problems arise in businesses operations, importing goods and reporting taxes. A big obstacle for investment is ‘word of mouth’ reports about business difficulties caused by the patronage of state officials. (For example, a foreign or diaspora investor will never understand why a police officer or representative of the special police squad would deal with the tax reporting issues of an organization or private company.) Reports of frequent in-person visits to check on business activities and accounting documents are intimidating. As an example, the Ombudsmen’s office has received many calls by business entities reporting frequent check-up by representative of the State Revenue Agency skipping the approved plan to carry out inspections and without prior notice. To solve these problems, the Armenian government should continue the reforms it has started, and end all intimidation of businesses in order to build an attractive image for investors.

Besides making direct investments in the Armenian economy, the diaspora could also be supporting more projects of a charitable or other nature. For this to succeed, investors and diaspora members must have confidence that the money they invest is being spent properly for its intended purpose. Accounts of improper use of financial resources may result in the suspension of ongoing projects and discourage future projects.
3.4 Possibilities for adapting the Israeli model

Based on the Israeli experience, the following recommendations are applicable to Armenia:

i. **Economic development**

Since it lacks natural resources, Armenia should develop as an innovation/knowledge-driven economy aimed at importing new ideas, technologies and investments. This can be achieved by improving the business environment and governance, and by attracting diaspora participation in the economy. As well, the national economy must be de-monopolized and shifted toward an export-oriented economy.

ii. **Improvement of the business environment**

Armenia should improve the environment for potential diaspora investors and businesspeople by (a) enabling small businesses to survive and prosper (especially ones focused on production); (b) reforming the tax and customs systems to make them friendlier to local businesses involved in production; and (c) continuing reforms aimed at improving the business environment, and creating a centralized database of laws and procedures to help foreign companies start and manage a business.

iii. **Investment in infrastructure**

Armenia needs real investments in infrastructure. Neither the conflict situation nor the economic crisis can justify channeling borrowed funds into direct consumption (as opposed to infrastructure funding). Even in its most difficult times, Israel has directed huge cash flows to improving its infrastructure and providing the country with long-term capital assets. Armenia’s infrastructure needs improvement to ensure a basic standard of living through elements such as water supply, electricity, sewage, roads, and telecommunication services. Financial support for improving infrastructure is available to some extent, supplied mostly by diaspora donations and by loans from international financial organizations. However, the real driving force for financial inflow and activation of the economy would be the development of production, starting from small and medium businesses. To achieve real cooperation between Armenia and its diaspora aimed at developing investment projects, Armenia must cut down the level of corruption and monopolization over imports. It will be essential to ensure that financial resources invested or donated by the diaspora are spent properly.
iv. **Encouraging diaspora repatriation**

Somewhat akin to Israel’s Ministry of Absorption, Armenia’s Ministry of Diaspora could encourage repatriation. Even though resources may not be available for massive investment in housing and other needs, the ministry could create resources and immigrant community centers with specialized immigration and adaptation programs. Such centers could be a primary information center for immigrants, where they could be trained in the local lifestyle and culture, and gain access to institutions and other information to help them adapt faster. To make this process more effective, such community/resource centers could offer free internet and other resources, as well as counseling support by case workers to guide immigrants through the adaptation process. The ministry also could collaborate with employment agencies and maintain a database of available jobs for new immigrants.

Diaspora organizations, such as AGBU and the All Armenia Fund, need to involve themselves in policy development in Armenia. They should not simply fund projects presented by the state but must ensure that the particular project is in keeping with the country’s long-term policy objectives. For example, simply building schools where the over-riding concern is a shrinking population is not good policy. Schools should be built in cooperation with other population retention programs, like health services and pro-business development policies.
Chapter 4: Repatriates from the Middle East

4.1 Repatriation on the Armenian national agenda

Even though Armenian dispersion dates back centuries, beginning with organized Armenian communities in many remote areas such as Europe, the Middle East, India, the concept of repatriation is more recent in Armenian political thinking. It is closely linked to the emergence of a collective identity as a nation in exile, or a diaspora. Though the definition of the term is debated, the notion of diaspora as a nation in exile started to be used in the Armenian press outside Soviet Armenia in the early 1930s. It reflected the collective awareness of a people who lost their historical homeland in the 1915 genocide. Whenever the genocide was remembered, the loss of the homeland was mentioned along with the 1.5 million victims.

Awareness of diaspora implied the notion of organizing dispersed Armenian communities worldwide. Meanwhile, the diaspora created institutions that would preserve Armenian identity, including schools, churches and community centers, all oriented toward an eventual return to the homeland. This narrative applied to all sectors of the diaspora, notwithstanding political divides with respect to ideological perspective, strategic alliances or power struggles in community politics.

The dominant myth of massive return to homeland as a goal giving meaning to diaspora existence persisted even as a third post-genocide generation came of age by the 1970s. Indeed, with political advocacy for the Armenian cause becoming globally active after the 50th anniversary of the genocide, the myth of return to homeland became even more assertive. However, as we have not seen a pronounced return to the homeland since independence in 1991, the idea of a collective return has proven to be more of a myth than reality.

The concept of repatriation was coined in Soviet Armenia in the aftermath of World War II. Its transformation into policy took place after nearly a quarter-century of borders that were almost completely closed to diaspora immigration during the worst post-1921 period of the Stalinist regime. The Soviet Armenian repatriation initiative of 1946 was politically ill-conceived and badly implemented, but it created a historical antecedent. Repatriation became an opportunity, a demand and a question mark after Armenia gained independence in 1991. The debate started as early as the NKR movement in 1988, initially as an almost naïve certainty.
that if justice were finally done and Armenian territories were unified, then repatriation would naturally follow.

The early years of Armenia’s independence saw massive emigration, mostly for economic reasons. Following the ability to obtain Armenian citizenship and become dual citizen, repatriation started to be debated as a policy option along with the creation of the Ministry of Diaspora. The debate continues even as different programs are still being implemented on a trial-and-error experimental phase.

Today repatriation is a necessity for Armenia on demographic grounds. Since 1991, the rapid decline of the country’s population has been a critical area of concern. Multiple studies have shown that difficult social and economic circumstances contributed to the mass wave of emigration; yet 20 years after independence, effective migration policies have yet to be adopted to stem the tide.

For a short period, a surplus in migration to the country was registered. However, following the global financial downturn in 2009, Armenia’s economy suffered a recession. GDP contracted by 14 percent, poverty rates increased, jobs dwindled, inflation increased to 4.8 percent, and a new wave of emigration began that continues unabated. Today Armenia’s government relies heavily on loans from international donor organizations such as the World Bank, IMF, Asian Development Bank and Russia, resulting in a large budget deficit and foreign loan obligations that will burden future generations. Stable economic growth is impeded by lack of dependable rule of law, corruption at all levels, a faulty judicial system, rooted oligarchy, and lack of market competition.

These problems have presented severe obstacles to repatriation during the past twenty years. Along with the local population, potential repatriates or returning migrants are faced with a lack of job opportunities, shortcomings in education and health care, corruption, high cost of living in relation to income, monopolies impeding market competition, and a deep lack of faith in the country’s future. Returning Armenians also face deep cultural differences, language issues (i.e. eastern vs. western Armenian), an unfamiliar business environment and practices, and complicated taxation and customs laws that are constantly susceptible to corrupt practices.

Upon the legalization of dual citizenship in 2007, many presumed that a high percentage of diaspora Armenians would take advantage of this new right. In reality however, a relatively
small percentage of diaspora members have become dual citizens of the Republic of Armenia; even fewer have actually repatriated.

A healthy inflow of people from both the traditional diaspora and from those who emigrated from Armenia following independence could create the conditions for a reverse in population decline. Understanding the reasons behind diaspora reluctance to return to Armenia, and offering policy solutions to the factors identified, is vital for the nation’s future.

The remainder of this chapter offers a critical appraisal of policies implemented by the current government of Armenia, and specifically by the Ministry of the Diaspora, in promoting the repatriation of diaspora Armenians. It focusses not only on state policies and public debates, but also on the experience of those who have repatriated, their experience and their opinions. For a number of reasons, the study sample focuses on repatriates from the Middle East (Lebanon, Syria and Iraq):

- The narrative of the diaspora, including the myth of return, developed mostly in Middle Eastern Armenian communities.
- These communities were by far those in whom elements of identity such as language, culture, historical memory and traditions were best preserved, arguably making their integration into Armenia easier.
- At the same time, these communities are strongly identified with Western Armenia (unlike, for example, Iranian Armenians, who are closer to the Eastern Armenian cultural identity).
- The Middle Eastern communities face the challenge of political turmoil in their host communities; in fact migration trends by Armenians from the Middle East to other countries, particularly in North America, have been accelerated since the mid-1970s.
- The precedent set by Iraqi Armenians fleeing political violence after the US intervention in Iraq presents a good case study.
- The current Syrian civil war, and its disastrous impact on the local Armenian community, makes the debate about best practices in repatriation policies even more urgent.
4.2 Politics, policies and practices of repatriation since 1991

Despite the unprecedented Armenia-diaspora interaction from 1988 to 1991, repatriation did not become an issue on the political agenda of the newly independent state as readily as some had hoped and believed it would. Armenian state policy in the early years after independence did not envisage repatriation as an important policy issue (though diaspora investment was welcomed). In late 1990s, Armenia started to pay attention to repatriation.

Public debate about dual citizenship became intensive beginning in 2005, when a referendum for Constitutional reform took place, and the Law on Citizenship was signed in March 2007. The institutionalization of diaspora-Armenian relations through the Ministry of Diaspora and its active involvement in repatriation initiatives coincide with two critical situations: first, the increase of emigration from Armenia due the 2007-2008 global financial crisis and internal political crisis in the country; and second, the present Syrian conflict that has greatly affected the local Armenian community. The most visible aspect of the Ministry’s involvement in fostering repatriation was the easing of the bureaucratic procedure to obtain citizenship, with its important consequences for Syrian Armenians caught in the middle of armed conflict. It is still too early to conclude how significant the level of repatriation will be, but increasing demand for citizenship might be a signal.

4.3 From dual citizenship to repatriation

Despite the warm welcome that the dual citizenship law received, diaspora Armenians did not immediately rush to submit applications. The law needed regulation, which was not introduced until April 2008. As well, the complicated and unclear application process did not encourage diaspora Armenians to start the process of becoming citizens. There is no indication that Armenian diplomatic representatives have received clear instructions to promote dual citizenship or have been trained on how to advise prospective applicants. In fact, amendments to simplify the application procedure and remove bureaucratic obstacles (e.g. now requiring only basic proof about the applicant’s Armenian origin) were introduced in April 2010, partly due to intervention from the Ministry of Diaspora. According to the Armenian Ministry of Diaspora, the number of people who were granted dual citizenship in Armenia 2012 totaled 15,000.\footnote{Armenian Minister: 15,000 People Received Dual Citizenship in 2012. (2012, December 25). Panarmenian.net online media. Retrieved from <http://www.panarmenian.net/eng/news/139513/> (accessed July 16, 2013)}
Three factors explain the increase in interest and applications for dual citizenship in 2011-2012. First, the Ministry of Diaspora was created and became active in facilitating dual citizenship and promoting the debate on repatriation. The Ministry became highly visible in the Syrian Armenian refugee issue by opening a special secondary school and by facilitating these immigrants’ access to health care and university education, among other initiatives.

The second factor consists in the current government’s eagerness to engage diaspora members in the Armenian economy. The deterioration of Armenia’s economic performance in 2011 and 2012 made the renewal of diaspora engagement crucial. Thus, the Fourth Armenia-Diaspora Conference in September 2011 (on the 20th anniversary of Armenia’s independence) became an opportunity for the government to send a strong message to diaspora investors.

The third factor is the situation of the Armenian communities in the Middle East following the Arab revolts in Egypt, Syria and Lebanon (and against the background of the Armenian government’s failure to ensure successful repatriation of Iraqi Armenians in 2006-2007). The Syrian civil war hit the Armenians of Aleppo, Damascus, Deir Zor and other Syrian cities and regions very hard. Eventually the highest demand for dual citizenship came from Syria; and with the flow of Armenians escaping the war in the summer of 2012, the government decided to make a further exception to standard procedure by handling dual citizenship documents in Armenian embassies. The measure was later extended to Lebanese Armenians applying for dual citizenship, probably as a preventive measure in case of expansion of the conflict from Syria to Lebanon. Armenia offered a number of privileges to Syrian-Armenians, and according to the Ministry of Diaspora, dual citizenship was granted to over 5000 Syrian Armenians during the last six months of 2012.114 There is a possibility to further improve the coordination of the welcome policy for diaspora Armenians based on the experience of Israel (by guiding repatriates through the whole process of repatriation starting from the moment when they wish to do so).

4.4 Focus group responses from repatriates

Focus group discussions were organized with a total of 22 repatriates from Armenian diaspora communities of the Middle East in order to understand the main factors that motivated them to repatriate, and ones that would encourage their relocation to be long-term or permanent. A large majority of the participants repatriated prior to the conflict in Syria, although five of the interviewees repatriated as a direct result of the war.

Although the study looked at creating opportunities for business investment in Armenia, several participants in the study were students or those with professional backgrounds working in different organizations in the country. Reflecting the fact that Middle Eastern Armenian communities have a long tradition of entrepreneurship and a significant number who are craftsmen/artisans, several in the sample also belonged to the service sector.

Features of the 22 interviewees included:

- Gender: 73% male, 27% female
- Age: 45% under 30, 55% over 30
- Origin: 73% from Aleppo (Syria), 9% from Damascus (Syria), 9% from Iraq, 9% from Lebanon
- Marital status: 68% married, 32% never married
- Education: 27% master’s degree, 50% bachelor’s degree, 5% currently in university, 5% five completed high school, 5% partial high school, 9% grade school only
- Family unit: 45% repatriated to Armenia alone, 9% with a spouse only, 41% with spouse and children, 5% with their parents
- Current accommodation: 9% living in a rented private house, 14% in an owned private house, 36% in a rental apartment, 32% in an owned apartment, 5% with relatives, 5% with friends.

Several core areas of inquiry were defined for the interviews, the first of which was employment:

- 45% of respondents came from a science and engineering background, 37% from the business/craftsmen/service sector and 18% from the liberal arts
- 68% were employed prior to moving to Armenia; now 59% are employed, 18% are self-employed and 23% are out of work but actively seeking employment.
• Current type of employment includes business administration (27%), professional (32%) and manual labor (9%)
• 64% said their current work in Armenia matches their previous work experience, 18% said no
• 5% said their financial satisfaction after moving to Armenia was very good, 36% good, 27% fair, 14% unsatisfactory

The second area explored was the respondents’ motivations for repatriation and the circumstances of their relocation:
• 59% moved to Armenia because it was their homeland, 9% because of family, 5% because of living conditions, 9% percent to study or accept a position, and 14% because of instability in the countries they were living in.
• 55% said that they researched the repatriation process prior to moving, 27% said they didn’t plan
• 55% left behind immediate families, and 55% left behind ownership/belongings
• Major difficulties during and after relocation included lack of job opportunities (27%), the socio-economic climate in Armenia (23%), leaving behind family and friends (14%); 36% cited no difficulties
• 82% had visited Armenia prior to relocating there

The third area of questions concerned respondents’ views of the integration process:
• Language barriers (Eastern/Western Armenian): 59% found them not difficult, 36% difficult, 5% very difficult
• Transportation: 64% found it not difficult, 27% difficult, 5% very difficult
• 27% said it was not difficult to manage on their present salary level, 27% said difficult and 41% said very difficult
• Securing housing: 36% found it not difficult, 41% difficult, 23% very difficult
• Accessing services and facilities: 41% not difficult, 36% difficult, 18% very difficult.
• Finding jobs: 55% found it very difficult, 32% difficult, 14% not difficult
• Reception from the local population: 14% have had a bad experience, 18% said it was “weird”, 41% said it was normal, 27% said it has been very welcoming
• Intending to leave Armenia soon: 14% said yes, 67% no, 14% maybe
Would they advise other Armenians to move to Armenia? 68% said yes, 9% said no, 23% said maybe.

The fourth area of interview questions concerned sustainability and business opportunities:

- When asked what would it take to make living in Armenia a realistic option, 22% mentioned a fair tax system, 32% job opportunities and better salaries, 5% good investments, 23% better cultural/social factors, 18% couldn’t answer.
- Whether living in Armenia is sustainable for a second generation of repatriates, 54% said yes, 27% no, 14% maybe.

In their general comments, respondents said they believed that new opportunities for a better and more prosperous country would materialize once cultural differences dissipated. Most said that the homeland needs the diaspora as much as the diaspora needs the homeland. Others complained about corruption and the lack of a clear economic policy by the government. Some said that the country has become service-oriented (restaurants, cafes, hotels, retail chains) at the expense of industries with the potential to create more jobs. The tax system was also noted to be a serious burden to businesses; instead of easing taxes to encourage new diaspora investment, the government is increasing taxes, making it very difficult to start a new business.

### 4.5 Toward successful repatriation

Repatriation should be thought of as both a social trend and a state policy. On the one hand, there must be the political will to repatriate; on the other, there must be supportive conditions created for people willing to move to Armenia and start a new life there.

The experience of Middle Eastern repatriates interviewed for this chapter shows that the main reason why people take the decision to repatriate is the view that Armenia is the homeland of Armenians (and not, for instance, instability in their previous countries or an expectation of better living conditions). The decision is not purely emotional, however, since most of the repatriates rationally conducted research before moving to Armenia. The idealist component in the decision to repatriate is underlined by the fact that the overwhelming majority of those who return express no intention to leave and would advise other Armenians to follow their example.
The first recommendation, therefore, is the need to reinforce the concept of homeland as the main reason for diaspora Armenians to settle in Armenia. At the same time, however, the state must facilitate the process for those who decide to repatriate and help them to implement it.

Understandably, Middle Eastern repatriates did not find the language barrier (eastern/western Armenia) a difficulty for their integration. On the other hand, job opportunities and better salaries are mentioned as conditions for the sustainability of their choice to live in Armenia. The fact that the majority thinks that Armenia was sustainable to a second generation could also reflect hope that the conditions of better salaries and job opportunities will become a reality. As for their general complaints, the burden of taxes, corruption and the lack of a policy of industrialization are seen as major difficulties.

The second recommendation is therefore that the state must promote repatriation by identifying as top priorities the tasks of solving problems of housing, decent salaries and employment. It must also aim to ease the burden of taxes, create a better business climate and promote value-added economic sectors.
5. Recommendations

Drawn from this study, the following recommendations are aimed at reducing emigration and improving the situation in Armenia. They are based on answers from different focus groups, and reflect public opinion in Armenia. Even though society and the diaspora can contribute to the process of repatriation and resisting emigration, the role of the government in this process is essential. If the recommended measures are adopted by the Armenian government, they will help to reverse the tide of population decline and attract more immigrants and investments.

1. Jobs

The lack of employment is one of the main reasons influencing Armenians’ decision to emigrate. Most returned migrants interviewed said the main reason that might force them to re-emigrate would be a lack of employment. There are two potential solutions to this problem: job creation and labour market reforms to ensure that people are not overqualified for the job they are doing. The latter issue is dealt with in the next section (Education), which gives recommendations for improving the education system and giving professionals the necessary technical skills to meet labor market demands.

To create new jobs, investments should be made in Armenia’s economy and reforms should be implemented to improve the business environment (see section 3 below). Armenia is currently considered a risky zone for new investment because of geopolitical uncertainty, monopolies, and poor protection of property rights. While the government cannot do anything about the first factor, it is fully responsible for addressing monopolies and the protection of property rights. Small businesses should be enabled to do business on equal conditions with larger ones; this would allow many people have their own sources of income, jobs and business. The process should be implemented slowly, through a liberal market and tax policy. The experience of Georgia can be an example, since its reforms toward equal and liberal business conditions in the market have resulted in much foreign investment in its economy.

2. Educational system

According to respondents, there is no connection between universities and employers, and often universities do not know what employers need. Most educational institutions are
specialized in particular fields of study (medicine, architecture and engineering) and do not substantively differ from each other in terms of the range of offered programs. The main fields of study offered to future students are too broad and do not include specialization that would provide students with marketable skills. Academic fields are limited, with the most popular majors in international relations, political science, history, economics, management/marketing and law. Most of these graduates have difficulty finding jobs because the supply is much higher than the demand for those professions. On the other hand, there are jobs requiring specific skills in trades, and relatively few people who can do the work.

A solution is to create private colleges specialized in different sectors of trades and technical knowledge. The government could collect statistics about job trends in the market and provide licenses to private colleges to teach training programs in fields where labour demand exists. These colleges could also offer field placement, internships and volunteering to give graduates practical knowledge, work experience and contacts. This will help prepare skilled professionals and secure them employment; and it will help pass the skills and knowledge of the older generation down to youth.

3. Business environment

Since the driving force of the economy remains small and medium businesses, they should be more robustly encouraged to expand and operate. The government should continue reforms aimed at making business easier in Armenia, and improve the application of electronic tax reporting system by excluding precedents of check-up by tax officials without prior notice. Thus far, the government has carried out improvements enabling the easy registration of new businesses; however, the real challenges are connected with the application of those laws during business operations.

The government should also make massive reforms in the customs sector. It should provide easy and transparent customs procedures for import, as well as revise some duties and taxes that limit competition and development in a number of sectors. Such reforms were envisaged in the ruling political party’s platform before the recent presidential elections; if they are implemented, the business environment will be significantly improved.
4. Economic reforms to provide alternative mechanisms for regulation

The economic sector needs mechanisms to regulate business relations, since the judicial system is not fully independent and is often ineffective with respect to economic disputes. Currently the government is developing a bill for the purpose of creating an institution of mediation in Armenia, which would enable the resolution of disputes without the need for state participation. Another positive mechanism in the economy could be the adoption of the institution of a ‘financial ombudsman.’ Currently Armenia has the institution of a financial conciliator, with powers limited to mediation in the economy. Expansion of these powers could provide an alternative mechanism for protecting rights in the business environment.

5. Rule of law

Changes in the legal system and the application of law are needed to protect human rights. This is a very important factor in people’s attitude toward their future and their decision to emigrate: if they do not trust their government, they cannot hope for a better life in Armenia for their families and children. To restore trust in the government, there must be equal conditions for everyone in the business environment and everyone should be equal under the law, with no impunity for wrongdoing by police or persons with influence.

6. Legal consciousness

Armenian society lacks legal consciousness. As a young democracy, it changes its laws very often, and many relations are regulated not by laws but by government-issued administrative orders. Often people are unaware of these changes, and are not capable of protecting their rights. Government information about laws is not available to citizens, and web sites and other resources that contain such information are often not updated. Even if information is updated and posted, texts are not written clearly in an understandable manner. As well, people are not used to doing research and do not know where to begin getting familiar with their rights and responsibilities.
New public initiatives are needed to provide reliable information about laws, rights, regulations and their implications for citizens. This information should be spread through mass media (sites, social networks, blogs, radio, and television), which could also provide advisory support to citizens. It is important to raise legal consciousness at the local level through domestic efforts (as opposed to international organizations); this could be done by the government and nonprofits.

Because the judicial system is not independent, there is currently a problem with checks and balances. An alternative mechanism for the protection of human rights in relation to economic affairs could be an independent institution that would provide advisory support to citizens, help them to protect their rights, and involve media in making stories public.

7. Government accountability

One of the main reasons for recent trends toward long-term emigration is citizens’ alienation from and lack of trust in the government. Governmental institutions are not transparent, and mostly make decisions without public debate or publishing information in advance. Transparency of decision-making and good governance would significantly reduce the level of societal alienation from the government. It is true that the government is implementing reforms and social programs related to tax administration, the business environment, freedom of speech, the justice system and government transparency—but those reforms are very slow. They must be accelerated to produce visible results.

8. Cultural and social changes

More efforts should be made to promote the national culture among youth, along with innovations in music and arts. The unique mixture of jazz and folk music, global achievements in chess, bright exhibitions of Armenian artists, high quality shows on TV, open-air screening of Armenian movies and other events would promote the national identity and make life in Armenia more interesting for young people. Both the society and government would benefit from more availability of recreation to release societal tension.
9. Cooperation with the diaspora

The Armenian government should be more persistent in efforts for cooperation with the diaspora. The Ministry of Diaspora and forums with diaspora representatives will certainly contribute to better cooperation. However, better guarantees for protection of property rights and investments in Armenia are also needed to attract more investment and create jobs.

10. Repatriation policy

Even though Armenia organized the repatriation of immigrants from Syria after the crisis in the Middle East (and did so better than it managed inflow from Iraq), there is still room for improvement and better repatriation policies. The Ministry of Diaspora still lacks a clear strategy and action plan with long-term goals. The effective state program of repatriation and absorption on the part of Israel may be a good example both for Armenia’s local affairs and its relations with the diaspora. A strategy and plan with steps for repatriation should be developed, along with policies for simplified registration procedures, special accommodations for immigrant communities, counseling, and employment and training programs.

11. Immigrant settlement

Immigrants need local support to settle and adapt to their new life in Armenia. To make this process effective, the Ministry of Diaspora should establish community centres to provide information and support to newcomers. This could be done by providing basic information and connecting immigrants with case workers to guide them through the settlement process. Case workers in these centres should receive information from employment agencies, healthcare institutions, and other places in order to be able to provide centralized and comprehensive information to immigrants. Many diaspora organizations would raise funds to help the settlement of immigrants in Armenia through the creation of such centres. The centres should employ repatriates who have adapted to life in Armenia successfully and can guide others through the process.
References


Arushanyan, Y. (2011, December, Yerevan). “Sumgait: The Silence” unpublished master’s essay under the supervision of Khatchik Der-Ghoukassian, graduate the School of Political Science and International Affairs, American University of Armenia.


Yearbooks 2011. Yerevan State University publishing.


Web Resources:

www.ada.am  www.168.am
www.arlis.am  www.lin.am
www.armstat.am  www.aravot.am
www.asparez.am  www.arka.am
www.crrc.am  www.armenianow.com
www.crrc.am  www.armenianow.com
www.etf.eu  www.armtown.com
www.etf.org  www.asbarez.com
www.ev.am  www.ecolor.org
www.gov.am  www.epress.am
www.heritage.org  www.eurasianet.org
www.ichd.am  www.rferl.org
www.mss.am  www.golos.am
www.parliament.am  www.hetq.am
www.shirakcentre.org  www.hraparak.am
www.smsmta.am  www.ilur.am
www.worldbank.org  www.lragir.am
www.armenianow.com  www.lurer.com
www.armtown.com  www.migrocenter.ru
www.asparez.am  www.news.am
www.crrc.am  www.panarmenian.net
www.etf.eu  www.tert.am
Who else migrates from Armenia?
Evidence from intentions

Aleksandr Grigoryan¹
September 12, 2013

Abstract

The paper analyzes recent migration wave in Armenia, using data on emigration intentions. The fact of remittances signals non-migrants about attractive life conditions in a host country and amplifies intentions to emigrate. Having a migrant member in household is another factor fortifying emigration intentions, with a strong potential of chain migration. Education measures have no significant role in shaping intentions, indicating low selectivity among non-migrants on educational grounds. Instead, respondents with work status express more willingness to emigrate. When turning to revealed actions in a macroeconomic level, we find that an inflow of remittances entails additional emigration, confirming that stated intentions to emigrate cannot be overlooked. Summarizing facts and findings, our analysis points out the existence of mass migration in Armenia.

Keywords: Migration, remittances, intentions, development, households.
JEL Classifications: F22, J11, O11, O12, O15

Introduction

Migration is an inextricable part of development with complex implications for migrant sending societies (Massey (1988), Martin and Taylor (1996)). In a decision making level, migration is a familial arrangement with underlying contractual relationship between migrants and their families (Stark and Bloom (1985)). In a macroeconomy, among other consequences, migration entails flows of remittances, which may benefit societies in transition by reducing poverty (Adams and Page (2003)) and may hurt by distorting growth (Chami et al. (2003)).

¹ Assistant Professor at American University of Armenia and Affiliate Fellow at CERGE-EI, Prague. E-mail: aleksandr@aua.am. This research has been implemented in the scope of CRRC-Armenia Exploratory Research Fellowship Program, financed by the Carnegie Corporation of New York.
Overall, migration is a consequence of certain socio-economic, demographic and political interactions, and it further reshapes these interactions as a self-enforcing dynamic process. It is inherent to most developing countries, heterogeneous in political regimes, ethno-cultural heritage, socio-economic conditions and future opportunities.

Post Soviet states, as a specific bloc of developing world, had faced huge migration flows already at the early stage of independence, along with broken traditional trade links, reciprocal territorial claims, civil wars and ethnic cleansing. Armenia, among the most developed Soviet Republics during the Soviet era, had been given minimal opportunities to start building an independent, healthy-growing country with bright future. In 20 years of independence the country had been hit by numerous adverse shocks, while exhibiting low resilience and modest capability to absorb. In particular, Armenian policymakers are concerned with migration tendencies, inherited from the past and highly responsive to negative events. In this context, questions such as "What are the main factors influencing migration related decisions" and "How general is the tendency to emigrate?" are of central interest. In the paper, we address these questions by exploring determinants of emigration intentions for individuals, using Armenian microeconomic data from 2011-2012.

We construct a three-stage model, where in the first stage migration related decision is estimated for a migrant member in the past; in the second stage, given the probability of currently having a migrant in household, determinants of remittances are identified; and in the third stage, emigration intentions are estimated, given migration and remittance related decisions and controlling for individual- and household specific characteristics. We estimate two versions of the model, linear and nonlinear (recursive multivariate), and the estimation outcomes coincide in a qualitative sense.

The factor of remittances in our analysis is central. As the new economics of labor migration (NELM) literature points out (Lucas and Stark (1985), Stark and Bloom (1985)), once we realize that migration is a familial arrangement, remittances are commonly perceived as an instrument to establish and sustain contractual relationship between migrants and household members, aimed at maintaining the latter home. Our findings, nevertheless, foresee another

---

2 Migration flows between post Soviet countries had reached to about 2 million people in 1991 with a gradual decrease about 600,000 in 2002 (Tishkov et al. (2005)).

3 The second question can be rephrased as “Do people heavily condition emigration choice on their skills, abilities and other individual characteristics or they follow to the mass?”. 
role for remittances: it serves as a signal for non-migrants that there are certain opportunities to make money in a host country, strengthening their incentives to emigrate.

In this study, geography of households is essential for explaining remittances. Since the dataset is silent about migrants’ characteristics, we search for instruments to explain remittances and they turn to be mostly of spatial nature, such as rural versus urban areas, distance from the capital etc.

Extended household networks abroad is another crucial factor shaping incentives for nonmigrants to join household members and/or relatives abroad. Formation of network migration (Massey et al. (1993)) is time dependent, and observing concentration of Armenian emigrants in the last two decades, it becomes obvious that migration networks and systems are well established for the Armenian society. Our results suggest that once we control for the network, the role of a migrant member in household is deprived.

Special attention is paid to education. Our finding is that years of education and related factors have no impact on emigration intentions, leaving no room for migration selectivity on educational grounds. This evidence supports the hypothesis that society is closer to mass migration, when individual skill characteristics are not important and migration is perceived as massive phenomenon. Another evidence of mass migration is the irrelevance of household’s location area, rural versus urban^4.

The next key finding is that the work status, cetirus paribus, amplifies willingness to emigrate. We think that respondents with work status, more competitive in domestic labor market by selection, estimate their chances of success abroad better, translated into stronger willingness to emigrate. This result leaves no room for the neo-classical argument that the wage differential between home and host countries is central in migration decision (see Borjas (1987) and references therein).

Our microeconomic analysis uncovers important details on intentions, while the question “How effectively these intentions are translated into real actions?” remains open. In order to address this question, we construct a vector-autoregressive (VAR) macroeconomic model, remittances and migration flows added. We use Armenian quarterly data for the period 2000-2012 and draw impulse-response functions to assess the impact of remittances on migration.

^4 Households in rural areas are mainly involved in agriculture, distinguished by very low (relative) productivity (Begrakyan and Grigoryan (2012)). Insignificance of the rural dummy indicates the secondary role of productivity in shaping emigration intentions.
Our finding is that an unexpected increase in remittances generates excessive outflow of emigrants, supporting the argument that intentions are indeed credible signal for predicting the intensity of emigration in the near future. The pattern from the VAR model becomes more vivid, when shortening sample size towards more recent history\(^5\).

Our paper contributes to the migration literature in certain aspects. In addition to Rozelle et al. (1999)’s approach, we construct an alternative nonlinear, recursive multivariate model, which accounts for the probabilistic nature of the underlying relationship. Unlike Van Dalen et al. (2005), we take observations into the model for all individuals, with and without (i) migrants and/or (ii) remittances received. Finally, to our knowledge, this is the first attempt to study emigration intentions in a post Soviet state formally, which may help better understand the complexity behind migration related decisions in a specific pool of developing countries.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The relevant literature is briefly surveyed in Section 1. Section 2 provides data description and related background information. Description of econometric models and estimation results are in Section 3 and 4, respectively.

Section 5 covers macroeconomic analysis followed by concluding remarks. Most tables and graphs are displaced in Appendix.

\section*{1 Relevant literature}

Recent advances in migration studies highlight the complexity of migration-development interactions in migrant sending societies. The theoretical perspective of the issue stresses the importance of viewing migration as a developmental phenomenon (Massey (1988)), for which application of distinct theories in isolation may fail to uncover the complexity (de Haas (2010)). For the post Soviet camp, many features of international migration can be understood and interpreted within existing migration-development theories with the caveat that these societies share unique heritage and followed transition path. Tishkov et al. (2005) provide background information on the emergence of migration patterns in the post Soviet area.

In neo-classical models (Todaro (1969), Harris and Todaro (1970)) migration is an individual decision based on wage differentials, in which no role is given to intrafamily relationship. In contrast, as a new strand of literature, NELM considers migration as a family involved decision,\(^5\) We run the model for the period 2004-2012 and the significance as well the magnitude of the impact increase.

There are two types of motives explaining the existence and nature of remittances: altruism (Lucas and Stark (1985), Stark and Lucas (1988), Van Dalen et al. (2005), among others), and self-interest. In the second category there are numerous motives assuming implicit contractual relationship: bequest (Hoddinott (1994), Bernheim et al. (1985)), accumulation of wealth (Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2001)), covering educational costs of household members (Lucas and Stark (1985)), allocating risks (Stark and Lucas (1988), Cox et al. (1998)), exchange of various types of services with remittances (Rapoport and Docquier (2005)). A general theoretical model on interaction between the two parties under non-cooperative and cooperative scenarios is developed by Melkonyan and Grigorian (2011). As a distinct motive, remittances may encourage or discourage migration from a home country (e.g. Stark (1995), Van Dalen et al. (2005), Rapoport and Docquier (1998)). In the paper, we address the question in the context of the above literature, whenever applicable.

When turning to a migrant’s relation to household, whose members receive remittances, the migrant can be a member of an extended family (Alesina and Giuliano (2010)). We test the importance of an extended family and it turns to be significant.

There are only few papers studying the pattern of migration and consequences in Armenia formally. The closest to our work is Grigorian and Melkonyan (2011), who use household data from 2004 and estimate the model for 4 distinct variables (hours worked, expenditures on education, savings and borrowings from banks). They conclude that in Armenia remittancereceivers (i) work less, (ii) spend less on education of their children, "...perhaps expecting to migrate themselves...", as the authors state, (iii) accumulate more savings and (iv) do not borrow more. As Grigorian and Melkonyan (2011), we also use a three-stage empirical model by Rozelle et al. (1999).

We may compare our results with those in Grigorian and Melkonyan (2011) from the first two stages of regressions, namely, migration and remittance equations. Still, these results are not perfectly comparable due to different objects in the two dataset: Grigorian and Melkonyan (2011) use household level dataset with average years of education, number of working hours, percentage of women etc., while we explore individual dataset, in which respondents answer
questions on household’s structure but with lesser extent. The most striking difference in terms of results is that in Grigorian and Melkonyan (2011) having a migrant in household increases the probability of receiving remittances for household, while we find an opposite result. We think the difference is due to the fact that Grigorian and Melkonyan (2011) control duration of being away for migrants, while we do not.

Dermendzhieva (2011) provides a cross-country empirical evidence on labor migration for the countries in South Caucasus. The author finds no evidence of mass emigration among skilled workers. However, individuals with higher education are more likely to emigrate to high income OECD countries from the capital of Armenia. Despite the lack of clear evidence on brain drain, Dermendzhieva (2011) stresses that “... policy makers should be aware that the possibility of brain drain from the region towards high-income OECD destinations cannot be excluded”.

Studies on emigration intentions are very few too. Early papers, such as Taylor (1999), discuss determinants of willingness to emigrate informally. Van Dalen et al. (2005) takes a step ahead by properly estimating the impact of remittances on emigration intentions for Egypt, Turkey, and Morocco. We share some of the findings with Van Dalen et al. (2005): being a mail or having job amplifies emigration intentions. We also share the main finding with Van Dalen et al. (2005), which is higher remittances have a positive effect on emigration intentions, which may further escalate migration, particularly in Morocco.

2 Data description

We use household level data collected by European Training Foundation (ETF), conducted in the period December 24, 2011 - January 30, 2012. Randomly selected individuals have been asked questions on 5 groups of distinct characteristics: (i) education, skills and socio-demographic, (ii) work, (iii) intentions, (iv) expectations and (v) economic and living conditions of household. The title of the survey, Potential Migration Survey, reflects its primary objective, which is to disclose individuals’ intentions and expectations concerning emigration.

Number of respondents is 2630. After filtering variables due to the absence of answers for different reasons (refuse to answer, no answer, do not know and not applicable) we obtain around 2600 observations for most of the variables. Summary statistics of the main variables are reported in Table 1.
Table 1: Summary statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individual characteristics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>35.128</td>
<td>9.254</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>2622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (male=0, female=1)</td>
<td>0.645</td>
<td>0.479</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital status (single=0, married=1)</td>
<td>0.625</td>
<td>0.484</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital status among female</td>
<td>0.423</td>
<td>0.494</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intention to move abroad (yes=1)</td>
<td>0.339</td>
<td>0.473</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of dependents over 65</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.662</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of dependents under 18</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>1.154</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of schooling</td>
<td>12.131</td>
<td>2.448</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fit of education to work</td>
<td>2.319</td>
<td>1.038</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education level</td>
<td>4.358</td>
<td>1.415</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taking further education (yes=1)</td>
<td>0.194</td>
<td>0.396</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Work</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skill fit to work</td>
<td>6.713</td>
<td>5.517</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holding second job (yes=1)</td>
<td>0.062</td>
<td>0.242</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1704</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work status (working=1)</td>
<td>0.328</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hours worked</td>
<td>28.927</td>
<td>25.898</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>2503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work income, 1000 AMD</td>
<td>97.675</td>
<td>1591.064</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>77808</td>
<td>2396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Career perspectives</td>
<td>1.896</td>
<td>0.675</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Looking for job</td>
<td>0.597</td>
<td>0.491</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Household characteristics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remitt-s from household members, 1000 AMD</td>
<td>30.254</td>
<td>327.495</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11175</td>
<td>2488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-household remittances, 1000 AMD</td>
<td>123.825</td>
<td>1130.345</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>37250</td>
<td>2341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial situation of household</td>
<td>1.496</td>
<td>0.982</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households in rural areas</td>
<td>0.314</td>
<td>0.464</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House type (apartment=0, house=1)</td>
<td>0.543</td>
<td>0.531</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home ownership (rented=0, own=1)</td>
<td>0.958</td>
<td>0.202</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income from social transfers, 1000 AMD</td>
<td>18.289</td>
<td>33.372</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>2542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household size</td>
<td>4.742</td>
<td>1.86</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant(s) in household (migrant=1)</td>
<td>0.127</td>
<td>0.333</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of migrants in household</td>
<td>0.291</td>
<td>0.855</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of migrants in Euro-Asian Neighbors</td>
<td>0.223</td>
<td>0.743</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of migrants in EU members</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.197</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of migrants in USA and Canada</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.107</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance from Yerevan</td>
<td>1.179</td>
<td>0.954</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marz border with Azerbaijan</td>
<td>0.164</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marz border with Georgia</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.145</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural and border with Azerbaijan</td>
<td>0.089</td>
<td>0.285</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural and border with Georgia</td>
<td>0.090</td>
<td>0.287</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2622</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ETF Potential Migration Survey.
Families with migrant member(s) are 12.7 percent in the sample. This number is potentially underreported, but the fact that an interviewer is asked to report whether a family has a migrant or not, it narrows the scope of migration, as migrated households are excluded from the sample. In Caucasus Barometer Project\(^6\), interviewers are asked the question "Do you have a family member or close relative currently living abroad, outside the borders of country?", which involves migrated households too. For Armenia, positive answers in proportions for 2009, 2010 and 2011 are 0.59, 0.63 and 0.68, respectively, indicating growing emigration after the crisis.

33.93\% of respondents answered "yes" to the question "Are you thinking seriously to move abroad to live and work at the moment?". Important for our analysis, the question aims to disclose intentions on permanent emigration. It is then interesting to identify the percentage of respondents with emigration intentions belonging to households with migrant members. Table 4 indicates that out of 334 respondents, whose family members are abroad, 147 (45.37\%) intend to migrate, while only 32.46\% of respondents with families without migrants expressed intention to migrate. Simple tabulation is by far insufficient to state any direct relationship between remittances and intentions to emigrate, as it may owe to household and migrant specific factors, driving both variables to the same direction. Van Dalen et al. (2005), for example, find that such means difference is significant for Turkey, but when controlling migrant specific factors, the impact of remittances on intentions to emigrate becomes insignificant.

Remittances are observed throughout the last year, while the presence of a migrant in a family is identified during the interview. Considering that interviews have been launched during the period of migrants’ return, the mismatch between households with remittance receivers and non-migrants captures the seasonal pattern in migration. Table 5 indicates that the percentage of remittance receivers among non-migrant households are almost as many as households with migrants without remittances: out of 292 families, received remittances in the last year, 186 (63.7\%) report that there is no migrant in a family. On the other side, 189 (64.07\%) from 295 respondents with a migrant household member report zero remittances received\(^7\). The issue of underreporting, studied by Shonkwiler et al. (2011) for Armenia, may explain a part of discrepancy, in addition to that there can be (i) migrants who are at their

\(^6\) Dataset and related documentation can be found in http://www.crrccenters.org/caucasusbarometer/overview/.

\(^7\) The P-value of means difference test is 0.64.
early stage of migration and earnings are not sufficient to send remittances and (ii) long
term migrants, who stopped remitting to their household members at home. Grigorian and
Melkonyan (2011) estimate that the probability to receive remittances increases in the first 3–5
years, from 53 to 58%, and then decays approximately by the same rate\(^8\).

In Table 7 we tabulate the same variables, as in Table 6, but selecting households with
migrant(s). We ask whether the two distributions of emigration intentions, one unconditional
and the second conditional on current migrant(s), significantly differ from each other. We
construct the distributions in columns, percentages in parentheses. The key observation is
that once we control for families with migrant(s), intentions to migrate become stronger for
families both with and without remittances. We observe this by comparing the second row of
Table 7 with the corresponding row of Table 6.

There are some interesting observations, directly related to our study object. When
considering emigration as an option, 25% of respondents (218 out of 872) are looking for support
from relatives living abroad. 96.5% of responders, if migrating, will send money for first of
all "living expenses of family and relatives", supporting the evidence that remittance-receivers
are wealth constrained. Intention to move abroad is slightly lower among the respondents
with dependent(s) over 65 years (29.44%), while respondents with child dependents express
almost the same intention as the average respondent, 34.07%. Marital status and gender
separately do not align intention either - percentages on intention to move remain close to
30%, little less than the average intention, 33.93%.

Next we ask whether there is much difference in intentions to emigrate among households
in rural versus urban areas. We distinguish 3 types of residence: village, town and the capital.
Mean tests in Table 8 indicate that intentions are almost the same among respondents living
in the 3 areas. There is difference in intentions among the two pools of households, one
living in villages and the second in towns, at the 10% significance level, with slightly higher
intentions to emigrate in town areas. The last column in Table 8 provides total respondents in
two corresponding residence types. Overall, we do not see drastic differences in intentions in
rural versus urban areas, signaling that migration is a countrywide phenomenon and cannot
be merely explained by lower standard living in rural areas.

We take a step further and check whether intentions to emigrate among house owners

\(^8\) For discussion and references on remittances’ decay over time, see de Haas (2007).
vary depending on these 3 types of residence. Table 9 reports that intentions are slightly different among residents in villages and in Yerevan. The last column in Table 9 indicates that respondents in villages are around 2.5 larger than those in towns or Yerevan, reflecting the fact that in rural areas houses are dominant. This, however, does not change the overall pattern that emigration intentions do not change much when moving from rural to urban areas. Around one third of respondents express willingness to emigrate, no matter where they reside, in rural or urban areas and whether families own house or not.

Considering specific geopolitical situation, Armenia has been experiencing since the collapse of the Soviet Union, we also inspect the variation of intentions to emigrate along the regions\(^9\) bordered with Georgia and Azerbaijan. Respondents living in regions bordered with Azerbaijan express less intention to emigrate relative to the average (29.77 versus 33.93%). If we select rural areas, in addition to the border with Azerbaijan, then the number changes only slightly, 28.51%. Respondents in regions bordered with Georgia are more eager to migrate, 38.10 % and the number is little smaller in rural areas, 36.13%. Given the overall underdevelopment of infrastructures in remote areas, the ongoing military conflict with Azerbaijan potentially intensifies the willingness to migrate in the regions bordered with that country, but the argument is not supported by the data\(^10\).

Destination geography for potential migrants is mapped in Figure 4. Vast majority of respondents (61.43%) considers Russia as a host country. Comparing this number with Russia’s share of the Armenian diaspora from the map in Figure 5, 39.22%, it is evident that the composition of diaspora is changing in favor of Russia. Geography of intentions differs from that of diaspora significantly. In particular, South America and Middle East are the regions with large diaspora formed in the past, while these regions are out of interest for current (potential) migrants. Instead, Europe is of more interest with its high standard living conditions and relatively easy access.

Spatial dimension of individual’s emigration intentions in Marz level is in Figure 6. Couple of facts is worth noting: (i) Yerevan patterns an average level of emigration intentions, (ii) Syunik Marz, where the mining sector is dominant has lowest intentions\(^11\), (iii) Kotayk Marz,

---

9 An administrative region is called "Marz". Armenia has 10 Marzes and the Yerevan city.
10 This can be explained by the common perception, subject to challenge, that migration process has been stabilized in poorer and remote areas where households have either thoroughly migrated or stayed at home.
11 Grigoryan (2012) analyses the impact of mining sector on socio-economic indicators in Armenia. The key
with the largest share of manufacturing among Marzes reports highest intentions, and (iv) Shirak Marz, with the highest poverty rate (Figure 9) patterns the second largest intentions.

The next two maps in Figures 7 and 8 provide spatial dispersion on percentage of households with migrants and remitted, respectively. Syunik Marz reports the lowest values for these measures too, suggesting that it experiences minimum emigration and related consequences among Marzes and Yerevan. Gegharkunik Marz is the second lowest with migrant members (7.65%), while it has the second highest rate of remitted households (30.59%), providing an evidence on a high share of seasonal workers and/or strong extended family ties in the Marz. A similar pattern is observed for Shirak Marz.

3 Estimation

Our econometric model is aimed to capture determinants of migration intentions in a three-stage decision making framework. Households send migrants, who are expected to remit to their family members in the home country. In our case, if we observe a migrant in household, he is more likely to be permanent, since interviews had been launched during the winter holiday, when most of the seasonal migrants working in construction and services return home. Then, if observed migration is permanent, the following time structure can be placed\(^\text{12}\): (i) in the first stage household sends migrant(s), (ii) in the second stage a migrant makes decision concerning remittances and (iii) in the third stage an interviewed household member discloses her/his intentions to emigrate, given the migration status of household member(s) and their decisions to remit, among other (individual and household specific) factors. A three-stage framework in the migration literature had been used by Rozelle et al. (1999) and Grigorian and Melkonyan (2011), where the authors carry variables in the third stage different from migration intentions. As noted by these authors, there is interdependence between migration and remittances. Despite the time structure, many economic factors affect migration and remittances simultaneously, entering both regression equations. Then, unobserved factors create strong correlation between the two error terms.

\(^{12}\) The structure is somewhat conventional, as decisions concerning migration and remittances much depend on the same set of determinants, which makes these decisions simultaneous. We discuss this point below in detail. Then, our assumption on observing permanent, rather than temporary migration, is not binding, but simply helps to place a formal structure.
As for robustness, aimed to check the impact directions of determinants in the linear model, we estimate recursive multivariate probit model, where migration, remittances and (migration) intentions affect recursively - migration has an impact on remittances, and they both shape intentions. This model is a trivariate version of recursive bivariate probit model, discussed in Greene (2008). In order to compare outcomes of the two models, we use the same specification. For the benchmark specification two models yield identical results.

3.1 Linear model

The linear model consists of three equations: migration, remittances and intentions. The migration equation has the following form:

\[ M = \alpha_1 + \beta_1 \Omega + \gamma_1 ZM + eM, \]  

(1)

where \( \Omega \) is the vector of observed individual and household characteristics, entering as control variables in the model, \( ZM \) is the vector of excluded instruments for \( M \) and \( eM \) is the error term. As migrants’ characteristics are not observable, we need to identify migration by relevant instruments. We select instruments from (i) a subset of household characteristics, and (ii) regional level data on socio-economic and spatial factors.

In the second stage, given the migration status, decision on remittances is disclosed. The remittance equation is

\[ R = \alpha_2 + \beta_2 \Omega + \gamma_2 ZR + \theta_2 \bar{M} + eR, \]  

(2)

where \( ZR \) and \( \bar{M} \) are the excluded instruments of remittances and the instrumented migration, estimated from (1). Again, we select instruments from individual/household characteristics and regional dataset. In the last stage, an interviewed-household member discloses her/his willingness to emigrate, given the migrant status of some members in household and their decisions to remit. The equation takes the form of

\[ I = \alpha_3 + \beta_3 \Omega + \gamma_3 \bar{R} + \theta_3 \bar{M} + eI, \]  

(3)

where \( \bar{R} \) and \( \bar{M} \) are the expected values of remittances and migration, estimated from (1) and (2).

As mentioned, decisions concerning migration and remittances can be driven by common unobservable factors. For this reason, we estimate the model by 3SLS, which takes into account correlation between \( eM \) and \( eR \). We obtain iterated 3SLS estimates, which are
efficient relative to two-stage estimates, as the former is obtained by maximum likelihood estimation method\textsuperscript{13}.

For the migration equation, we use the following push factors from ETF Potential Migration dataset: household size, house type (house or apartment) and number of rooms. Following to the migration literature (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006), Grigorian and Melkonyan (2011)), we enrich the set of instruments with socio-economic and spatial factors in a regional level. In the migration equation we interact Gini index from 2009 with household size. The Gini index in 2009 captures the increased inequality in Armenia as a direct consequence of the world financial crisis, started in 2008\textsuperscript{14}. Households with many dependents in more unequal regions are potentially more vulnerable and to send migrants is less affordable due to binding wealth constraints. A positive coefficient will imply that large size households in more unequal regions are willing to send migrants.

The next regional variable in the migration equation is the corruption index, calculated from corruption perception index (CPI) by Transparency International\textsuperscript{15}. We develop a simple methodology to disaggregate CPI for regions (Marzes and capital Yerevan), using distance from capital, overall population and urban population as shares (centered to 1) with the weights 0.3, 0.3 and 0.4, respectively. We interact CPI from 2010 with household’s estimate of the neighborhood’s wellbeing\textsuperscript{16}, which scales transparency index upward for communities with better financial situation. We construct a measure for neighborhood’s wellbeing rather than households’ itself, in order to control for endogeneity, as household’s current financial situation depends much on migration in past, while community’s wellbeing is predetermined relative to single household’s financial situation. The way the index is disaggregated, identifies urban areas with relatively high standard living. In particular, Yerevan takes a large value as a (i) center with (ii) high population density.

We also control for spatial differences - a dummy variable taking value one if a region is

\textsuperscript{13} For comprehensive textbook discussion on 3SLS, see Greene (2008).
\textsuperscript{14} In 2009, the Gini index, averaged for 10 Marzes and capital, had increased from 32.30 to 33.59. The standard deviation of the index had also been expanded from 3.69 to 4.43, amplifying differences among regions. The Gini index and poverty rate series are constructed using Household Survey Data by National Statistical Service of the Republic of Armenia (NSSRA).
\textsuperscript{15} In fact, the index is an inverse of perceived corruption - the higher the value, the better the situation.
\textsuperscript{16} We have household’s rating on (i) its financial situation and (ii) its economic situation compared to other households in the neighborhood. Both variables have the same scale (from 0 to 4), which enables to construct another variable as a difference of the two, measuring financial/economic situation of the neighborhood.
bordered with Azerbaijan and otherwise zero, is another (excluded) instrument. Overall, we have 7 instruments for migration\textsuperscript{17}.

We use regional data on poverty rate from 2010 as an instrument for remittances in (2). For the poverty line we use the threshold 2 dollars a day per household member\textsuperscript{18}. Interactions of rural dummy with borderline (with Azerbaijan and Georgia) dummies provide two more instruments. Rural dummy itself is an instrument, as well as distance of the marz center from Yerevan. The last instrument is created by interacting household size with distance. Number of instruments in the remittance equation is six.

Our control variables in migration and remittances equations are marital status, work status, age, home ownership, gender, old dependents and wellbeing of neighborhood. All variables, apart from marital status, enter the intention equation (3).

### 3.2 Recursive multivariate model

Complementary to the linear model, we construct a recursive multivariate model with identical stages. In the literature, recursive bivariate models have been formulated by Maddala and Lee (1976) and Heckman (1978). As we have 3 stages, our model takes the multivariate (trivariate) form, as an extension of the bivariate model, in which the nature and the properties of the model are preserved. The model involves 3 equations with endogenous binary variables. In our case, the model takes the following form:

\[
M^* = \tilde{\alpha}_1 + \tilde{\beta}_1 \Omega + \tilde{\gamma}_1 ZM + \epsilon_M, [M = 1, \text{ if } M^* > 0] \tag{4}
\]

\[
R^* = \tilde{\alpha}_2 + \tilde{\beta}_2 \Omega + \tilde{\gamma}_2 ZR + \tilde{\theta}_2 M + \epsilon_R, [R = 1, \text{ if } R^* > 0] \tag{5}
\]

\[
I^* = \tilde{\alpha}_3 + \tilde{\beta}_3 \Omega + \tilde{\gamma}_3 R + \tilde{\theta}_3 M + \epsilon_I, [I^* = 1, \text{ if } I^* > \bar{I}^*]. \tag{6}
\]

Variable names are the same as in the linear model. Latent variables are in asterisk and can be properly interpreted. If intentions to migrate in past, given by \(M^* \in [0, 1]\) have been realized, we set \(M = 1\), otherwise \(M = 0\). Also, if a migrant has sent remittances with the amount \(R^*\), then \(R = 1\); otherwise \(R = 0\). Respondents’ intentions to emigrate may take any value in \([0, 1]\) in terms of probability, while they should report single number. For individual \(j\), there should be some \(\bar{I}^*_j \in [0, 1]\), such that if \(I^*_j > \bar{I}^*_j\), the individual expresses intention

\textsuperscript{17} Somewhat surprisingly, years of education is significant only in the migration equation, thus serving as an excluded instrument for it.

\textsuperscript{18} As for the Gini index, the source of data is Household Survey Data by NSSRA.
to emigrate, 1 = 1. Otherwise, 1^* ≤ \bar{T}^*_j, no intention is stated and 1 = 0. It is important to note that families, having no migrant at the interview moment, may receive remittances, which makes the model different from nested models with underlying decision three.

The vector of errors, (ε_M, ε_R, ε_I), is independently and identically distributed as trivariate normal, with the covariance matrix, involving nonzero off-diagonal elements ρ_{MR}, ρ_{MI} an ρ_{RI}. Correlation in error terms indicates the presence of endogeneity. For example, if Corr(ε_M, ε_R) = 0, then using the observed status of migration in (5) will lead to a biased estimate for \tilde{θ}_2.

We estimate the model by using the same set of instruments as in the linear model, by this effectively controlling for endogeneity.

Multivariate form of this class of models appears in the literature without recursive structure. Cappellari and Jenkins (2003) develop an algorithm for multivariate probit model with a structure similar to that of a seemingly unrelated regression. Nevertheless, from the descriptive part of the model it is straightforward to see, that the model can be extended to a recursive form.\footnote{Discussion with Stephen P. Jenkins has confirmed the argument. In our model, we have fully recursive structure without simultaneous relationship between endogenous variables. This makes the model identified (see, e.g, Maddala and Lee (1976)).}

In our model, there are 8 possible outcomes with corresponding joint probabilities. Cappellari and Jenkins (2003) write the particular probability for the trivariate case (page 280), and it is obvious from the formulation that nothing impedes to have a dummy endogenous variable in vectors X_2 and X_3, as long as the model is identified. We use the algorithm by Cappellari and Jenkins (2003) to estimate the model.

### 4 Estimation results

We have three narrative rich sets of estimates, which can be discussed within the framework of NELM and recently growing literature on migration and development. We analyze causal relationship based on the linear equation, but equivalently we would have identical argumentations based on the recursive multivariate model. In alternative specifications, next to the estimation results from the linear model, estimates from the recursive model will also be discussed, whenever applicable.
4.1 Migration equation

We start with the migration model, summarized in columns 2 and 3, Table 2. Households with many dependents are more likely to have migrant(s). On the other side, large size households in more unequal regions are less likely to have members abroad: in average, households’ income per capita decreases in size due to number of dependents and in more unequal regions these households are even poorer, which, cetirus paribus, makes more difficult to send migrants.

The wellbeing of neighborhood interacted with the corruption index identifies households in socially developed urban areas, Yerevan and surrounded towns. Probability for these households to have migrants is in average higher. This result may well depend on the distribution (in urban versus rural areas) of entirely migrated households. It might be the case that family unification abroad is more prevalent in rural areas, led to the observation that the share of households with migrant members is relatively larger in Yerevan and its agglomeration, as relatively more families are still to be unified. The map in Figure 7 provides some support to this argument (Lori Marz is exception).

The signs of coefficients for house type and number of rooms differ, despite the fact that both variables seem to measure the accumulated wealth for households. The issue is that houses outside Yerevan and the surrounded area are not priced significantly different from apartments, located in towns. This makes the variable house type an improper measure for household’s wealth. It rather distinguishes households with more dynastic values and strong social networks. This pattern is even significant in municipalities in Yerevan, where houses dominate. The positive coefficient suggests, that such a social capital facilitates to send household members abroad. Contrary to house type, the variable number of rooms better reflects the accumulated wealth of families - they involve both large houses and apartments, the latter being highly expensive in centers of most towns and the capital. Families with bigger houses or apartments are less likely to have a migrant.

Education of respondents appears only in the migration equation. We do not have an answer on to what extent respondents’ education represents average education of household members. Potential explanation for the positive coefficient for years of education will be that families with educated member(s) are more able to diversify household earning capacities by
Running the same model for only rural areas, education preserves the positive coefficient with a slight loss of significance (p-value = 0.136), after cleaning all irrelevant and non-significant variables.

### Table 2: Regression results from the linear model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Migration coefficient</th>
<th>Migration t-value</th>
<th>Remittances coefficient</th>
<th>Remittances t-value</th>
<th>Intentions coefficient</th>
<th>Intentions t-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Migration</td>
<td>-0.2747</td>
<td>[-1.941]*</td>
<td>0.3048</td>
<td>[2.159]**</td>
<td>0.4614</td>
<td>[3.094]**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remittances</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Instruments for migration</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household size</td>
<td>0.0493</td>
<td>[3.957]**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household size × Gini\textsubscript{2010}</td>
<td>-0.0007</td>
<td>[-2.135]**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fin_sit\textsubscript{neighb} Corr\textsubscript{2010}</td>
<td>0.0045</td>
<td>[3.892]**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House type</td>
<td>0.0319</td>
<td>[2.330]**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BorderAZE</td>
<td>-0.0763</td>
<td>[-4.155]**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rooms</td>
<td>-0.0312</td>
<td>[-6.022]**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of schooling</td>
<td>0.0041</td>
<td>[1.655]*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Instruments for remittances</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household size × Distance</td>
<td>0.0113</td>
<td>[3.652]**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance</td>
<td>-0.0933</td>
<td>[-4.791]**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty\textsubscript{2010}</td>
<td>0.0091</td>
<td>[5.223]**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>-0.0903</td>
<td>[-4.280]**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural × BorderAZE</td>
<td>0.1019</td>
<td>[3.345]**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural × BorderGEO</td>
<td>0.1263</td>
<td>[4.680]**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>-0.0356</td>
<td>[-2.328]**</td>
<td>-0.0661</td>
<td>[-3.367]**</td>
<td>0.1051</td>
<td>[4.200]**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work status</td>
<td>0.0021</td>
<td>[2.541]**</td>
<td>0.0022</td>
<td>[2.175]**</td>
<td>-0.0052</td>
<td>[-4.443]**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.0220</td>
<td>[2.690]</td>
<td>0.0377</td>
<td>[0.947]</td>
<td>-0.2058</td>
<td>[-4.149]**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home ownership</td>
<td>0.0395</td>
<td>[2.788]**</td>
<td>0.0414</td>
<td>[2.217]**</td>
<td>-0.1067</td>
<td>[-4.622]**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.0239</td>
<td>[-2.258]**</td>
<td>-0.0331</td>
<td>[-2.576]**</td>
<td>-0.0309</td>
<td>[-1.977]**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent (old)</td>
<td>-0.0165</td>
<td>[-1.543]</td>
<td>-0.0022</td>
<td>[-0.225]</td>
<td>-0.0440</td>
<td>[-3.785]**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fin sitneighb</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* t statistics in brackets
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Hansen statistic: 19.858 (p-value = 0.705).
Four individual characteristics from the set of control variables, married, work status, age and female, enter the migration model with significance, the first two with a negative and the last two with a positive sign. Given that no information is available on the relationship between an interviewer and a migrant, channels to explain these causal impacts are potentially several and not worth hypothesizing.

From household characteristics among the controls the presence of dependent(s) over 65 has a significant impact - probability to have a migrant for households with old dependents is smaller. This can be explained by the willingness to stay closer to parents among households headed by middle-age offspring.

### 4.2 Remittances

Columns 4-5 in Table 2 summarize the remittance equation. One of the central results of the paper is that migration enters the remittance equation with a negative sign. In another study for Armenia, Grigorian and Melkonyan (2011) report a positive coefficient, indicating that probability to receive remittances is higher among households with migrant(s). How come that in our model we have a negative coefficient? There are at least two complementary factors explaining the phenomenon. As argued above, we are more likely to observe permanent migrants, rather temporary. That is, the model does not properly distinguish households as potential remittance-receivers. The second argument is that the stock of permanent migrants has been continuously increased since independence and it comes natural to expect that many permanent migrants experience number of years abroad. If altruistic motives are dominant in remittance related decisions, then probability of sending remittances may get very low for such migrants. In fact, our information set identifies households with permanent migrants, for whom the presence of migrant member(s) may even decrease the probability of receiving remittances as it may hinder to have temporary migrants\(^\text{21}\), while households with temporary migrants, though not identified in the data, are by far more likely to receive remittances. This result is robust to many specifications, such as two-stage linear and bivariate probit specifications, in which intention equation is

\(^{21}\) The fact of remittances is perceived as a signal for non-migrants what will be earnings abroad, if migrated. Adequately, if the migrant-member fails to send remittances, this creates disincentives for non-migrants to emigrate.
dismissed. Household specific instruments for migration play a crucial rule in determining such a (negative) causal impact.

Potentially, this result hinges on the fact that migrants’ characteristics are missing in the dataset. In particular, earnings of a migrant and the strength of family ties between household/respondent and the migrant are important determinants to control for. In our analysis, we retrieve the exogenous part of migration intentions, which is barely explained by household (and individual) characteristics and regional variables. If, however, we expect that migrant’s characteristics also affect directly on decision whether to remit or not, they should be in the set of covariates in the remittance equation. This is exactly the endogenoeity problem, controlled in the model. In what follows, the impact of migration on remittances may differ from our finding, if there are migrant’s characteristics, which merely affect on the migration decision, taking a role of an additional instrument with an opposite impact.

We have 6 excluded instruments for the remittance equation. Households’ distance from the capital decreases probability to receive remittances. Nevertheless, if these households are distinguished by a large size (interaction between household size and distance), the probability increases\textsuperscript{22}. Poverty rate in 2010 played a positive role to explain increased remittances by the end of 2011. Correlation between distance and poverty 2010 is fairly high, 0.774, but still the pure impact of poverty rate is significant and positive. Households in rural areas are less likely to receive remittances. But if we identify households in Marzes bordered with Azerbaijan and Georgia, in average, they have more chances to receive remittances.

Contrary to the migration equation, where household characteristics and social factors served as instruments are prevalent, in the remittance equation the dominance accrues to spatial factors. There can be at least two reasons: (i) households are spatially clustered based on certain characteristics (wealth, business activity type, vulnerability towards external shocks etc), which drives corresponding, cluster-specific decisions concerning remittances and (ii) social norms, which are region specific and projected to migrants’ uniform behavior, disciplined by households through social sanctions\textsuperscript{23}.

Among control variables, it is worth mentioning the negative sign for the variable dependents

\textsuperscript{22} Large size households in remote areas are expected to be more vulnerable with low long run income and they are likely to receive remittances based on altruistic motives. See, e.g., Rapoport and Docquier (2005).

\textsuperscript{23} An interesting discussion on the topic can be found in Rapoport and Docquier (2005).
Perhaps the reason is that migrants do not invest in sharing inheritance, since the heir in household will bequeath the whole accumulated wealth in form of house/apartment and related economy.

4.3 Intentions

Estimation results for intentions equation are in columns 6 and 7, Table 2. The impacts of migration and remittances on intentions are of primary interest for this paper. Both affect remittances positively, signaling about the possibility of migration chain, which is current migration begets migration in future. Emigration intentions increase for respondents, whose households have a migrant member. Having a migrant member abroad, it facilitates emigration by pooling accommodation and job finding risks in a host country.

The fact of remittances fortifies incentives to emigrate, serving as a credible signal on better opportunities for work and earnings abroad. The NELM literature discusses the role of remittances in the light of contractual relationship between migrant and non-migrant members, stressing on an opposite causal relationship between remittances and emigration intentions. For example, Stark (1995) develops a game, in which strategic interaction between the parties takes place through remittances in order to maintain a non-migrant home\(^{24}\). In our case, the fact of\(^{25}\) remittances amplify incentives for a non-migrant to follow destiny of a migrant member.

Individual specific factors, such as skill or ability, determine the extent of migration (human factor) selectivity within the pool of potential migrants. In this aspect, we do not observe selectivity among respondents on educational grounds. Based on this result we put forward the hypothesis of mass migration, Armenia is currently experiencing, at least as far as it concerns education. Construction (21.26%), service (22.18%) and manufacturing (18.11%) are the main sectors respondents intend to work, and only 15.36% of them think that the work abroad will correspond their educational qualifications.

\(^{24}\) Such a relationship is sustainable if individual productivities of migrants are not perfectly observable in a host country.

\(^{25}\) We use dummy variable for the series of remittances. There are at least two reason to convert the series with a continuous range into a dichotomous variable: (i) remittances are systematically underreported (see Shonkwiler et al. (2011)) and (ii) our model is probabilistic and remittances, as an endogenous continuous variable, would change that nature. Nevertheless, in Section 4.4 we estimate the model with volumes of remittances when checking sensitivity of the model.
Table 3: Regression results from the recursive multivariate model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Migration coefficient</th>
<th>Remittances coefficient</th>
<th>Intentions coefficient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>t-value</td>
<td>t-value</td>
<td>t-value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration</td>
<td>-0.4224</td>
<td>0.7760</td>
<td>0.5321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remittances</td>
<td>[-1.784]*</td>
<td>[3.058]**</td>
<td>[2.035]**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Instruments for migration**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>t-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Household size</td>
<td>0.1989</td>
<td>[3.150]**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household size × Gini2010</td>
<td>-0.0025</td>
<td>[-1.569]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fin_sit_neighb × Corr2010</td>
<td>0.0224</td>
<td>[3.610]**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House type</td>
<td>0.1506</td>
<td>[2.051]**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BorderAZE</td>
<td>-0.4213</td>
<td>[-4.097]**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rooms</td>
<td>-0.1340</td>
<td>[-3.921]**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of schooling</td>
<td>0.0192</td>
<td>[1.358]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Instruments for remittances**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>t-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Household size × Distance</td>
<td>0.0333</td>
<td>[3.111]**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance</td>
<td>-0.3281</td>
<td>[-4.347]**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty2010</td>
<td>0.0348</td>
<td>[4.590]**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>-0.3724</td>
<td>[-3.905]**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural × BorderAZE</td>
<td>0.4537</td>
<td>[3.269]**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural × BorderGEO</td>
<td>0.4546</td>
<td>[4.279]**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Control variables**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>t-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>-0.4529</td>
<td>[-6.017]**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work status</td>
<td>-0.1665</td>
<td>[-2.164]**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.0089</td>
<td>[2.159]**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home ownership</td>
<td>0.1527</td>
<td>[0.792]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.2198</td>
<td>[2.936]**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent (old)</td>
<td>-0.1352</td>
<td>[-2.579]**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fin sitneigh</td>
<td>-0.0807</td>
<td>[-1.394]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**t statistics in brackets**

* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. ρ12 = 0.772, ρ13 = -0.332, ρ23 = -0.312.
among other risks. This is what the neo-classical theory would predict, in which migration decision hinges on earning differentials (Sjaastad (1962), Borjas (1987)). In fact, it may well happen that individuals with work status are not saturated from employment conditions, while the indicator effectively selects respondents, competitive in labor market with potentially larger opportunities overseas. This may drive respondents with work status in home country to emigrate.

Better financial situation in the neighborhood drops emigration intentions, indicating the importance of externality for individuals, created by surrounding social environment. The rest of the controls (age, home ownership, gender and dependent over 65 ) enter the intentions equation with a negative sign, and they are self-explanatory. The set of potential controls is fairly large, while only few of them are significant, indicating overall low selectivity in individual and household characteristics in a migration related decision.

### 4.4 Alternative measures

We provide some alternative measures for different variables to check the sensitivity of our results. For some of the specifications the recursive model is not applicable due to the continuous range of dependent variables. We first analyze the role of migration network using a different variable for remittances. Then we introduce numbers of migrant members in household and volumes of remittances instead of corresponding binary variables.

Migration network plays a certain role in explaining emigration tendencies in Armenia. Over the last 20 years, a new diaspora has been formed along the continual process of emigration. Geography of the young diaspora covers post Soviet countries (mostly Russia and Ukraine) USA and Europe (Germany, France).

In order to assess the impact of migration network on emigration intentions, we use the flows of remittances received from all sources, outside the country. Remittances, sent by remote relatives and friends, signal about the strength of network, which cares about household and may facilitate emigration process for some of the non-migrants in household. Table 10 reports the estimates from the linear model with the new indicator of remittances (otherwise

---

26 IOM (2008) provides estimates of Armenian emigrants in top countries of destination for 2005. A different estimate is provided ILO (2009) for the period 2002-2007. More recent figures on emigration stock can be found in EUI (2013), in which USA leads the country list.
the same, as the one in Table 2). Once remittances from all sources are taken to the model, presence of a migrant member in household becomes insignificant in remittance and intention equations. If we agree that involving remittances from all sources is a proper measure for the strength of migration network, then the fact that it crowds out the factor of a migrant member in household indicates the key (and somewhat dominant) role of migration network. The presence of migrant members in households remains significant in the intentions equation for the recursive model, however, it fails to explain remittances (Table 11).

When using number of migrants in household as a measure for migration, estimation results do not change qualitatively - both significance and direction of impacts are preserved. The previous result can be reformulated: the more migrants in household, the lower the probability to be remitted in the second stage, and the higher the intentions to emigrate in the third stage. This argument suggests that family unification, if any, is more likely to take place in a host country, since along the increase in the migration stock, resources are redistributed in favor of migrant members, while intentions to emigrate and join the family increase. The family unification process creates chain migration.

Our model is robust to the use of actual volumes of remittances. The only minor difference is that the interaction variable for household size and Gini index (served as an instrument for migration) becomes insignificant. When using numbers of migrants with volumes of remittances, the previous outcome is preserved. We conclude that not only the fact of remittances is important for intentions, but also the volume providing more detailed information about migrants’ wellbeing.

Using number of migrants and volumes of remittances instead of indicator functions create sample selection issues. The mass concentrated at zero for these variables introduces bias and destroys reported coefficients. Unfortunately, we cannot estimate the equations stepwise correcting the bias by Heckman-type procedure, as the relationship will be nonlinear and the expectation operator does not pass through. Our recursive model accounts both for nonlinearity and sample selection, but it uses indicator functions.

We complete our microeconomic analysis and move to macroeconomics, aimed to uncover how effectively stated intentions can be translated to revealed actions.

---

27 See, e.g., Heckman (1976).
28 For discussion on the topic, see e.g. Wooldridge (2010), Chapter 15.
5 Macroeconomic analysis

The early stage of emigration flaws in Armenia had started before the collapse of the Soviet Empire - after the Spitak earthquake in 1988, around 200,000 Armenians have left the country. Then, the territorial conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, the active phase started in 1988-1989, had entailed two-direction migration flows: around 170,000 Azerbaijanis left Armenia and around 360,000 Armenians immigrated to the country from Azerbaijan (Yeghiazaryan et al. (2003)). The next wave of migration had started right after the independence in 1991, when economic conditions had continuously been deteriorated due to broken traditional trade links with the rest of the post Soviet camp and the military phase of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, 1991-1994. According to different estimates, around 800,000 Armenians had left the country during the period 1991-2001. In the first decade of independence, two major outflows had been reported, 1991-95 and 1999-2001, the latter wave mostly conditioned by strong disappointment of the nation from government’s inability on taking substantial steps towards sustainable development.

Taking a closer look at the country’s recent history and current tendencies, it seems emigration incentives among distinct classes of population reflect general dissatisfaction from the country’s course of development. A double-digit growth rate of GDP and significant improvement in poverty and inequality indexes in the period 2001-2008 have played little role in pooling down strong incentives to leave the home country and join the fast-growing Armenian young diaspora. As mentioned above, migration is perceived as a pattern intrinsic to development, but geopolitical environment specific to Armenia makes the issue sensitive to national security, since human capital in Armenia has been traditionally acknowledged as a leading factor for the long term development.

Despite the huge outflow of population in the first decade, emigration has continued to be a major concern for policymakers in the new millennium. Figure 1 reflects this reality. In particular, we observe population inflow for the period 2004-2006, but then the pattern of emigration has been recovered, perpetuated by the world financial-economic crisis started in 2008.

Melkonyan and Grigorian (2011) discuss the early transition path from the migration viewpoint. An in-fact ongoing military conflict with Azerbaijan is another convincing argument that government needs to take substantial steps to reverse the current tendency in migration.
In this section we ask how effectively stated preferences in terms of emigration intentions are transformed into revealed actions. In particular we ask, whether amplified intentions are projected to amplified emigration in response to remittances. In order to provide some evidence addressing to the question, we construct a recursive VAR model for the Armenian economy, for the period 2000-2012, using quarterly data. From the timing viewpoint, it seems logical to provide evidence from revealed actions covering the last decade or so, and then move to the microeconomic study, based on 2011-2012 data. We reverse the order, by this stressing the importance of microeconomic results, supported by macro evidence in the near past.

Our VAR has a recursive structure going back to Sims (1980). The classical literature distinguishes two classes of (policy oriented) VAR models, monetary (Sims (1980), Bernanke and Blinder (1992)) and fiscal (Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Fats and Mihov (2001)). The latter class, nevertheless, involves a monetary policy component such as interest rate, making the model more general\textsuperscript{31}. We model the economy as a mix of the two VAR-s, having tax collections as fiscal and exchange rate as monetary policy ingredients. Our list of variables, with a recursive order is as follows: (i) remittances, (ii) GDP, (iii) nominal exchange rate, (iv)

\textsuperscript{31} In fiscal VAR-s monetary indicators respond to the rest of the economy and embedded in the set of non-policy variables (Rebei (2004)).
taxes and (v) net migration (immigration minus emigration)\textsuperscript{32}. The intuition behind is that first the economy is shocked by the flow of remittances, then the overall economic activity takes place, resulting in equilibrium exchange rate, after the amount of collected taxes is disclosed and in the final stage migration related decisions are made. The recursive structure ensures that the shock remittances affects all other variables in the current period, a shock on GDP affects all other variables in current period except remittances etc. We put remittances in the first order, as they are determined outside country (it is strongly correlated with Russia’s GDP growth rate, IMF (2012), Figure 6) and directly condition the level of economic activity in the country. Migration, on the other side, is very endogenous to the ongoing macroeconomic processes and outcomes and hence we place it the last in the variables’ order.

GDP, exchange rate and tax collections are the gaps from their natural levels\textsuperscript{33}, remittances are in first difference and net migration is in gap\textsuperscript{34}, but taking the level for the latter leads to identical results\textsuperscript{35}. All variables are seasonally adjusted. Time series of the variables are plotted in Figures 10-13.

![Figure 2: The response of net migration in thousands one-standard deviation shock to first differenced remittances. Time span: 2000Q1 - 2012Q4.](image)

We restrict our attention to structural impulse-response functions, in particular, the impact of one-standard deviation shock on remittances to net migration. Impulse-responses for the

\textsuperscript{32} Initially, we ran the model with inflation, but since it has no role in shaping outcomes, we excluded from the model.

\textsuperscript{33} GDP and tax collection gaps are in percents, nominal exchange rate is in national currency (AMD) units.

\textsuperscript{34} We take first difference for remittances as it patterns more variation and no-autocorrelation compared to the gap.

\textsuperscript{35} In both cases the stability condition for VAR is met.
full sample are drawn in Figure 14. We highlight the impulse-response of remittances on migration in Figure 2, indicating the significance of the impact for the current quarter. We find that remittances of 21.938 mln USD received leads to additional 1367 emigrants. Within the year, the cumulative stock of migration remains in favor of emigrants, 1281.

When taking a short sample, 2004Q1 - 2012Q4, closer to recent tendencies in the economy, the pattern is even more intense: remittances amounted to 34 mln USD entails additional outflow of 3253 migrants. If compared to the full sample, then the same amount of remittances, (21.938 mln USD) generates 2100 emigrants, about 1.5 times more. This is an evidence that the adverse impact of remittances is even stronger, if moving closer to the recent tendencies in the economy. The sample size is too short for analyzing the post-crisis period (2008 onwards), but the structural relationship between remittances and net migration is expected to be preserved, given the consistent increase in remittances after the sadden drop in 2009 and growing emigration.

From the VAR-based evidence we stress high sensitivity of GDP growth from remittances. One can state the nexus of remittances, growth and migration - remittances generously stimulate short-run economic growth, but it comes at the expense of excessive emigration. This, we believe, stands as a major challenge for Armenian governments: past, current and near future.
Concluding remarks

Post Soviet history distinguishes several waves of migration in Armenia, fairly diverse in terms of reasons and consequences. The recent migration wave, evolved along the world financial-economic crisis started in 2008, seems to be a serious challenge for policymakers from demographic and socio-economic perspectives. In this paper we take a step on this direction and study the determinants of migration using data on intentions.

We find that intentions are amplified if they receive remittances or if there is a migrant member in household. In some other societies these factors may create disincentives to emigrate, but not in Armenia. The next finding is that education seems to have no role in shaping intentions - respondents express willingness to migrate unconditional on the years and type of education. From this point of view, we deal with mass migration in Armenia.

Work status, nevertheless, matters and affects intentions positively. How to interpret this result? It can be that respondents with work status are selected based on skills and abilities and consider that migration will open more opportunities to further raise their life standard. But it may equally be that work status involves large diversity of skills and abilities and in average respondents with the status intend to emigrate in order to get better opportunities.

Macroeconomic analysis reveals certain relationship between migration and remittances. Our results from vector-autoregressive model confirm that additional remittances entail a new emigration flow (while stimulating short term growth), suggesting that observed intentions can be translated to real actions.

Given the above outcomes, how should the public policy, aimed at reducing (if not reverting) migration, be designed? The objective itself is subject to challenge from the viewpoint of migration-development literature, but the fact that huge outflows of migration since independence has adversely changed the demography of the country, justifies the above objective. For Armenia, central to the issue is the threat of chain migration, when migration becomes self-perpetuating by the help of strong migration networks (Massey (1988)). Descriptive statistics and regression outcomes support the existence of chain migration in modern Armenia, which, as the literature alerts (de Haas (2007)), may go on ad-infinitum.

We developed several alternative models, in which work status is taken as an endogenous variable. Despite our efforts to find proper instruments for work status, no specification passed the endogeneity test, and consequently we treat the variable as exogenous.
Our findings suggest that public policies should be effectively addressed to the needs of households, which have already established connections abroad. Are these households more socially vulnerable relative to the rest of the society? According to respondents’ perceptions about their households’ financial situation (absolute and relative to the neighborhood), the only small positive difference is reported for households with remittances, compared to the average. It also turns out that unemployment rate for respondents, remitted and with intentions, is only slightly larger than the average rate (38.73% versus 35.92%), suggesting that the issue is beyond the work status. Then, if households with connections abroad are otherwise the same as the rest of the society, how should the economic policy discriminate the two classes?

Perceptions are central in a migration related decision. They absorb long term trends in a development course of a country and form incentives for migration. In our study, we do not observe perceptions, but the evidence on mass migration and rejection of a simple wage-differential argument infer that migration causes in Armenia are rather long lived and hence institutional, and short-term policy adjustments cannot address the issue. In these circumstances, large scale public policies are needed with new institutional arrangements, designed for the entire society. What should be these arrangements depends on expectations of society members, the latter hinging on incentives. The circle repeats back and the bottom line is that for policy analysis we need to observe perceptions, in order to answer the question "Why these people emigrate?".

6 Appendix

Table 4: Cross tabulation (variables in bold)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intention to move abroad</th>
<th>No migrant in a family</th>
<th>Migrant in a family</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stay at home</td>
<td>1,550</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>1,737</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intention to migrate</td>
<td>745</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,295</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>2,629</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ETF Potential Migration Survey.
### Table 5: Cross tabulation (variables in bold)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Migrant in family</th>
<th>No remittances sent</th>
<th>Remittances sent</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No migrant in a family</td>
<td>2,015</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>2,201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant in a family</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,204</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>2,496</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ETF Potential Migration Survey.

### Table 6: Cross tabulation (variables in bold)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intention to move abroad</th>
<th>No remittances sent</th>
<th>Remittances sent</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stay at home</td>
<td>1,484 (67.36%)</td>
<td>163 (55.82%)</td>
<td>1,647</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intention to migrate</td>
<td>719 (32.64%)</td>
<td>129 (44.18%)</td>
<td>848</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,203 (100%)</td>
<td>292 (100%)</td>
<td>2,495</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ETF Potential Migration Survey.

### Table 7: Cross tabulation (variables in bold) for households with current migrant(s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intention to move abroad</th>
<th>No remittances sent</th>
<th>Remittances sent</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stay at home</td>
<td>116 (61.70%)</td>
<td>49 (46.22%)</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intention to migrate</td>
<td>72 (38.20%)</td>
<td>57 (53.78%)</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>188 (100%)</td>
<td>106 (100%)</td>
<td>294</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ETF Potential Migration Survey.
Table 8: Average intention to emigrate in villages, towns and capital. Standard errors are in parentheses, * - significance at 10% level.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Respondents in villages</th>
<th>Respondents in towns</th>
<th>Total in each category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intention (yes=1, no=0)</td>
<td>0.316* (.016) in villages</td>
<td>0.357* (.017) in capital</td>
<td>823, 814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intention</td>
<td>0.316 (.016) in villages</td>
<td>0.344 (.015) in capital</td>
<td>823, 992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intention</td>
<td>0.357 (.016) in villages</td>
<td>0.344 (.015) in capital</td>
<td>814, 992</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ETF Potential Migration Survey.

Table 9: Average intention to emigrate among house owners in villages, towns and capital. Standard errors are in parentheses, * - significance at 10% level.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Respondents in villages</th>
<th>Respondents in towns</th>
<th>Total in each category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intention (yes=1, no=0)</td>
<td>0.305 (.017) in villages</td>
<td>0.349 (.028) in capital</td>
<td>747, 292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intention</td>
<td>0.305* (.017) in villages</td>
<td>0.364* (.028) in capital</td>
<td>747, 297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intention</td>
<td>0.349 (.028) in villages</td>
<td>0.364 (.028) in capital</td>
<td>292, 297</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ETF Potential Migration Survey.
Figure 4: Geography of emigration intentions
Figure 5: Geography of Armenian diaspora. Data source: http://www.armeniadiaspora.com/population.html
Figure 6: Percentage of individuals with emigration intentions

Figure 7: Percentage of households with migrant(s).
Figure 8: Percentage of remitted households

Figure 9: Poverty rates from 2010. Source: Household Survey Dataset, NSSRA.
Table 10: Regression results from the linear model: remittances from all sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Migration coefficient</th>
<th>Remittances coefficient</th>
<th>Intentions coefficient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>t-value</td>
<td>t-value</td>
<td>t-value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration</td>
<td>-0.1024 [-0.676]*</td>
<td>0.2122 [1.463]</td>
<td>0.4420 [3.118]***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remittances</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Instruments for migration**
- Household size: 0.0401 [3.096]***
- Household size × Gini 2010: -0.0004 [-1.303]
- Fin_sit_neighb × Corr 2010: 0.0047 [3.875]***
- House type: 0.0359 [2.506]**
- BorderAZE: -0.0661 [-3.495]***
- Rooms: -0.0336 [-6.281]***
- Years of schooling: 0.0045 [1.731]*

**Instruments for remittances**
- Household size × Distance: 0.00120 [3.500]***
- Distance: -0.0983 [-4.561]***
- Poverty 2010: 0.0094 [4.893]***
- Rural: -0.0909 [-3.894]***
- Rural × BorderAZE: 0.1031 [3.045]***
- Rural × BorderGEO: 0.1272 [4.210]***

**Control variables**
- Married: -0.0948 [-6.281]*** -0.0586 [-2.563]**
- Work status: -0.0359 [-2.341]** -0.0853 [-4.107]*** 0.1118 [4.359]***
- Age: 0.0020 [2.479]** 0.0024 [2.157]** -0.0052 [-4.453]***
- Home ownership: 0.0227 [0.713] -0.0314 [-0.745] -0.1744 [-3.580]***
- Female: 0.0396 [2.798]*** 0.0343 [1.734]* -0.1020 [-4.514]***
- Dependent (old): -0.0232 [-2.185]** -0.0298 [-2.185]** -0.0332 [-2.163]**
- Fin sitneighb: -0.0175 [-1.595] -0.0036 [-0.357] -0.0434 [-3.757]***

**t statistics in brackets**
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Hansen statistic: 23.705 (p-value = 0.477)
Table 11: Regression results from the recursive multivariate model: remittances from all sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Migration</th>
<th>Remittances</th>
<th>Intentions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>coefficient</td>
<td>t -value</td>
<td>coefficient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration</td>
<td>-0.2362</td>
<td>[-0.749]</td>
<td>0.6129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remittances</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Instruments for migration**

<p>| | | | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Household size</td>
<td>0.1507</td>
<td>[2.125]**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household size × Gini2010</td>
<td>-0.0014</td>
<td>[-0.825]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fin_sit_neighb × Corr2010</td>
<td>0.0242</td>
<td>[3.638]***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House type</td>
<td>0.1576</td>
<td>[2.120]**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BorderAZE</td>
<td>-0.3584</td>
<td>[-3.470]***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rooms</td>
<td>-0.1463</td>
<td>[-4.344]***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of schooling</td>
<td>0.0205</td>
<td>[1.436]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Instruments for remittances**

<p>| | | | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Household size × Distance</td>
<td>0.0342</td>
<td>[3.306]***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance</td>
<td>-0.3107</td>
<td>[-4.366]***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty2010</td>
<td>0.0314</td>
<td>[4.603]***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>-0.3249</td>
<td>[-3.858]***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural × BorderAZE</td>
<td>0.3657</td>
<td>[2.819]***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural × BorderGEO</td>
<td>0.4101</td>
<td>[4.096]***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Control variables**

<p>| | | | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>-0.4287</td>
<td>[-5.594]***</td>
<td>-0.1876</td>
<td>[-2.618]***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work status</td>
<td>-0.1917</td>
<td>[-2.492]**</td>
<td>-0.2778</td>
<td>[-4.314]***</td>
<td>0.2737</td>
<td>[4.371]***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.0087</td>
<td>[2.080]**</td>
<td>0.0075</td>
<td>[2.152]**</td>
<td>-0.0136</td>
<td>[-4.417]***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home ownership</td>
<td>0.1689</td>
<td>[0.885]</td>
<td>-0.0645</td>
<td>[-0.451]</td>
<td>-0.4512</td>
<td>[-3.490]***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.2286</td>
<td>[3.000]***</td>
<td>0.1207</td>
<td>[1.833]*</td>
<td>-0.2648</td>
<td>[-4.635]***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent (old)</td>
<td>-0.1272</td>
<td>[-2.368]**</td>
<td>-0.0942</td>
<td>[-2.050]**</td>
<td>-0.1024</td>
<td>[-2.490]**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fin sitneighb</td>
<td>-0.0895</td>
<td>[-1.494]</td>
<td>-0.0042</td>
<td>[-0.122]</td>
<td>-0.1226</td>
<td>[-4.055]***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

t statistics in brackets

* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. ρ_{12} = 0.700, ρ_{13} = −0.328, ρ_{23} = −0.412.
Figure 10: Net migration (number of individuals). Source: State Migration Service of Armenia

Figure 11: Net migration (number of individuals). Source: State Migration Service of Armenia
Figure 12: Remittances in current USD mln. Source: National Statistical Service of Republic of Armenia.

Figure 13: GDP gap, nominal exchange rate gap and tax revenue gap. Source: National Statistical Service of Republic of Armenia, Central Bank of Armenia.
Figure 14: Structural impulse responses for 2000Q1 - 2012Q4.
Figure 15: Structural impulse responses for the model without inflation (CPI gap).
References


«Համագործակցական մարմարակերտներ
Հայաստանի Հանրապետությունում»

8-րդ հոկտեմբերի 2013թ., հ. Երևան

«Սամը ծրագրերն ի գիտակցական սպասարկություններն»

Արդյունաբերական կողմերի հետ: Նույն, սահմանում է, որ տեղակայված կան կյանքի գրեթե բոլոր ունեցած կողմնյան քարտուղարները և կանխադրությունը։ Նույնիսկ, ապահովելու համար, ՀՀ կառավարության 2009 թվականի հուլիսի 2-ի թիվ 27 արձանագրական որոշումը հապալում է արժանացած «Հայաստանի Հանրապետության Համազանգաղթի և այլ ջարդաշարի նախարարության գործունեության պահանջում» այսօրտի կողմից հիմնականում թվականի 2009-2035թթ.» /այսուհետ ՀՀ/։ Այսպիսով, միտրական ու պետական կառուցվածքները ուղղված են նախորդ փոխաբարձուների տեսությանը և համազանգաղթի հիմքում կառուցված մեծագույնությունը։

Առաջին մասին է

- սույնհազված սույնհազվածությունը, պահանջումը,
- տնտեսական մասնագեկությունը պահանջումը,
- մշակութային մասնագեկությունը պահանջումը,
- սեփականատերերի առաջակցության պահանջումը և պահանջումը,
- միջազգային գրողերի պետական կառուցվածքը, քաղաքական պահանջումը,
- տարածքային քաղաքական պահանջումը և բնականի պահանջումը առաջադիմությունների միջակայքում,
- հաղորդ քաղաքական պահանջումը և պահանջումը և պահանջումը-

Առաջին մասին է, որ պատմական և արդյունքներից կարեցնող տեսությունը նույնիսկ առաջադիմություններից կարեցնող տեսության համար կարեցնող մեկնարկերի պահանջումը և պահանջումը տեղակալում գրանցված դրամաշրջանում այսօրտի կողմից հիմնականում 2008-2009թթ.։ Այսպիսով, որ այսուհետ ՀՀ կառավարության կողմից հիմնականում պահանջումը է, տեղեկատվությունները և պահանջումը տեղեկացված այսօրտի կերպով հիմնականում կառուցված մեկնարկերի պահանջումը և պահանջումը տեղակալում գրանցված դրամաշրջանում այսօրտի կողմից հիման վրա տեղեկատվությունները և տեղեկատվությունները այսօրում կառուցված մեկնարկերի պահանջումը և պահանջումը:
Դրա նք կապ ված են երեխայի ծննդի և խնամքի մեջ։ Մանկական հացության և մայրական հացության նվազեցումը պողոտայում։ Երեխայի առաջին պահանջի դրագից, նախապատմության և իրավապահության մասունքներին, երիտասարդության պահանջներին պողոտայում։

Հատկապես նորազգույցի լրագրության նախագահի մեջաբանությունը։

1. Մանկական հացության և պարունակություն ՀՀ առողջապահության նախարարի 2008թ. մայիսի 30-ի N 761-Ա հրամանով և 2010թ. դեկտեմբերի 21-ի N 2093-Ա հրամանով «Երեխայի առողջության պահանջ» համակարգը, որի համաձայն «Երեխայի առողջության պահանջ» արտահայտվում է անվճար բժշկական ռիցաստետում, միայն երեխայի հիվանդության, բժշկական միջակայքի և հիվանդության այլ չափաստանական անձանց։
սայրից երեխայի ֆիզիկական և ինտելեկտուալ մարդկանցը նրանց համար, որ էականության իրավունքները, հիմնավորապես հարաբերակցություններին, որպես նախկին մուլտիպլիկատուրակ էական իրավունքներ։


Հայաստանի Հանրապետության երեխայի զարգացման նախագիծը նոր բնական իրավունքների համար՝ կազմակերպությունը, որի մասին դարձրում է համապատասխան երեխայի իրավունքների կարևորագույն մասնագիտակցություն։

Հայաստանի Հանրապետության իրավունքների կարևորությունը նախագիծը երեխայի զարգացման որոշ մասն է դարձելով, եզրակացնելով երեխաների իրավունքների կարևորագույն հարաբերություն։

Հայաստանի Հանրապետության իրավունքների կարևորությունը նախագիծը երեխայի զարգացման որոշ մասն է դարձելով, եզրակացնելով երեխաների իրավունքների կարևորագույն հարաբերություն։

Հայաստանի Հանրապետության իրավունքների կարևորությունը նախագիծը երեխայի զարգացման որոշ մասն է դարձելով, եզրակացնելով երեխաների իրավունքների կարևորագույն հարաբերություն։

Հայաստանի Հանրապետության իրավունքների կարևորությունը նախագիծը երեխայի զարգացման որոշ մասն է դարձելով, եզրակացնելով երեխաների իրավունքների կարևորագույն հարաբերություն։
204
Հայաստանի վարչապետության ներքևի գրասենյակային դեկորացիաների և հատկացման պահանջմությունների տեսակետ

Հայաստանի վարչապետության ներքևի գրասենյակային դեկորացիաների և հատկացման պահանջմությունների տեսակետ

Հայաստանի վարչապետության ներքևի գրասենյակային դեկորացիաների և հատկացման պահանջմությունների տեսակետ

Հայաստանի վարչապետության ներքևի գրասենյակային դեկորացիաների և հատկացման պահանջմությունների տեսակետ

Հայաստանի վարչապետության ներքևի գրասենյակային դեկորացիաների և հատկացման պահանջմություն

Հայաստանի վարչապետության ներքևի գրասենյակային դեկորացիաների և հատկացման պահանջ

Հայաստանի վարչապետության ներքևի գրասենյակային դեկորացիաների և հատկացման պահանջ

Հայաստանի վարչապետության ներքևի գրասենյակային դեկորացիաների և հատկացման պահանջ

Հայաստանի վարչապետության ներքևի գրասենյակային դեկորացիաների և հատկացման պահանջ

Հայաստանի վարչապետության ներքևի գրասենյակային դեկորացիաների և հատկացման պահանջ

Հայաստանի վարչապետության ներքևի գրասենյակային դեկորացիաների և հատկացման պահա

Հայաստանի վարչապետության ներքևի գրասենյակային դեկորացիաների և հատկացման պահ

Հայաստանի վարչապետության ներքևի գրասենյակային դեկորացիաների և հատկացման պահա

Հայաստանի վարչապետության ներքևի գրասենյակային դեկորացիաների և հատկացման պահ

Հայաստանի վարչապետության ներքևի գրասենյակային դեկորացիաների և հատկացման պահա

Հայաստանի վարչապետության ներքևի գրասենյակային դեկորացիաների և հատկացման պահա

Հայաստանի վարչապետության ներքևի գրասենյակային դեկորացիաների և հատկացման պահա

Հայաստանի վարչապետության ներքևի գրասենյակային դեկորացիաների և հատկացման պահա

Հայաստանի վարչապետության ներքևի գրասենյակային դեկորացիաների և հատկացման պահա

Հայաստանի վարչապետության ներքևի գրասենյակային դեկորացիաների և հատկացման պահա
К основным проблемам правового регулирования миграционных процессов в Республике Армения на 2013г.

Проблема правового регулирования миграционных процессов – одна из основополагающих в сфере государственно-правового регулирования. Миграционные процессы и попытки выработки государственных и правовых механизмов их регулирования имеют весьма глубокие корни. Как показывает история, непродуманная миграционная политика стоила “жизни” многим государствам (Ассирия, Рим, Византия и др.) и спустила с пьедестала мирового господства многие великие нации.

Сегодня она во много раз усложняется и тем, что благодаря совокупному развитию теле- и транспортных коммуникаций, мы имеем беспрецедентные масштабы миграции людей за весьма короткие промежутки времени. По данным зарубежных специалистов, еще на начало 2000-х годов только количество мигрантов, получивших гражданство другой страны, по всему миру составило более 100 млн. человек\(^1\).

В 2013г. по данным обнародованным ООН в мире насчитывалось 232 млн. международных мигрантов\(^2\) (для сравнения в 2009г. свыше 214 млн. и 740 млн. внутренних мигрантов\(^3\) (т.е. перемещенных лиц внутри одной страны)). Сама динамика вступления государств в МОМ говорит о скорости развития данной отрасли общественных отношений – с 67 государств-членов в 1997г. до 127 в 2009г. и 151 - в 2013г.

Начиная с 2001г., после ряда масштабных террористических актов\(^4\) проблемы,

---

связанные с миграционными процессами и их правовым и административным контролем, приобрели новое звучание. Права человека, его личные свободы, ставившиеся во главе угла государственной политики развитых стран за последние десятилетия, резко уступили место жесткому контролю над личностью. Во многих странах на первое место был вновь поставлен приоритет государственных и общественных интересов над личными и частными интересами. Ряд государств, исторически задействованных в глобальных миграционных процессах, официально объявили ошибочной миграционную политику мультикультурализма, проводимую за последние десятилетия.

В контексте данного утверждения приведем пример ЕС, где под влиянием быстрорастущего мигрантского населения и давлением терроризма стали происходить серьезные изменения в сфере регулирования миграционных процессов. За последние пять лет существенно ужесточились процедуры принятия граждан третьих стран, в т. ч. по самой предрасполагающей директиве Совета 2003/86/ЕС о праве воссоединения семей. С другой стороны, исходя из демографических отрицательных тенденций и необходимости привлечения высокопрофессиональных специалистов, в соответствии с директивой 2009/50/ЕС (от 19 июня 2009г.) с 11 июня 2011г. в ЕС введен специальный документ, который называется “Blue Card” (синяя карта). Его принятие способствует облегчению миграции профессионалов в ЕС.

Ужесточение общей миграционной политики наблюдается и в США, где после серии террактов 11 сентября (к началу 2003г.), впервые после второй мировой войны, была произведена реформа по управлению и упорядочению миграционных процессов. Существенно ужесточилась ответственность за нарушение визового статуса, введена процедура “ускоренной депортации”, без права пересмотра дела в суде,

---


6 Многие из главы правительств признали фиаско в построении мультикультурализма и высказались за введение дополнительных ограничений в международных нормативно-правовых актах регулирующих миграцию. См. выступления канцлера ФРГ Меркель А., премьер-министра Великобритании Кэмерона Д. и президента Франции Саркози Н. в октябре 2010г. и феврале 2011г.
приняты меры по совершенствованию патрульной службы и укреплению границы США, рассматривается вопрос о внедрении оперативной имплантации чипов (микросхем со считываемой информацией) правонарушителям и преступникам (в т.ч. нелегальным мигрантам) и т.д.

Определенной спецификой обладает регулирование миграционных процессов в странах СНГ. После распада СССР, сопровождаемого политическими, этническими конфликтами и образованием гигантских миграционных потоков, практически на всем постсоветском пространстве, в срочном порядке принимались новые нормативные акты регулирующие миграцию.

Главным актом, по-новому регулирующим миграционные процессы во всех странах постсоветского пространства, стала новая Конституция. В отличие от Конституций советской эпохи, она юридически закрепила принципиально новые для стран бывшего СССР принципы, приоритеты и направления государственного развития, в т. ч. в области миграционных отношений.

Международные ратифицированные акты были признаны неотъемлемой важнейшей частью национального права. Конституция провозгласила человека, его права и свободы высшей ценностью, а их признание, соблюдение и защиту – первой обязанностью государства. Во всех странах СНГ на конституционном и административно-правовом уровне была закреплена защита прав человека: на свободное передвижение, выбор места жительства, рода и вида трудовой деятельности и пр.

В ближайшие годы, в связи с развитием ЕПЭ для стран СНГ станут одними из важнейших правовых актов, регулирующих трудовую миграцию - Соглашение о правовом статусе трудящихся-мигрантов и членов их семей и Соглашение о сотрудничестве по противодействию нелегальной трудовой миграции из третьих государств7.

Говоря об административно-правовом регулировании миграционных процессов следует отметить и новую международную стратегию, которая основана: на превентивном контроле, внедрении биометрических паспортов, офтальмологических

7 Уже известно о новом ограничении для трудовых мигрантов из стран, не входящих в ТС и ЕЭП: с 1 января 2015 года, мигранты из других стран СНГ смогут въезжать в Россию только по загранпаспортам.
и дактило-скопических проверках на контролльно-пропускных пунктах и в странах-реципиентах, и в странах-донорах.

Миграционные процессы и регулирующие их нормативные акты в конечном итоге влияют на целый ряд важнейших факторов государственного развития. При недостаточном внимании они могут представлять большую опасность и для принимающих и для отправляющих государств. Если относительно принимающих стран и позитивные и негативные факторы, как правило, очевидны, то в отношении отправляющих стран большинство связанных с ними тенденций носят скрытый характер. С одной стороны миграционные процессы отрицательно влияют на гендерный баланс, формируют утечку кадров, спад науки, производства и вводят экономическую зависимость от трансфертов. С другой стороны, миграция, и особенно ее международная форма, для многих государств является единственным способом поддержания экономики, трудоустройства своих граждан, повышения или обретения ими новых трудовых навыков, внедрения новых технологий, снижения социальной напряженности и т.п. Отсутствие, или же недостаточная проработанность правовых механизмов, регулирующих миграцию, может усугубить отрицательное воздействие указанных процессов, и привести к минусу любые позитивные проявления.

Перечисленные и проблемы, и позитивные факторы, связанные с правовым регулированием миграционных процессов, присущи сегодня и Республике Армения. Около 60% выехавших из страны мигрантов – это мужчины репродуктивного возраста. В стране на 300% снизилось деторождение, постепенно происходит распад института семейных ценностей. Около 30% из покинувших страну мигрантов имели высшее образование, а это около 300 тыс. человек(!), т.к., начиная с 1990-х гг. до 2002г. страну покинули более 1 млн. человек, т.е. приблизительно 30% населения РА.

Экономика РА на сегодня сильно зависит от трансфертов мигрантов, которые согласно различным данным за последние годы составляют в среднем 9 % от ВВП

8 Данные МОМ, обнародованные на семинаре по теме Трудовая миграция начальником Управления миграции и беженцев при правительстве РА Еганяном Г., 05.04.2002г.
в год (по данным Мирового Банка за 2006г. это было 30% ВВП РА\(^{10}\), по сведениям приводимым Г.Еганяном\(^{11}\) за 2008 – 20%).

На сегодня, в РА нормативное регулирование миграционных процессов охватывает только наиболее уязвимую категорию мигрантов – беженцев. Никак не охватывается масштабная внешняя трудовая миграция, утечка кадров.

Признавая право человека на свободное передвижение и свободный выбор трудовой деятельности, РА не имеет никаких административно-правовых механизмов, которые сделали бы данный выбор для своих граждан прогнозируемым и безопасным. Отсутствуют механизмы лицензирования предприятий посредников/рекрутов, превентивной проверки трудовых контрактов, возврата студентов (особенно обучающихся за государственный счет). Первые два упущения, как правило, сопровождаются образованием нелегальной миграции (вкл. трафикинг), затрудняя борьбу с данным явлением.

Параллельно с этим ни Кодекс об Административных нарушениях РА, ни Уголовный Кодекс РА не предусматривают наказания за заведомо ложное оформления цели зарубежной поездки и поддержку (создание) нелегальной миграции. УК РА по ряду преступлений предусматривает легкое или среднее наказание, в случае трафикинга не предусматривает обязательной конфискации имущества, в большинстве случаев оставляя преступнику результаты незаконного обогащения.

Анализ нормативного поля РА указывает и на то обстоятельство, что учитывая мизерность штрафов и сроков наказания по массе распространенных во внешнем мире тяжелых преступлений, есть опасность перемещения определенного рода деятельности транснациональных преступных группировок в Армению. Это может быть изготовление фальшивых лекарств, незаконная трансплантация и продажа органов, развитие порноиндустри и пр.

В нормативно-правовой базе РА отсутствуют нормативные акты и государственные программы (за исключением международных обязательств по реадмиссии) по содействию иммиграции армян, особенно в экстренных случаях (в т.ч. из горячих точек)\(^{12}\).

---

10 Diaspora Networks and the International Migration of Skills, noted work, p. 129.
11 См. Еганяна Г., Миграционные процессы и их регулирование в Армении. См. Международная научная конференция, Социальная и демографическая цена перехода (тезисы докладов), Ер., 2008, с.89.
12 У госорганов РА до сих пор отсутствуют планы оказания экстренной помощи соотечественни-
В отношении регулирования миграционных потоков из-за за проводится недальновидная, а вскоре и чрезмерно опасная либеральная политика страны “открытых дверей”\textsuperscript{13}.

Практически отсутствуют меры по обеспечению превентивной общественно-правовой, экономической, микробиологической и инфекционной безопасности и т.п.

Отсутствует единая миграционная политика государства, и нет соответствующего значимого единого госоргана, который мог бы организовать и регулировать межведомственные работы в данной области\textsuperscript{14}. За исключением спецкурсов для погранвойск, отсутствует внутриведомственная специализированная подготовка необходимых кадров. Другая проблема заключается в том, что большинство ратифицированных международных правовых актов в области миграции не находят дальнейшего отображения во внутреннем законодательстве РА.

Для любой страны подобное развитие миграционной ситуации и нормативного поля могло бы стать катализатором к спаду функционирования государственных институтов, однако исторически богатый миграционный опыт армян имеет особую ценность. Он дает основание для рассмотрения процессов массовой миграции из страны, как периодическую циркуляцию, а наличие современных средств коммуникаций – как возможность избегания самого опасного аспекта миграции - культурной и национальной ассимиляции\textsuperscript{15}.

\textsuperscript{14} 21 апреля 1999 г. решением правительства РА было создано Управление по миграции и беженцам при правительстве РА, однако оно занимается исключительно беженцами. Управление переименовано в Миграционное Агентство и на сегодня входит в Министерство территориального управления. Кроме того, вопросами миграции занимаются МИД, Служба Нацбезопасности (2-е подразделение), Пограничная служба РФ (согласно Договору о сотрудничестве в XXI веке от 29.12.1991), Полиция (Отдел Виз и Регистрации, Подразделение по борьбе с нелегальной миграцией и международной преступностью, Подразделение по борьбе с траффикингом и пр.), Администрация Президента РА, Министерство Труда и Соцобеспечения и т.д.
\textsuperscript{15} Научное изучение различных аспектов миграционного опыта армян даст возможность его дальнейшего максимально продуктивного применения, тем более, что учитывая соотношения населения РА и Диаспоры (около 3 млн. в РА и более 7 млн. вне РА), сложное геополитическое расположение Армении и сегодня (рассечение клином тюрко-муслиманского мира), миграционные процессы будут иметь большое значение для развития армянского государства
Тем не менее, следует отметить, что не регулируемые должным образом общественные отношения, возникающие в процессе миграции - отсутствие гибких механизмов действенного контроля над данными процессами со стороны государства, могут стать причиной перехода миграционных процессов в весомую угрозу национальной безопасности любого государства, и, тем более, Армении.

Анализ миграционного законодательства РА (период 1991 - 2013гг.)

Говоря о формировании миграционного законодательства РА сегодня, следует указать на ряд событий, произошедших перед развалом СССР.

7 декабря 1988г. в северной Армении произошло землетрясение. В зону землетрясения попали десятки городов и поселков в Армении (21 город и поселок, 400 сел). Полностью был стерт с лица земли город Спитак (население 16 тыс. человек). Более 80% жилого фонда было разрушено в Ленинакане (Гюмри) - втором по величине городе Армении с населением 250 тыс. жителей. На 50% был разрушен жилой фонд в Кировакане (Ванадзоре) – третьем по величине городе РА. Из пострадавших 400 селений 58 было полностью разрушено. По оценке погибло 25 тыс. человек, раненых и инвалидов – 17 тыс., лишилось кровя 514 тыс. человек. Был нанесен огромный ущерб жилому фонду республики – пострадало около 9 млн. квадратных метров жилья, из которых 4,7 млн. было или уничтожено или снесено впоследствии из-за аварийного состояния. Тогда же образовалась гигантская миграционная волна, направленная из пострадавших населенных пунктов в Ереван, а так же во внешний мир (в основном в РСФСР).

и нации еще на протяжении очень долгого времени.

16 В эпицентре землетрясения в городе Спитак его сила достигла 10 баллов, в Ленинакане (Гюмри) – 9 баллов, в Кировакане (Ванадзоре) – 8 баллов.
17 См.: Спитакское землетрясение, зона бедствия вчера и сегодня, взгляд через 20 лет, НАА, Сборник документов. Ер., 2008г., Приложение, п.16.
Параллельно, с 1988г., впервые после Великой отечественной войны, в Армении вновь появились беженцы. Это были наши соотечественники - граждане Советского Союза, ищущие убежища от Геноцида армян в Азербайджане, а также от вооруженных конфликтов во многих республиках СССР.

Как отмечают многие исследователи, так как закона о беженцах в тот период не было, то прибывшие признавались беженцами на основании правительственных постановлений. До принятия соответствующих законов, в соответствии с которыми различия между вынужденными переселенцами и беженцами определялись наличием или отсутствием гражданства, на всем постсоветском пространстве существовала путаница в отнесении мигрантов к той или иной категории^{9}.

Это создавало большие юридические и социальные проблемы, поскольку распад СССР и появление новых государств сопровождались беспрецедентными миграционными перемещениями.

Данные проблемы были присущи и Республике Армения. После 23 августа 1990г., когда Верховный Совет Армянской ССР принял Декларацию о независимости и Армения вышла из состава СССР, в стране уже сложилась особая сложная миграционная обстановка.

Спитакское землетрясение, глобальные политические, экономические и социальные последствия распада СССР, война за независимость Арцаха, блокада границ РА, а впоследствии, и приход к власти в Армении политического движения АОД, чрезвычайно обострили проблемы миграции в Армении. Они качественно изменили ее характер, мотивацию миграционного поведения населения, направление, масштабы и структуру миграционных потоков, поскольку внутри страны создались (в т.ч. были искусственно смоделированы) невыносимые условия.

По сравнению с 1980-ыми годами денежные сбережения граждан после внедрения национальной валюты в 1993г., сократились в 200(!) раз^{20}, 55,05% населения республики перешли порог и до сих пор находятся ниже уровня бедности

19 См.: Воробьева О., Методологические основы разработки миграционной политики в Сб.: Миграция населения. Вып.6: Миграционная политика. Приложение к журналу Миграция в России, М., 2001, с.27.
“по некоторым экспертным оценкам 86,3% населения республики можно считать бедным, практически исчез средний класс (коэффициент Джина составил 0,593, для сравнения, до перехода к рыночной экономике был 0,2521). Возникло и прочно вошло в жизнь ранее неизвестное армянскому обществу явление – массовая безработица, официально учтенная часть - 11,7% экономически активного населения (это явно заниженная цифра, потому что в основу расчета брались лишь официально зарегистрированные безработные)22. Рождаемость упала в 2,5 раза, количество браков уменьшилось в 3 раза23. Миграция приобрела ярко выраженный вынужденный характер.

Некоторые исследователи предлагают классифицировать миграционные потоки этих лет, выделяя для Армении два основных этапа:


В связи с этим предлагается различать в РА следующие категории мигрантов25:

– беженцы – более 360 тыс. армян, вынужденно покинувших места постоянного проживания в Азербайджане в результате армяно-азербайджанского конфликта, нашедших убежище в РА;

21 Коэффициент Джина – макроэкономический показатель, характеризующий дифференциацию денежных доходов населения в виде степени отклонения фактического распределения доходов от абсолютно равного их распределения между жителями страны. Этот индекс служит показателем социального неравенства в обществе. См. Кочинян Н., Макроэкономическое моделирование миграционных процессов в Республике Армения, канд. дис., Ер., 2005г., с. 60.
25 Там же, с.6-7.
– экологические мигранты – порядка 400 тыс. чел. из зоны землетрясения;
– лица, перемещенные внутри страны из приграничных районов, в связи с военными действиями с Азербайджаном, 72 тыс. человек;
– лица, находящиеся в ситуации, сходной с ситуацией беженцев (из Абхазии, Чечни и пр.) – свыше 11000 тыс. человек;
– трудовые мигранты – свыше 1 млн. (исходя из различных подходов от 500 тыс. до 1,3 млн.) граждан РА и беженцев, выехавших из страны с 1990-1997 гг., из-за ухудшения социально-экономической ситуации в Армении;

Мы предлагаем дополнить данный список добавив в него следующие категории:
– резэмигранты – возвращающиеся в страну из дальнего и ближнего зарубежья граждане Армении (или Арм. ССР);
– репатрианты – этнические армяне, граждане других стран, переезжающие в РА на постоянное жительство;
– иммигранты – граждане иностранных государств, ищущие постоянное место жительство в Армении, не связанные с армянами этническими и культурными корнями.

При изучении и составлении нормативных актов регулирующих миграционные процессы в РА необходимо учитывать и тот факт, что главной отличительной чертой миграционных процессов в Армении является высокая моноэтничность обоих потоков – из Армении и в Армению. В них подавляющий процент мигрантов составляют этнические армяне (в т.ч. в категориях рекреационной, образовательной и экономической /инвестиционной/ миграции).

Этому способствует и исторически сформированная тенденция и наличие разветвленной армянской Диаспоры, в более чем 70 странах мира.

Можно констатировать, что на начале 90-х годов XX в. начался процесс формирования 26 Sbu << Ուղղաշահույթ ՀՀ Միգրացիաի տարրը, էջջ 13, 14: 27 После войны в Ираке 2001г. и начиная с цветных революций в арабском мире (2010-2011гг.) – в Тунисе, Египте, Бахрейне, Ливии, Иордании, Сирии и пр. мы предлагаем заново осмыслить и ввести в оборот понятия репатриантов и резэмигрантов, которые употреблялись еще в советский период, рассмотренный ранее. Это прямая необходимость, поскольку в указанной нами Концепции по организации процесса репатриации в РА, разработанной министерством Диаспоры РА, предполагается единое понятие мигранта, переезжающего на постоянное место жительства (далее ПМЖ) в РА - репатриант («հայրենադարձ»). Для обозначения разных категорий мигрантов в Концепции к понятию репатриант добавляются различные вспомогательные уточнения, которые не раскрывают сути и не дают четких разграничений.
моноэтничного армянского государства, и сегодня, Армения стала единственным государством Евразии, которое практически моноэтнично и моноконфессионально. Этому способствует и то обстоятельство, что вне общеармянского мира остаются армяне иного, нехристианского вероисповедания. Наибольшую группу из них составляют армяне исповедующие ислам.

Специалисты указывают, что начиная с 1992 г. по 1998 г. число населения, покинувшего Армению, колеблется и составляет около 1 миллиона человек, т.е. это более 30% населения страны. С одной стороны, в процентном отношении, это один из наивысших показателей миграции населения в мире. С другой стороны, обратим внимание, что это и есть приблизительное число беженцев плюс количество граждан Армении оставшихся без крова после спитакского землетрясения. Конечно, из страны выехали не только представители данной группы, однако на всей территории Армении (и в Арцахе) обозначался эффект волновой замещаемой миграции – из периферии к крупным центрам, в т.ч. вне страны. Однако замещение не было равноценным, интенсивная миграция сельского населения в города “не смогла заполнить вакансии в промышленности, науке и образовании”, и, в основном, была направлена в сферу услуг.

Как мы уже указали, общему тяжелому положению в РА способствовал ряд тяжелых обстоятельств, за короткий промежуток времени потрясших политическую и социально-экономическую сферу страны. Добавим к указанным обстоятельствам еще и искусственный энергетический кризис внутри страны, блокаду границ РА со стороны Азербайджана и Турции и как следствие - полный коллапс не только в экономике, но и во всех остальных сферах РА, особенно в сфере занятости населения.

Согласно исследованиям армянских экономистов, в связи с развалом СССР

29 Различные исследователи указывают на амшенских армян, но и армян-павликиан в Болгарии принявших ислам, а также криптоармян в Турции.
31 См. Кочинян Н., указ. Исслед., с. 29.
и переходом к рыночной экономике, на всем постсоветском пространстве был зафиксирован резкий рост безработицы. Однако и на данном фоне, напряженность на рынке труда в РА крайне высока. На уже более не менее благополучный для РА 1999г. (конец года) эти цифры составляли:

Таблица 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Государство</th>
<th>Количество человек на 1 рабочее место</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Армения</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Грузия</td>
<td>60,7 (98,8*)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Кыргызстан</td>
<td>46,2 (48,6*)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Казахстан</td>
<td>35,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Таджикистан</td>
<td>9,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Азербайджан</td>
<td>6,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Узбекистан</td>
<td>1,4**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Показатели на начало 1999г.

** Следует учитывать, что наличие рабочих мест не всегда означает соответственно оплачиваемый труд. На наш взгляд именно низкая оплата труда, а также неразвитая социальная политика, политический режим, неравенство перед законом являются основными факторами трудовой миграции для стран с благополучными показателями (прим. И.М.).

В таких условиях в стране принимались законы, определяющие тенденцию в регулировании миграционных процессов. Их можно охарактеризовать как охранительные и ограничительные. Появилась также новая группа, которую составили международные нормативные акты. Будучи ратифицированы Арменией и имплементированы в национальное законодательство, они стали его важной и неотъемлемой частью, имея к тому же большую значимость при применении. Это стало возможным благодаря добровольно принятым Арменией обязательствам,

33 К примеру, к первой группе законов следует отнести законы и подзаконные акты, регулирующие положение беженцев армян из Азербайджана, а ко второй группе – законы и подзаконные акты, ужесточающие требования к военнообязанным и ограничивающие права граждан РА мужского пола в установленном порядке не прошедших воинской службы на эмиграцию, при устройстве на работу и т.п.
которые были сформулированы в ст. 6 Конституции РА34. Появилась реальная возможность непосредственного влияния указанных международных актов на граждан Республики Армения с одной стороны, и аппеляции к ним граждан РА – с другой.

Как и для других стран, в данной категории нормативных документов для РА важное место занимают Всеобщая декларация прав человека, Европейская конвенция по защите основных прав и свобод человека, Международный пакт об экономических, социальных и культурных правах, Международный пакт о гражданских и политических правах и др.

Исходя из исторических реалий, среди базовых специализированных международно-правовых актов, относящихся к источникам миграционного права РА, особо следует отметить нормативные акты о статусе беженцев. В первую очередь – это Конвенция ООН о статусе беженцев 1951 г., которая считается одним из базовых международно-правовых источников миграционного права в данной сфере. Армения присоединилась и к Конвенции, и к Нью-Йоркскому Протоколу Конвенции 1967 г. (оба акта вошли в силу для РА в 1993 г.), а также приняла ряд национальных нормативных актов, основанных на ней. Последним из них следует считать и закон РА “О беженцах” (принят 3 марта 1999)35, который устанавливает основания, порядок и условия временного размещения лиц, ходатайствующих о статусе беженца на территории Республики Армения, предоставления статуса беженца или отказа в нем, утраты статуса беженца, компетенции уполномоченного Правительством Республики Армения государственного органа, (далее - уполномоченный орган), права и обязанности беженца и лица, ходатайствующего о статусе беженца, гарантии их правовой и социальной защищенности. Другим основополагающим документом в данной области является принятое в рамках Содружества Независимых Государств Соглашение “О помощи беженцам и вынужденным переселенцам” (1993 г.).

Значительный удельный вес среди международных источников миграционного

34 Данная статья идентична в обеих редакциях от 1995 г. 5 июля и после референдума 27.11.2005 г. Конституция РА 1995 г. дается по изд. Наири, Ер., 1995 г., а после референдума 27.11.2005 г. по электронной законодательной базе РА, Сб’ <<еунихуунурншпунч, ՐՊՍԲԳ <<օրմունդրթայդր ցինհունուն» ցինհունուն: 
35 Мы не имеем возможности рассматривать все нормативные акты (включая утратившие силу) в данной области, а потому указываем на главнейшие из действующих актов.
права РА имеют договора в области борьбы с нелегальной миграцией. В 2004 г. РА был ратифицирован Протокол против незаконного ввоза мигрантов по суше, морю и воздуху, который дополняет Конвенцию ООН против транснациональной организованной преступности от 2000 г. К этой же группе источников относится Соглашение о сотрудничестве государств – участников Содружества Независимых Государств в борьбе с незаконной миграцией от 1998 г. Отдельную категорию составляют двусторонние договоры по реадмиссии. К числу источников миграционного права относятся и решения Европейского Суда по правам человека.

Кроме международных ратифицированных актов, в структуру источников миграционного права РА входят: Конституция, нормативные и поднормативные правовые акты.

Огромную роль в регулировании миграционных отношений призваны играть такие нормативные акты, как Административный кодекс РА, Уголовный кодекс РА, законы “О границе РА”, “О гражданстве РА”, “Об иностранцах”, пакет законов “О беженцах”, законы РА “О воинской обязанности” и “О гражданах, не прошедших обязательную воинскую службу с нарушением установленного порядка” и т.д. Особое место занимают Указы Президента РА, а также решения КС. Согласно ст. 55, п. 15 Конституции РА, а также ст. 26 и 27 закона РА “О гражданстве”, Президент РА и формируемая им Комиссия по вопросам гражданства при Президенте РА являются ключевыми органами в вопросах касающихся гражданства. Своими Указами Президент РА решает вопросы приема в гражданство РА, восстановления гражданства, группового приобретения гражданства РА, прекращения гражданства, а так же определяет порядок рассмотрения заявлений о гражданстве.

В силу определенных Конституцией РА полномочий (ст. 100, пп. 1 и 2), Конституционный Суд в установленном законом порядке определяет соответствие Конституции внутренних законодательных актов РА, а также, до ратификации, определяет соответствие международного договора Конституции РА. Таким образом, внутренние и, особенно, международные нормативные акты, проходят предварительную экспертизу КС на предмет их Конституционности. Данное положение верно и относительно нормативных актов в сфере миграции. Тем самым, можно констатировать, что и Указы Президента РА и соответствующие решения КС38 являются важными источниками миграционного права.

Как мы указали, одним из важнейших источников миграционного права, как и для других отраслей права, является Конституция РА.


Рассмотрим одну из важнейших статей Конституции РА ст. 11.3, которая гарантирует защиту граждан РА со стороны государства не только на своей территории, но и за рубежом. Приходится констатировать, что сегодня она не совсем эффективно действует (или не действует вообще), и сотни тысяч граждан РА трудовых мигрантов, жертв трафикинга и мигрантов иных категорий находящихся за рубежом, не могут получить ни правовой, ни финансовой, ни моральной помощи со стороны

соответствующих органов РА, поскольку реально не существует механизма ее оказания39. И по сути, кроме оказания помощи гражданам РА жертвам траффикинга или подлежащим реадмиссии практически отсутствует бюджетное или иное финансирование подобных программ.

На наш взгляд, основные меры должны быть превентивными и в большинстве случаев должны осуществляться до перемещения граждан-мигрантов из страны. Научные конференции, одиночные клипы, редкие телепередачи или небольшие вывески в метро слишком мало на сегодняшнем этапе развития общественных отношений и телекоммуникационных технологий.

Мы предлагаем проводить следующие мероприятия: установить в городе и на подступах к аэропортам и вокзалу постоянные просветительские агитационные баннеры, проводить систематические лекции для школьников и студентов по данной тематике, транслировать ролики на TV, в самолетах и в интернете, и пр. В них прямым текстом, без аллегорий, в доступной форме на армянском и русском языках должны передаваться сообщения типа – никому нельзя отдавать паспорт, куда и к кому обращаться в иностранных государствах в случае его похищения, куда и к кому обращаться в случае возникших проблем с законом в принимающем государстве при нелегальной миграции, перечень сведений, которые следует проверить при поездке за рубеж – наличие официального приглашения учреждения, работодателя; наличие контракта со вписанными данными приглашаемого лица; необходимость регистрации в консульстве или посольстве РА военнообязанных граждан и пр.

Следующая статья Конституции (ст.25) гарантирует каждому свободу передвижения, однако для некоторых граждан РА это связано с дополнительными ограничениями, которые следуют из иных обязательств – к примеру, призывным возрастом и срочной службой для военнообязанных граждан РА. Большинство проблем данной категории связаны с массовой миграцией из страны еще в 90-е годы XX века. Они до сих пор имеют частичное решение и негативно воздействуют на репатриацию молодого поколения армян и членов их семей и сегодня.

Так, несмотря на эмиграцию из Армении около 1 млн. человек в указанный период, в отношении лиц мужского пола призывного возраста до сих пор продолжается

39 Данный факт акцентируется и в упомянутой нами Концепции по регулированию миграционной политики РА.
действие ряда нормативных актов РА, даже в том случае, если они покинули страну в младенческом возрасте. Данные нормативные акты действуют даже при смене указанной категорией лиц гражданства РА на другое гражданство, либо при получении лицом, достигшим 16-летия, иностранного гражданства. Такое положение дел сохраняется в связи с требованиями закона РА “О воинской повинности” с одной стороны, закона РА “О гражданстве” с другой, а также процессом, связанным с выпиской мигрантов, проводящейся на основании закона РА ”О Государственном регистре населения”. Так согласно ст.7 п1. данного закона, лицо, проживающее в РА при смене места постоянного жительства (жилища) обязано в семидневный срок письменно уведомить соответствующие органы местного регистра, а согласно п2. граждане РА, выезжающие на жительство за пределы территории Армения на срок более шести месяцев или проживающие там более шести месяцев, обязаны письменно уведомить об этом соответствующую консульскую службу или дипломатическое представительство РА, которое в семидневный срок официально информирует об этом орган, ведущий Центральный регистр

В связи с этим в Армении создано особое правовое поле, которое образовывает некоторые проблемы для детей (мужского пола) мигрантов, вывезенных из Армении до их совершеннолетия, особенно если они и их родители поменяли гражданство.

а) Многие из граждан РА, выезжая из страны, не были выписаны по месту регистрации в РА. Их несовершеннолетние дети остались зарегистрированными в поликлиниках, которые по совершеннолетию детей мужского пола вместе с регистром, паспортным столом и образовательными учреждениями, отправляют их документы в районный военкомат. Затем по адресу регистрации лица, достигшего 16 лет и подлежащего воинской повинности, отправляется повестка, даже в случае, если данное лицо не проживает в РА уже много лет и имеет гражданство другой страны. После отправления повесток и “неявки” военнообязанного, он попадает в списки розыскников.


41 В консультативно-юридической практике автора в 2005г. был уникальный случай, когда лицо, объявленное в розыск как уклонившееся от несения воинской повинности, являлось членом
6) Несовершеннолетнее лицо покинуло Армению с родителями, имеющими гражданство РА, которые в установленном порядке выписались в ОВИРе. По мере проживания в другой стране, родители (или один из них) указанного лица приобретают другое гражданство. При совершеннолетии лицо, принимающее гражданство одного из родителей, тем не менее, не считается сменившим гражданство РА, поскольку согласно закону “О гражданстве РА” ст.1 сам факт отказа или смены гражданства сам по себе не приводит к потере гражданства РА.

В указанных случаях достигшее совершеннолетие лицо также признается военнообязанным в РА, и, в случае неявки, также пополняет число розыскников и т.д. Многие хотели бы вернуться в страну и исполнить свой долг, но они плохо владеют армянским языком, не имеют сведений или имеют негативные сведения о службе в армии РА.

Некоторым решением данных проблем стало принятие парламентом РА 17 декабря 2003г. закона “О гражданах, не прошедших обязательную воинскую службу с нарушением установленного порядка”. Закон позволяет желающим урегулировать свой статус, заплатив в госбюджет определенную сумму. Максимальная сумма выплат составляет для призывников – 100 мин. Зарплата (т. е. 1000 /базовая миним. зарпл./ х 100 = 100000 драм), за каждый год с момента неявки призывника с нарушением закона “О воинской службе”, до исполнения последнему 27 лет (для офицеров запаса – 35 лет и фиксированная ставка - за год 100 тыс. драм).

Сумма, которую должен заплатить в бюджет нарушитель определяется в каждом конкретном случае отдельным коэффициентом в зависимости от семейного положения, образовательного ценза и пр. обстоятельств, которые перечисляются в ст.2 закона. Закон распространяется на лиц, подлежащих призыву на обязательную воинскую службу в РА с осеннего призыва 1992г. до октября 2007г. Учитывая актуальность проблемы, ряд общественных организаций и Новообразованное Миндиаспоры семьи дипломата высокого ранга, официально уехавшего с семьей из РА и работающего за рубежем непрерывно несколько лет. Кроме этого, указанный молодой человек был официально (!) переведен из Государственного университета РА в Государственный университет страны пребывания родителей. Покидая Армению, он не получили особого разрешения Минобразования, о чем не был предупрежден ни на какой-либо стадии обучения или пребывания с родителями за рубежом. По окончании ВУЗа и защиты диссертации молодой человек, желая приехать в РА вдруг узнал, что он уголовный преступник и уже несколько лет находит в розыске в РА, в связи с уклонением от воинской обязанности!
выдвинули предложение о продлении его действия. Неурегулированность данного вопроса для многих мигрантов является наиболее мощным удерживающим фактором при их желании вернуться в РА. Об этом свидетельствует тот факт, что вопрос в отношении статуса военнообязанных, не прошедших воинскую службу, является одним из главных 4 вопросов, задаваемых Агенству по Миграции на специальном сайте 42, в рамках интернет проекта Агенства по возвращению мигрантов домой.

Уже давно назрел вопрос открытия спецчастей для армян из диаспоры, желающих пройти воинскую службу в РА, и комплектацию воинского состава из специалистов владеющих 2-3 языками. С другой стороны, возвращаясь к вопросу законоамнистии, следует отметить, что сама форма подачи заявления, его регистрация и рассмотрение - это также достаточно сложный процесс, требующий его постоянного отслеживания заявителем или уполномоченными им лицами. Мы считаем, что гораздо эффективнее могла бы быть виртуальная форма прохождения данного процесса с возможностью выплаты и получением электронного военного билета, который заменяется бумажным в соответствующих странах проживания, в консульствах РА. Аналогом может служить процесс получения электронной визы, который широко практикуется во многих странах, в том числе и в РА. Мы предлагаем использовать возможность решения данного вопроса с применением новейших информационных технологий, путем создания виртуального процесса регистрации (в т.ч. отправления документов и оплаты). Это позволит резко увеличить количество обращающихся лиц и сразу же решить вопрос коррупции при подобных оформлениях.

При решении указанной проблемы одним из сложных элементов, на наш взгляд, является и тот факт, что ко всему прочему, основная часть мигрантов из РА получило иностранное гражданство с нарушением “Закона о гражданстве” РА. Согласно ст. 25 закона они могут быть лишены гражданства РА 43 без права его восстановления. Следует указать, что после референдума по изменениям в Конституции РА (проведен 27 ноября 2005 г.) и данный вопрос также был несколько смягчен. Принятые изменения в Конституции РА послужили основой для статьи 13.1 о двойном гражданстве “Закона о гражданстве РА”. Данная статья указывает, что

42 См. Официальный сайт Агентства по миграции Министерства территориального управления РА, http://www.backtoarmenia.am/, visited on 25.06.09.
43 Տես ՀՀ Քաղաքացիության մասին, ԻՌԵԿ ՀՀ օրենսդրության էլեկտրոնային շտեմարան:
лица, которые приняли или получили гражданство иного государства до 1 января 1995г., не выходя из гражданства РА в установленном законом порядке, а также граждане, в одностороннем порядке отказавшиеся от гражданства РА, признаются лицами, имеющими двойное гражданство. Они признаются РА “исключительно как граждане РА и имеют все права и обязанности граждан РА, за исключением случаев, предусмотренных законом или международными договорами РА”.

И здесь следует отметить, что первоначальный запрет в отношении двойного гражданства, закрепленный в ст. 14 Конституции РА от 1995г., фактически устанавливал заслон на миграционные потoki армян из внешнего мира в РА, ограничивая их выбор исключительно одним гражданством.

Некоторой уступкой армянской Диаспоре следует считать факт предоставления лицам армянского происхождения гражданства РА в упрощенном порядке⁴⁴, либо предоставление специального вида на жительство в РА (сроком на 10 лет, с правом продления). Тем не менее, их права во многом были ограничены. К примеру, они не имели права приобретать в собственность землю (только недвижимость в виде зданий и сооружений), не пользовались правами граждан РА при поступлении в высшее учебное заведение, не имели права принимать участие в выборах и пр.

Положение частично изменилось в связи с принятыми поправками к Конституции РА референдумом от 27 ноября 2005г. Важнейшей из данных поправок стало введение в РА двойного гражданства ст.30.1 Конституции РА, а также уравнивания прав для данной категории граждан во многих сферах деятельности (к примеру, право на приобретение недвижимости – земли, право на выбор статуса при поступлении в ВУЗ-ы РА и пр.) с правами граждан РА⁵⁵.

Данный процесс идет очень медленно, поскольку связан с заключением двусторонних международных договоров РА. Глобально он возымел свое воздействие и все больше армян живущих за рубежом вовлекается в экономическое и политическое развитие РА. Однако, до сих пор, этические армяне граждане иных государств имеют в каком-то смысле “подвешенный” статус, поскольку нет отдельного закона, учитывающего их статус и интересы. До сих пор множество из них сталкиваются с

⁴⁴ См. Конституцию Республики Армения, 2005г., ст.11.3.
⁵⁵ См. Конституцию Республики Армения, 2005г., ст.30.1, ИРТЕК Республики Армения.
множеством проблем: при оказании медицинской помощи с них взимается двойной тариф как с обычных иностранцев, зачастую их с нарушением закона призывают в армию РА, не определены их права и обязанности при трудоустройстве на территории республики и т.п.

Следующими основными нормативными актами, которыми должны регулироваться миграционные процессы в РА, должны были быть административный и уголовный кодексы. Однако следует отметить, что они либо не содержат соответствующих статей, либо их санкции не соответствуют действительности и тяжести данных преступлений.

К примеру, в кодексе об административно-правовых нарушениях (AK) до сих пор существует множество анахронизмов, связанных с СССР, особенно в отношении иностранцев и лиц без гражданства.

Так, согласно ст.23 в качестве вида административной ответственности в отношении иностранцев или лиц без гражданства предполагается их административная депортация с территории СССР(!), если они допускают административные правонарушения, которые грубо нарушают советскую правовую систему (трагикомично, но данная статья, как и многие другие в иной части подвергалась изменению в 16.01.2006г., однако, анахронизмы не были откорректированы или удалены)⁴⁶.

В отношении иностранцев на общих основаниях может быть принято решение и об административном аресте (ст. 262). Проживание граждан без паспорта (речь о тех, кто должен его иметь), или проживание с недействительным паспортом, или проживание без регистрации порождает штраф размером...50% или 100% от МЗП, т.е. от 500 до 1000 драмов (ст.195)⁴⁷. К сожалению, также не ясно, как регулируется данный вопрос с иностранцами, но на регулирование хотя бы вопросов внутренней миграции мизерность подобного штрафа явно не способствует.

Непосредственно к иностранцам относится ст. 201 AK “О нарушении иностранцами правил пребывания или транзита через РА”. Нелегальные мигранты или мигранты, нарушающие порядок пребывания, включая незаконное пребывание после срока окончания визы, или порядка транзита через РА, наказываются за подобное нарушение мизерным штрафом от 1 до 3 МЗП, т.е. 1000 или 3000 драмов (!).

⁴⁶ НК РФ, ст.23, §27.2; НК РФ, ст.47.2.
⁴⁷ НК РФ, ст.195.
Приглашающая иностранца сторона, нарушая порядок оплаты затрат по его пребыванию (вкл. возможные медицинские расходы и выезд из страны), штрафуется таким же мизерным штрафом. Совершенно не соответствует современным реалиям наказание юридических лиц (работодателей) за обеспечение нелегальных мигрантов работой – в размере от 2 до 4 МЗП, т.е. 2000 и 4000 тыс. драм (обратим внимание, что данные статьи в последний раз были изменены в 2005г.).

Следующая статья 195.1 "О нарушение правил регистрации в государственном регистре населения" также предполагает крайне мизерный штраф (50% или 100% от МЗП, т.е. от 500 до 1000 драмов), притом, что ее можно считать наиболее болезненной с точки зрения регулирования миграционных процессов граждан РА. Статья предписывает гражданину РА, выбывающему из страны более чем на 6 месяцев, или проживающему за рубежом более чем 6 месяцев, или рожденному вне РА, в предусмотренном законом порядке уведомить об этом посольство или консульство РА за рубежом, представив адрес постоянного проживания. Статья 195.2 предполагает штраф в 500(!) драмов гражданам РА, которые получили или приняли гражданство иного государства, не сообщив об этом полномочным органам Правительства РА. Примечательно, что несмотря на мизерные штрафы, данные правонарушения порождают "эффект домино". Они влекут за собой другие более серьезные правонарушения и создают значительные проблемы, например, у военнообязанных граждан мужского пола при смене гражданства, о чем мы писали ранее.

В плане санитарно-гигиенической и эпидемиологической безопасности государства, АК имеет ряд статей непосредственно или косвенно относящихся к глобальным миграционным процессам – это ст. 109 "Изъятие материалов (вещей/ ýУáöÃ»ñ/) не прошедших обработку и карантинную проверку (привезенных из-за границы различными видами перевозок)" (штраф 15 МЗП для граждан и 20 МЗП.

48 Считается, что в Армении нет нелегальной трудовой миграции, но это не так. У нас даже образовались специальности, которые, как правило, занимают иностранцы, например, работники казино, танцовщицы-стриптизерши и т.д.

49 << ЧО, н.195.2, ղեկավար ունեց: Данная статья больше не существует (на 2013г.), она слегка переменилась и переместилась в УК РА (ст.314’1) и уже предполагает от 3-х до 5-ти лет тюремного заключения для граждан РА, которые находятся на государственной службе и с нарушением закона получили иное гражданство, либо скрыли данное обстоятельство при поступлении на госслужбу.
для должностных лиц, т.е. 15 или 20 тыс. драмов). Статья 112.5 "Осуществление международных и внутриреспубликанских перевозок животных, продуктов или сырья животного происхождения или иных продуктов, подлежащих госконтролю без прохождения ветеринарно-медицинской экспертизы" предполагает штраф от 100 до 200 МЗП. Неуместность подобного штрафа очевидна, если учесть, что статья в последний раз изменена в 04.05.2005г. (т.е. уже во время распространения по миру коровьего бешенства). В связи с темпами и географией распространения за последние 5 лет антропогенных мутаций: коровьего бешенства, куриного, свиного гриппа и т.п., подобные "штрафы" просто немыслимы. Но о чем можно говорить, если за "невыполнение рекомендаций данных органом, осуществляющим государственный санитарно-гигиенический и противозаразномедицинский контроль, или препятствование проверкам, исследованиям и административному делопроизводству, которые осуществляются органами государственного санитарного контроля" предполагаются штрафы от 3 до 10 МЗП для граждан и от 40 до 100 МЗП для должностных лиц (при повторном деянии - немного выше)!51.

Необходимо отметить, что в АК начисто отсутствуют санкции по санитарно-эпидемиологическому контролю в отношении людских потоков. К сожалению, в Армении только в 2009 – в связи с эпидемией свиного гриппа, предпринимались робкие попытки по регулированию данных вопросов, которые давно осуществляются во многих странах мира. Мы предлагаем внести на контрольно-пропускных пунктах границах РА санитарно-эпидемиологический контроль, и наряду с таможенной декларацией заполнить декларацией о здоровье мигрантов.

Данный контроль, как правило, проводится до пересечения государственной границы мигрантами - на воздушном судне, поезде, корабле и т.д. Он включает в себя ряд превентивных мероприятий, и, как правило, основан на обязательном заполнении "Декларации о здоровье при въезде/выезде"52. Кроме общих сведений о пассажире, там должны быть отмечены:

50 << ЧО, h.112.5, ԵՎՕ ՏՀ;
51 << ЧО, h.42.1, ԵՎՕ ՏՀ;
52 Описание Декларации о здоровье при въезде-выезде (Health Declaration form on entry-exit) дается нами на основании образца, действующего в аэропорту ПУ Дон (г. Шанхай) КНР (2005г.).
1. предыдущая страна (город) пребывания (14 дней до прибытия);
2. место, контактные номера, адрес пребывания в стране на последующие 14 дней после прибытия;
3. список симптомов (температура, лихорадка, кашель, затрудненное дыхание и пр.)
4. список заболеваний (предлагается отметить, чем больны в т.ч. психиатрические (видимо имеются в виду психические, И.М.) расстройства, туберкулез легких, венерические заболевания, проказа, СПИД, вкл. ВИЧ);
5. температура тела (указывается непосредственно заполняющим бланк или, при необходимости, медперсоналом),
6. абзац с надлежащим местом для подписи о достоверности и точности данной информации.

Параллельно, заполняется Карта на въезд (Entry Card), где кроме общих сведений, целей пребывания, номера визы, номера транспортирующего средства и пр. повторяется вопрос о месте пребывания и особо подчеркивается серьезная ответственность пассажира при предоставлении неверной и не полной информации.

Правовой вакум в вопросах миграционного регулирования отображается и в Уголовном Кодеексе РА (УК). Однако, положение кардинально улучшилось после 2011г., когда он пополнился рядом очень важных статей, направленных против траффикинга, содержащих более соответствующее (строгое) наказание (ст.132, 132’2, 132.3).

Тем не менее, благодаря мизерности его санкций по ряду иных аспектов международной преступной деятельности, связанной с нелегальной миграцией Армения может стать привлекательной зоной для транснациональных преступных группировок, в их числе: продажа человеческих органов, с тяжелыми последствиями для жертвы (ст. 125 максимальное наказание от 2-х до 6 лет), изготовление порнографии с использованием несовершеннолетних (ст. 166, штраф от 200 до 400 МЗП, тюремное заключение от 1-5 лет, при отягощающих обстоятельствах максимум 7 лет), секс с несовершеннолетними (ст. 141, штраф от 100 до 200 МЗП, максимальное

53 Описание Карты на въезд (Entry Card) дается нами на основании образцов, действующих в аэропортах КНР Пу Дон (г. Шанхай, 2005г.) и Урумчи (2012г.).
54 ՀՀ Քրեական Oրենսգիրք (ՀՀ ՔՕ), ԻՌՏԵԿ օրենսդրության էլեկտրոնային շտեմարան:
наказание - 2 года), используя принуждение – ст.140 - штраф от 200 до 300 МЗП, максимальное наказание - 3 года⁵⁵, рекрутирование заведомо нелегальных мигрантов (вообще ненаказуемо) и пр. Напомним еще раз, что коэффициент, по которому рассчитывается штраф, равен 1000 драмов и согласно нашему законодательству, преступники могут быть амнистированы или досрочно освобождены решением суда после прохождения 1/3 тюремного заключения (!).

К сожалению, во всех перечисленных случаях несоразмерность наказаний с одной стороны, отсутствие обязательной конфискации имущества с другой стороны привносят коррупционный элемент и делают подобную преступную деятельность экономически привлекательной, а значит неизбежной.

Упущения способствующие вовлечению граждан РА в негативные миграционные процессы существуют и в Семейном кодексе РА. Статья 106 регулирует порядок выплаты алиментов лицом, выезжавшим из страны за рубеж на постоянное место жительства. Проблема усыновления рассматривается кратко в ст. 112 “О детях подлежащих усыновлению”, которая разрешает усыновление детей, проживающих в РА, в семьи иностранных граждан, лиц без гражданства и граждан РА за рубежом на общих основаниях(!). Единственное условие, усыновление данной категорией лиц может осуществляться в отношении детей, которых не усыновили граждане РА, проживающие в стране или родственники ребенка. Статья 150 “Об усыновлении” уточняет, что усыновление детей граждан РА иностранными гражданами, лицами без гражданства и гражданами РА за рубежом осуществляется решением правительства в случае наличия предварительного согласия (видимо речь о согласии органов опеки и попечительства, в законе не уточняется, прим. И.М.).

Формально, дети-граждане РА, усыновленные вне страны, пользуются защитой своих прав и интересов со стороны консульств РА (состоят там на учете до совершеннолетия), в разрешенных рамках международного права и если международными договорами РА не предусмотрено иное.

Учитывая современные реалии – это страшная беспечность, которая вкупе с недоработками УК РА может быть использована транснациональными преступными

⁵⁵ В дополнение можно привести еще массу подобных статей УК (ст.140, 142, 261, 262 и др.), несоразмерность наказаний которых вызывает недоумение и возмущение.
группировками по вывозу детей в криминальных целях (проституция, продажа органов, порнография, рабский труд и т.п.)

Не только дети, но и совершеннолетние граждане РА менее защищены при браке, чем граждане большинства стран, имеющих длинную миграционную историю. Суть в том, что международное частное право многие коллизии решает на основании места проживания супругов и гражданства одного из них, как правило, не учитывая разницы подходов законодательств стран гражданства лиц, состоящих в браке. Вопросы при разводе касающиеся: опеки детей, наследования после брака долгов одного из супругов, порядок разделения их доходов и порядок владения движимым имуществом (статус недвижимости, определяется законодательством места его нахождения, прим. И.М.) – является предметом многочисленных судебных тяжб сторон, где наши граждане практически не имеют защиты или помощи со стороны государства.

Согласно ст. 143 Семейного кодекса, РА признает брак, заключенный вне своей территории его гражданином с иностранным гражданином или лицом без гражданства, только в случае подтверждения данного брака соответствующим армянским консульством РА. Таким же образом регулируются вопросы признания брака недействительным или его расторжения. Согласно ст. 144 и 145, указанные процессы между гражданами РА и иностранными гражданами и лицами без гражданства, регулируются законодательством страны заключения брака, с дальнейшим подтверждением консульством РА. Не трудно заметить, что во-первых, армянские консульства есть не во всех странах мира, во-вторых, во множестве государств, таких как США, РФ, Канада, Индия, Китай, Германия, Франция и т.д., необходимо преодолеть огромные расстояния, чтобы в них попасть. Учитывая только дороговизну юридической помощи, билетов и необходимости приодолевания огромных расстояний, следует констатировать, что при конфликтной ситуации или необходимой срочной помощи, гражданам РА вообще не на что рассчитывать\(^{56}\).

---

\(^{56}\) В консультативной практике автора встречались множество случаев, когда армянские граждане не имели возможности на защиту своих прав и были вынуждены уходить, оставляя детей и/или имущество (широчайшая география от США до Германии). В некоторых случаях им приходилось расплачиваться по долгам супруга (Швеция), или подвергаться разноплановым унижениям, связанным с культурно-религиозными особенностями супруга (брак с мусульманами в Индии).
Приемлемым решением проблемы на раннем этапе могла бы стать разработка обязательного (или хотя бы рекомендуемого) для граждан РА образца брачного контракта с иностранцами и лицами без гражданства, при заключении брака вне страны.

В данном документе должны будут учтены необходимые минимальные гарантии в отношении имущественных и неимущественных прав наших граждан. Создание портала электронной юридической службы (платной, бесплатной, частично оплачиваемой международными и др. донорами и т.д.) по основным странам расселения армянской диаспоры. На портале привести наиболее важные выборки законодательства по браку, ответить на наиболее часто встречаемые вопросы, разместить координаты юристов армян в данных странах и т.п.

Неурегулированными остаются и вопросы трудового порядка. Трудовой кодекс РА (далее ТК РА) не предусматривает разницы между гражданами РА, лицами без гражданства или иностранцами в процессе трудовых отношений. Кодекс не ставит различия между иностранными гражданами-армянами и иными иностранцами (ст.15). В ТК РА не нашли место нормы, которые приняты во многих государствах и направлены на защиту прав собственных граждан (а также иностранных граждан, принадлежащих к единой национальности с государствообразующей нацией) и трудового рынка страны от возможных последствий массовой миграции иностранцев. Единственное, что ст.7 п.4 отмечает, что если работодателем является иностранное государство или его дипломатическое представительство, иностранная компания или иностранный гражданин, то нормы ТК или иные нормативные акты (области труд. отношений) распространяются на возникающие трудовые отношения с работниками, постоянно проживающими в РА, без нарушения дипломатической неприкосновенности. Пункт 5 данной статьи также отмечает, что регулирование трудовых отношений между иностранными работодателями и работниками, не проживающими постоянно в РА, но работающими на территории РА не регулируются.
ТК или иными нормативными актами РА в области трудового права. Фактически данные правоотношения регулируются законом РА "Об иностранцах".

Отдельно необходимо отметить, что в Армении отсутствуют и до сих пор не приняты специальные законы, регулирующие вопросы международной трудовой миграции населения РА. Наиболее опасным является отсутствие норм, регулирующих деятельность посреднических организаций по найму и трудовых агентств. Сегодня их деятельность зачастую сразу же противозаконна, с точки зрения принимающего государства. Примером может служить отправление из Армении в статусе туристов лиц, которые заведомо сообщают о своем желании остаться в принимающей стране или намерении переправиться в третью страну, с последующей попыткой устройства на работу.

Отсутствие нормативного регулирования данных процессов тем более удивительно, что трудовая миграция является важной статьей доходов множества государств, в том числе и РА. По самым скромным подсчетам, трансферты от международной трудовой миграции пересылаемые в страну составляют в среднем от 9 до 30% ВВП Армении в зависимости от источников, а также рассматриваемого года.

Важным показателем отсутствия общенациональной миграционной стратегии и политики может служить и "Закон об образовании" РА. Остановимся на основных упущениях. Закон включает одинаковый коэффициент оплаты (как правило, двойной) для обучения всех иностранцев, не принимая в расчет интересы армян, имеющих иное гражданство. К примеру, получается, что гражданине Грузии - грузин и этнический армянин платят одинаковую сумму. В течение 2009г. была попытка решить данный вопрос для отдельной категории наших соотечественников. Так, в 07.10.2009г. была принята поправка «О внесении дополнений в закон об образовании РА», согласно которой со студентов армянской национальности, обучающихся в платной системе РА, имеющих иное гражданство (прописку), и проживающих в НКР, в регионах Грузии Самцхе-Джавахк и Квемо-Картли, запрещается взимать оплату выше, чем с граждан РА. А с момента вступления закона в силу 01.08.2010г. должны были быть пересмотрены все договора с указанной категорией студентов в сторону понижения оплаты за обучение59. Данный позитивный шаг должен иметь свое логическое продолжение. Ведь указанная проблема касается не только наших

59 Слуцкий "Черногория: внешнеэкономическая политика" и др., 10.07.2009г., 17.05.2010г, 17.05.2010г.
соотечественников из указанных регионов, но и других тоже, а также относится и к
бывшим согражданам.

Конституция РА дает право каждому на образование (ст.39) и только за гражданами
РА оставляет право получать бесплатное образование в государственных высших
и иных специальных образовательных учреждениях на конкурсной основе в
установленном законом порядке.

В 2010г. были приняты существенные поправки к закону об образовании,
главная из них за 23.06.2010г. дает право гражданам РА, имеющим двойное
гражданство, самим решать порядок поступления в РА: в качестве предусмотренном
правительством для граждан РА или иностранцев. Это очень важный элемент
развития сферы образования. И дело не только в наличии исторической диаспоры,
но и современного фактора вынужденной миграции, превратившего многих
армян в иностранных граждан. Не проводя различий между иностранцами по
признаку этногенеза, мы упускаем возможность сделать обучение в РА более
привлекательным.

Другим важным упущением в сфере проводимой политики в данной сфере является
факт отсутствия в РА дистанционного обучения с использованием современных
технологических возможностей, что актуально не только в отношении Диаспоры, но
и регионов Армении.

Есть проблемы и в отношении граждан РА, обучающихся за рубежом. Так в
РА сложилась двойная прискорбная практика: во-первых, практически все те,
кто обучается за рубежом за государственный счет, не приезжают обратно и нет
правового механизма, по которому можно было бы потребовать у них вернуть
затраченные государством средства. Имеет смысл обратиться к мировой практике,
а также использовать опыт и советского периода – ввести договорной залог и
обязательство возвращения в страну, и работы в выбранном государственным
органом регионе РА.

Как мы неоднократно указывали, несмотря на то, что значительная часть
этических армян проживает вне РА, в законодательных актах данный веский
фактор практически не отображается. Не является исключением и закон “Об
иностранных”. 
Согласно ст. 2 закона этнические армяне приравниваются к прочим иностранцам и согласно ст.5 наряду с иными иностранцами в РА пользуются правами и свободами, установленными нормами международного права и законодательством РА, т.е. наши соотечественники НЕ ИМЕЮТ никаких привилегий даваемых по принципу этнической принадлежности к титульной нации. Нелишне отметить, что указанный принцип основанный на этнической идентичности, действует практически во всех странах, имеющих диаспоры – напр. в Израиле, Греции, Германии и даже Турции. Единственной уступкой можно считать введенный в закон в 2011г. п.4.1 в ст.9, который позволяет армянам по происхождению получать визу на границе в том случае, если это не предусмотрено для других граждан данного государства. Граждане указанного государства, армяне по происхождению, для получения визы на границе РА (а не в консульстве или посольстве страны гражданства) должны предоставить доказательства своего армянского происхождения (перечень документов определяется решением правительства РА, видимо речь о церковных метриках или иных документах, прим. И.М.).

Серьезным несоответствием реалиям являются ст.10 и ст.13 (п.2 в редакции 8.12.11г.) закона. Статья 10 (п.3) предусматривает возможность получения визы прямо на границе РА в пограничных пунктах (в т.ч. в аэропортах). Во первых, подобной практикой значительно ослабляется контроль над нелегальной или нежелательной миграции. Во вторых, создаются ситуации, когда РА открывает двери перед гражданами иных государств, этническое происхождение которых может нести прямую угрозу национальной безопасности РА. Тем самым Армения провоцирует возможное скопление у своих границ нежелательных или потенциально нелегальных мигрантов, о которых возможно придется заботиться, а в ряде случаев и финансировать их возвращение на родину.

Данное положение предусматривается ст.6 указанного акта. Согласно ей мигрант может получить отказ в получении визы РА на ее границе (п.3), и в случае отсутствия у мигранта средств на возвращение в страну гражданства или прибытия, данные

---

60 Например, граждане большинства европейских государств, США, стран Британского содружества и т.д. могут получить визу на границе. Однако уже много лет в данных странах проживают и имеют гражданство многочисленные неевропейские национальные и религиозные меньшинства (в т.ч. и турки, курды, чеченцы и т.д.; члены различных экстремистских группировок).
расходы могут быть возложены на перевозчика или на РА, в порядке, предусмотренном правительством РА (п.4).

В указанном контексте более чем странно смотрится ст.13 (п.2 в редакции 8.12.11г.) закона, которая разрешает иностранцам пересекать транзитом РА (сухопутным путем) не имея визы или билета в третье государство. Формально она принята для граждан ИРИ следующим в Грузию, но может быть использована в целях нелегальной миграции и другими иностранцами, и тогда встает их вопрос экстрадиции из третьего государства в РА, а из РА далее, уже с возможными расходами из армянского бюджета, согласно ст.6.

Другим несоответствием является возможность осуществления массовой экстрадиции из РА, что следует из контекста ст.3 закона, а с другой стороны - категорический запрет на ее осуществление (согласно ст. 32, п.3) и др.

В итоге порядок, (но не технология) предоставления визы, ослабление функций пограничного контроля и многие другие, рассмотренные ранее нормативные акты, не отвечают современным реалиям. Как мы отмечали, этому способствует недостаточная разработанность национальной миграционной программы, отсутствие единого органа госуправления, координирующего управление миграцией, отсутствие четкого разделения обязательств существующих структур, которые занимаются этим вопросом, отсутствие взаимосвязанной системы сбора и анализа информации о миграции, а так же недостаточно развитая система обмена данными между учреждениями, занимающимися миграцией.

Отмечая проблемы регулирования миграционных процессов в РА, экспертами различных стран выделяются не только отрицательные, но и положительные и передовые аспекты армянского опыта. Речь в частности идет о внедрение современных информационных технологий в области регулирования и управления миграционными

61 Сегодня в РА постепенно переезжают национальные меньшинства из других стран (напр. цыгане). Их права гарантируются Всеобщей декларацией прав человека, ст. 14.1 Конституции РА и рядом иных актов. Завтра, вопрос их массовой экстрадиции будет сложно решаемым. Примером тому Франция, которая при высылке цыган в октябре 2010г. подверглась резкой критике со стороны СЕ, несмотря на то, что действовала в рамках законодательства ЕС.

62 Как мы указали, кроме Миграционного Агентства, входящего в Министерство территориального управления, вопросами миграции занимаются МИД, Служба Нацбезопасности (2-е подразделение), Пограничная служба РФ, Полиция (Отдел Виз и Регистрации, Подразделение по борьбе с нелегальной миграцией и международной преступностью, Подразделение по борьбе с траффикингом и пр.), Администрация Президента РА, Министерство Труда и Соцобеспечения и т.д.
потоками на границе в контрольно-пропускных пунктах РА. К ним относятся “Информационная Система Перевозка” (“ИС Перевозка”)63 в аэропорту Звартноц РА и Информационная Система Управления Границами (“ИСУГ”)64.

Для содействия процессу внедрения инновационных разработок в сфере госуправления были внесены некоторые изменения в законодательные акты РА и принят ряд поднормативных актов, главный из них – Постановление Правительства РА от 22 июня 2006 г. № 884-Н “О создании электронной системы управления границами, и об установлении порядка эксплуатации системы и утверждении списка пользователей системы”.

Высоким показателем значимости армянских разработок в данной области стало соглашение между соответствующими органами РА и оргкомитетом стран СНГ по внедрению указанной системы в странах входящих в ОДКБ.

В связи с этим можно однозначно утверждать, что существует огромный разрыв между технологическим обеспечением и механизмом контроля миграционных потоков в РА и законодательным полем РА.

Кроме того, что необходимо произвести пересмотр основных актов, регулирующих или косвенно связанных с миграционными процессами, следует создать всермянскую Концепцию по Миграции65. В нее должны войти основные

63 “ИС Перевозка” была создана армянскими специалистами из компании “Авиаинфотел” и внедрена с 1999 г. в международном аэропорту “Звартноц” (ныне - “Международные аэропорты Армения”). Она позволяет с использованием высоких информационных технологий (ИТ) выполнять не только задачи по управлению жизнедеятельности аэропорта, но и осуществлять миграционный контроль, что входит в информационный комплекс под названием “Контроль пассажиропотока в а/п Звартноц”.

64 “ИСУГ” решает задачи направленные на облегчение и упрощение миграционных процессов происходящих в законных и приемлемых целях; осуществляет идентификацию и предотвращение всех форм нелегальной миграции; управление процессами выдачи виз и разрешений; выявление на границах уголовно преследуемых лиц, розыскиваемых республиканскими и международными правоохранительными органами; контроль транзитных потоков лиц, грузов и транспортных средств; обеспечивает выполнение международных и межправительственных соглашений РА по вопросам контроля миграционных процессов и т.д. С 1999 г. система внедрена во всех консульствах РА, в управлении выдачи виз и разрешений ПО и полиции РА (ОВИР); в пунктах пропуска международного аэропорта Звартноц. Она обслуживает в реальном масштабе времени органы национальной безопасности и полиции РА. В 2004-2005 гг. Система была внедрена в контрольно-пропускном пункте Баграташена (государственная граница Армении с Грузией) и в контрольно-пропускном пункте Мегри (государственная граница Армении с Ираном). С 2007 г. Система была внедрена и в остальных основных контрольно-пропускных пунктах РА. Также разработка компании “Авиаинфотел”.

65 Министерство диаспоры РА и Агентство по миграции Министерства территориального управления РА раздельно предпринимают попытки в указанном направлении. Министерство
понятия, очерчены основные вектора развития государственного регулирования миграционных процессов. Это даст возможность с одной стороны произвести скрупулезный пересмотр законодательства, начиная с поэтапного пересмотра кодексов РА, в контексте регулирования миграционных процессов и сопутствующей деятельности (в том числе возможной преступной). Подобный подход к проблеме поможет определить приоритеты в разработки новых нормативных и поднормативных актов, регулирующих данную область правоотношений.

Приоритетные направления в области правового регулирования миграционных процессов на ближайшие десятилетия: Армения и Диаспора - тенденции, прогнозы и перспективы.

Главные международные тенденции в сфере регулирования миграционных процессов на ближайшие десятилетия будут формироваться вокруг нескольких факторов:

Экологический фактор – связан с последствиями глобального изменения климата и природными катализмами;

Фактор политики ассимиляции – основан на отказе от построения мультикультурного общества, озвученного сразу несколькими главами европейских государств – Франции66, Германии67 и Великобритании68 - основными центрами притяжения миграционных потоков в Европе;

Продолжение роста нелегальной миграции – происходит на фоне интенсивной трудовой миграции и продолжает процветать в связи с поддержкой принимающих государств, которые получая налоги, избегают социальных обязательств в отношении нелегальных трудовых мигрантов;

Фактор вынужденной миграции (наибольший поток идет из стран Африки, а в связи с революциями начала 2011гг. в основном из стран Магриба) – происходит из-за увеличения революций, вооруженных конфликтов, обострения межнациональных отношений в мире;

Завершение процесса глобализации мировых миграционных потоков - в ближайшие годы завершится указанный процесс и преобладание международной миграции над внутренней, определятся государства с превалирующей иммиграцией или эмиграцией;

Двойственный характер миграционной политики - ужесточение и регламентация миграционной политики в отношении миграции неквалифицированной рабочей силы, с одной стороны; и увеличение доли миграционных квот и специальных программ для лиц с высоким уровнем образования – с другой.

Пересмотр и ужесточение нормативно-правовой базы в отношении беженцев – казалось бы, события последних пятидесятилетий XXв. полностью оформили нормативно-правовую базу в отношении беженцев. Однако, в связи с цветными революциями, и обострением ситуации в странах Магриба образовывается гигантская волна исламских мигрантов. В 2011 г. только египтян пытающихся выйти из Ливии было около 1 млн. человек. Форсируя средиземное море десятки тысяч беженцев перешли в Италию. Италия в срочном порядке предоставила большинству беженцев вид на жительство, открыв для них вход в другие страны Шенгенского соглашения. Подвергаясь критике за подобную политику, Италия устами министра ВД в апреле 2011 г. заявила о возможности инициирования пересмотра базовых соглашений ЕС по беженцам.

Огромная иноконфессиональная миграционная волна заставляет страны Европы внести значимые коррективы и принципиально пересмотреть подходы к беженскому вопросу.
В связи с вышеперечисленными факторами и тенденциями, в области правового регулирования миграционных процессов следует ожидать принятия ряда международных и национальных актов по ужесточению миграционной политики, в т.ч. законодательства по беженцам (в первую очередь в европейских странах), ужесточению требований к профессиональным навыкам мигрантов, знанию основ языка, соблюдению культурных обычаях страны-приема, глобальному внедрению миграционных историй, увеличению количества договоров по реадмиссии и т.д.

Интересными и многообещающими в перспективе могут быть миграционные процессы между Арменией и армянской Диаспорой. Как мы уже отмечали, армянская миграция имеет многовековую историю, столько же времени существую армянские колонии, которые в течение веков частично выполняли функции Диаспоры⁶⁹.

Во многом, благодаря миграционным процессам происходит непрерывное приобщение армян к общемировым стандартам развития науки, техники, технологии и культуры. Особенно наглядно данное утверждение для начала XXв., когда в кратчайшие сроки стал возможен стремительный рывок нации из массовой безграмотности, безысходной нищеты начала века в космический век уже в 50-60-е годы⁷⁰.

Приглашенные армянские специалисты и выращенные ими кадры за кратчайший срок построили (частью в прямом смысле) новое разностороннее развитое государство и вывели армянскую нацию в первые ряды образованных и имеющих технологически новаторское мышление наций менее чем через полвека⁷¹. Большую роль в данных процессах сыграл научно-технический потенциал Диаспоры.

⁶⁹ На наш взгляд, само явление организованной армянской Диаспоры и явилось тем источником силы, который позволил армянам потеряв на многие века государственность с честью дойти до XXI в. н.э. сквозь немыслимые испытания. Имеется в виду не только факт физического существования армян сегодня, но и причастность армян ко всем видам деятельности современной цивилизации от информационных технологий до космонавтики.

⁷⁰ В указанный период армянами были разработаны или усовершенствованы новые наукоемкие технологии, проведены фундаментальные научные исследования - братья Орбели, Алиханян, Иосифян, Микаелян, Бурнацян, Микоян, Саркисов, Елян, Гюрзадян, Герун и др.. Подробно см. А.Саркисян, Армяне-военные ученые, конструкторы, производственники и испытатели XX века, , в 2-х томах, изд.Амарас, Ер., 1998.

⁷¹ В Армении за годы Советской власти была создана многочисленная, народная интеллигенция. Только численность работников науки, просвещения, здравоохранения и культурно-просветительных учреждений в 1959г; составила82 тысячи человек против 7 тысяч человек в 1929 году. См. Советская Армения за 40 лет, Статистический сборник, Армянское государственное издательство, Ер., 1960, с.17, 156.
Роль Диаспор очень велика и в экономическом развитии стран-происхождения, поскольку они являются основным катализатором иностранных инвестиций. К примеру, проживающие только в Калифорнии 1 млн. армян имеют годовые доходы/домохозяйств/ более чем в 15 раз выше, чем ВВП Армении (данные за 2006 г.)\(^72\). После независимости РА, 14 больших организаций армянской Диаспоры собирали более 1 млрд. долларов в помощь Армении, причем большинство этой суммы им предоставили неармяне\(^73\).

Диаспора предопределяет и способствует развитию другой производной миграционных процессов – трудовой миграции. Последняя играет иногда большую роль для страны-происхождения, чем иностранные инвестиции. К примеру, для Армении частные трансферты вне официальных благотворительных каналов составили в 2006 г. $ 900 млн., что составило около 30% ВВП указанного года. Из указанных средств 2/3 были перечислены армянами – трудовыми мигрантами, остальная часть - Диаспорой.

Уже давно армянская Диаспора предлагает правительству Армении использовать ее связи, финансовые возможности и создать нетрадиционные финансовые инструменты, такие как национальные инвестиционные фонды, а также организовать Всеармянский банк развития для облегчения национального инвестирования в Армению\(^74\).

Данные предложения уже более 15 лет обсуждаются на уровне правительства. За последнее время новосозданным Министерством Диаспоры РА\(^75\) были начаты работы в указанном направлении - проведены несколько профессиональных форумов

---

\(^{72}\) Отмечая, что с 1988 г. около 1 млн. человек покинули Армению, ученые фиксируют - эта последняя эмиграция была самой высокой квалификации, из них 30% имели высшее образование. Minoian V., Freinkman L., noted work, p. 129.

\(^{73}\) Финансируемый армянским правительством Всеармянский фонд Айастан, один из главных каналов помощи Диаспоры. Уже в первые 10 лет своей деятельности им потрачено $ 75 млн. на 138 инфраструктурных проектов в Армении и Нагорном Карабахе. See at the same place.

\(^{74}\) Данные предложения высказывались делегатами на заседаниях конгрессов Армения-Дiaspora (2001 и 2006 гг.), в том числе автором, в части создания общей базы данных по роду занятий и деятельности компаний, требующимся вакансиям и т.п.

\(^{75}\) Создание Министерства Диаспоры РА (в 2008 г.) Несомненно, одним из самых важных шагов в данном направлении. Это первый государственный орган такого масштаба, который признан, развивать отношения с Диаспорой, способствовать решению вопросов связанных с иммиграцией армян: их репатриации/резаергации, интеграции, сохранению материального и духовного наследия Диаспоры.
(архитекторов, юристов и др.), с приглашением представителей Диаспоры старой и новой волны миграции, а также заинтересованных лиц и организаций РА. В процессе создание транснациональных профильных союзов подобных профессиональным союзам времен СССР.

Однако, формирование вышеуказанных органов мало что изменит, а иные финансовые инструменты вообще не могут быть созданы, поскольку в Армении существует правовой вакум в сфере регулирование миграционных процессов, способствующих многоцелевой миграции армян как внутри страны, так и вне ее.

Решение данных вопросов уже давно должно было стать одним из основных приоритетов современного армянского государства. Как никогда назрела необходимость принятия законов “О культурно-правовом наследии армянской Диаспоры”, “О репатриации” (или “О соотечественниках”)77 и Всеармянской (панармянской) миграционной Программы по международной и внутренней миграции.

Указанные нормативные акты должны дать четкие определения основным понятиям, определить круг прав и обязанностей субъектов правоотношений, определить направления развития.

Основополагающие принципы закона “О культурно-правовом наследии армянской Диаспоры”. Сегодня армянское наследие за рубежом, особенно в странах с угасающими диаспорами распыляется, уничтожается, переходит во владение иных субъектов. Горьким примером может служить армянское наследие не только в Турции и Азербайджане, но и Грузии, Индии, Израиле, Польше, Украине, Сингапуре и т.д.

Принятие закона “О культурно-правовом наследии армянской Диаспоры” поможет РА более активно поддерживать очаги Диаспоры, выступать их представителем и правопреемником в случаях незаконного изъятия, преобразования или уничтожения имущественной составляющей армянского наследия за рубежом. Законом должна быть предусмотрена паспортизация недвижимого имущества армянской Диаспоры.


77 Аналогичные законы имеют Германия, Израиль, РФ и др.
- общественных зданий, сооружений, церквей, общинных земельных участков, кладбищ и пр. Отдельно должны вестись регистрационные работы по каталогизации и оцифровке армянских рукописей, книг и особо ценных архивов по всему миру, включая доступ к уже оцифрованным источникам.

Виртуально-бумажная паспортизация данных объектов и нормативное регулирование подобных правоотношений могут стать не только основой для укрепления связей между Арменией и Диаспорой, но и причиной масштабных научных изысканий по восстановлению информации о культурном наследии армян и их вкладе в развитие многих стран мира. Изучение и распространение подобных сведений позволит укрепить позиции армянских Диаспор и Армении во многих странах мира и будет иметь политический, экономический, культурный и другие эффекты. Законом также должны быть регулироваться взаимоотношения госорганов Армении и Армянской Церкви, в отношении т.н. “покинутого” имущества армянской церкви за рубежом, пересмотрены архивные материалы и завещания, сделанные в прошлом в пользу армянского государства и т.д.

Одним из самых важных шагов на пути урегулирования взаимоотношений РА и Диаспоры должно стать нормативное закрепление статуса наших соотечественников, имеющих иностранное гражданство и проживающих вне страны и принятие закона о репатриации.

Основополагающие принципы закона “О репатриации”. Нормативные акты аналогичные закону “О репатриации” принимались в армянском государстве неоднократно, что мы уже подробно рассмотрели. И сегодня есть насущная необходимость принять подобный закон.

Именно поэтому министерство Диаспоры РА разработало “Концепцию по организации репатриации”. Будучи важным документом, “Концепция” во многом не учитывает современных реалий и не дает четких определений основным понятиям.

Согласно “Концепции” репатриантом называется лицо, имеющее армянское происхождение, но не имеющее гражданство РА, либо лицо являющееся гражданином иностранного государства, принявшее также гражданство РА и добровольно поселившееся в РА на постоянное место жительства.

Получается, что репатриантами являются и армяне из Диаспор, и бывшие граждане Арм. ССР, СССР, которые оказались за рубежом и приняли гражданство других государств. Репатриантами становятся и граждане РА, которые поменяли гражданство РА на гражданство другой страны. Это относятся и к повзрослевшим их детям.

В данном документе отсутствуют разработанный и апробированный еще в период Арм. ССР понятийный аппарат, в котором происходит четкое разграничение понятий репатриантов и рези-мигрантов.

Учитывая развитие миграционных правоотношений в мировой практике сегодня, понятие репатриантов и рези-мигрантов следует еще более детально разделить и конкретизировать. Так, понятие репатриант разделиться на следующие группы: собственно репатриант, репатриант-беженец и вынужденный репатриант. По аналогии должно быть разделено и понятие рези-мигранта: собственно рези-мигрант, рези-мигрант-беженец и вынужденный рези-мигрант.

Репатриант - лицо армянского происхождения, имеющее иностранное гражданство и решившее переехать на постоянное место жительство (ПМЖ) в РА, имеющее имущество, средства на проживание и возможность себя обустроить и т.п.

Репатриант-беженец – это лицо армянского происхождения, имеющее иностранное гражданство, бежавшее из страны происхождения (пребывания) в результате вооруженных конфликтов, стихийных бедствий или иных значимых неблагоприятных факторов, имеющее тяжелое социально-экономическое положение и решившее переехать на ПМЖ в РА.

Вынужденный репатриант - лицо армянского происхождения, имеющее иностранное гражданство (в том числе проживающее в третьей стране), решившее переехать на ПМЖ в РА вследствие неблагоприятного стечения обстоятельств. Несмотря на возможное тяжелое социальное положение, данное лицо по статусу все же является не беженцем, а вынужденным мигрантом (репатриантом).

Ключевыми в данном разделении понятий должны выступать первопричины репатриации.

Данное подробное разделение сделает более действенным разработку механизмов по репатриации и оказания целевой помощи репатриантам-беженцам и
вынужденным репатриантам. По аналогии следует разделять понятия резидента:  
- беженца и вынужденного резидента.

Резидент - это гражданин РА (в том числе бывший), который вследствие миграции обосновался в другой стране, со временем решил переехать на ПМЖ в РА, имеет имущество, средства на проживание и возможность себя обустроить и т.п.

Резидент-беженец - это гражданин РА (в том числе бывший), который вследствие миграции обосновался в третьей стране, и в результате вооруженных конфликтов, стихийных бедствий или иных значимых неблагоприятных факторов в стране пребывания возвратился на ПМЖ в РА, имея тяжелое социально-экономическое положение.

Вынужденный резидент - это гражданин РА (в том числе бывший), который был вынужден покинуть страну пребывания вследствие неблагоприятного стечения обстоятельств. К классическому виду вынужденной резиденции следует отнести и редмиссию.

Подобная скрупулезность в определениях актуальна и потому, что на сегодня Армения не в состоянии выделять дополнительные нецелевые средства, и потому, даваемый статус мигрантам должен сузить и конкретизировать данную помощь.

Сегодня Армения стоит перед новым серьезным витком репатриации. В ближайшие годы образуются огромные массы наших соотечественников, перед которыми заново встанет вопрос о миграции. Ухудшение условий жизни, массовые увольнения, высокий уровень безработицы среди автохтонного населения принимающих стран, обесценивание накопленных сбережений, взлет преступности, революции, вооруженные конфликты, военные действия и пр. проблемы заставят многих армян вновь пуститься в путь.

Куда будет направлен данный поток или как будут решены проблемы данной категории мигрантов, в случае их желания иммигрировать в РА - вопросы, которые необходимо решать быстро и прямо сейчас.

Сегодня в Армении основной вид миграционных правоотношений базируется на внутренней и внешней трудовой миграции, а также проблемах связанных со взаимоотношениями с Диаспорой и иммиграцией соотечественников из-за рубежа.

Внешняя миграция. Внешняя миграция из РА в основном носит трудовой и
Маятниковый характер. Массовая трудовая миграция из Армении началась еще после коллапса экономики в начале 90-х прошлого столетия, войны с Азербайджаном, внутренним политическим и энергетическим кризисом.

Как мы отметили ранее, сегодняшние потоки миграции из/в RA интересны тем, что они практически полностью состоят из представителей титульной нации (т.е. армян), с принадлежностью к единому социокультурному обществу. Данная ситуация могла бы быть в корне иной, если бы к примеру иммигрировать в Армению захотели этнические армяне павликиане-мусульмане из Болгарии, амшенские армяне из Турции, Черноморского побережья РФ и Грузии, исповедующие ислам, но осознающие свою этническую принадлежность. На сегодня иммиграция в Армению, как правило, носит переселенческий, векторный (т.е. безвозвратный) и монанациональный характер.

После распада СССР, в Армении самым болезненным вопросом остается отсутствие рабочих мест и соответствующая реалиям оплата труда. Основными причинами миграции армянского населения на сегодня являются именно два этих фактора.

Интересно, что в армянском обществе на уровне социальных дебатов существует резко негативное отношение к трудовой миграции, хотя при грамотной постановке вопроса можно было бы минимизировать отрицательные аспекты миграции, увеличив положительные тенденции.

По данным Международного валютного фонда, по средней норме прибыльности, экспорт товаров в среднем приносит 20% дохода, тогда как экспорт услуг (т.е. труда мигрантов) - 50%, тем самым, трудовая миграция сама по себе является важной статьей развития государства.

Кроме решения вопросов, связанных с трудоустройством населения, трудовая миграция связывается с привнесением новых технологий и инвестиций в государство-исхода мигрантов. Экспорт рабочей силы приносит государствам-экспортерам немалые доходы от перевода средств мигрантов на родину. Даже для стран, которые вошли в международный рынок труда сравнительно недавно, эта доля достаточно высока. Так доля денежных переводов, как часть ВВП в ряде стран Восточной Европе и в бывшем Советском Союзе составляет: Молдавии (27%), Боснии и Герцеговине (23%), Албании (15%), Таджикистане (12%), Армении (11%), Кыргызстане.
(9%), и Грузии (7%).\textsuperscript{79} А приток частных денежных трансфертов из России в Армению в 2005-2007гг. составил около 81% от их общего объема. Исходя из этого, множество государств активно продвигает своих граждан на международном рынке труда, что способствует их эффективному трудоустройству и активному пополнению госбюджета страны-исхода.

После распада СССР для РА были характерны государственная отстраненность, бессистемность трудовой миграции как внутренней так и внешней (что особенно опасно при внешней миграции) - неустроенность и незащищенность мигрантов.

Подобное положение вещей во многом сохраняется и сегодня. Трудовой мигрант рассматривается законом и государством как обычный мигрант, с широким диапазоном возможного статуса. Не регулируется и деятельность организаций по трудоустройству, которые имеют общекоммерческий статус без соответствующего лицензирования, зачастую не выполняют своих обязательств перед клиентом. Однако, их невозможно привлечь к ответственности, поскольку договора составляются весьма расплывчато, а государственно-правового механизма регулирования в этой области не существует\textsuperscript{80}.

Фактически, экспорт рабочей силы происходит на бытовом уровне, и трудовой мигрант может рассчитывать на поддержку государства только в общем - конституционном смысле института гражданства.

Не участвуя в процессе интеграции Армении в международный рынок труда, особенно сейчас, с распространением мирового финансового кризиса, наше государство начнет терять с трудом получаемые трансферты.

Стоит отметить и тот факт, что армянское государство не в состоянии сегодня оградить своих граждан от недобросовестных рекрутеров и работодателей, делая


\textsuperscript{80} Как отмечается в докладе для ЮНЕСКО за октябрь 2002 - апрель 2004гг., в законе “О занятии” RA предусматривается деятельность негосударственных служб по предоставлению населению услуг по трудоустройству, в том числе за пределами RA, при наличии лицензирования деятельности в соответствии с законодательством. Однако, в принятом при первом чтении законе “О порядке занятия видами деятельности, подлежащих лицензированию” вышеуказанный вид деятельности вообще не указан.
их мишенью для различных мошенников. Подобное упущение в законодательстве оборачивается множеством и других серьезных проблем – трафикинг и рабство, вместо того, чтобы быть одним из основных доходов государства.

К примеру, вопреки распространенному мнению, многие молодые женщины, отправляющиеся на заработки за рубеж, не собираются заниматься проституцией. Многие действительно надеются подработать честным и неунизительным образом, но попадают в безвыходное положение или принуждаются к проституции угрозами или силой.

К сожалению, все эти истории не имеют широкого освещения ни в нашей прессе, ни на телевиденье, что вовлекает все новые количества жертв. Этому способствует, как мы уже указали ранее илазейки в законодательстве, отсутствие значимого материального наказания, амнистии (в числе прочих) данной категории преступников.

Государство, в принципе, могло бы иметь дополнительные доходы в виде налогов на каждый из заключенных трудовых договоров, а наши граждане - иметь гарантии на защиту своих прав от недобросовестных посредников и работодателей. Не следует сбрасывать со счетов и тот факт, что многие из армянских трудовых мигрантов имеют нелегальный статус и уже на основании этого становятся преступниками, преследуемыми в силу закона в государствах-приема. Что касается самой международной трудовой миграции для граждан РА, то необходимо отметить, что несмотря на ряд существенных преимуществ наших граждан на международном рынке труда – образование и/или трудовые навыки выше среднего уровня в стране приема, грамотность (часть би- или три- лингвичность), быстрое усвоение основ нового языка, традиций и обычаев, легкую религиозную интеграцию, армяне пока что без поддержки государства, на общих основаниях, на свой страх и риск, пускаются в дорогу и теряют намного чаще, чем следовало бы.

Для того, чтобы вернее оценить возможный успех армян в международной трудовой миграции стоит отметить, что при государственной поддержке (при надлежащей внутренней и международной двусторонней нормативной базе), использовании разветвленной и мощной диаспоры в ряде государств, экономический и образовательный эффект от трудовой миграции был бы максимально полезным и для государства, и для граждан РА и для Диаспоры.

Говоря о позитивных сторонах миграции, было бы неверным игнорировать негативные последствия миграции - гендерный дисбаланс, нелегальная миграция, трафиккинг, санитарно-
Внутренняя миграция. Кроме внешних миграционных процессов в РА существует непростая проблема внутренней миграции относительно оси «центр-периферия». Это гравитационный миграционный процесс, представленный аккреционными процессами, направленными от периферии к крупным промышленным, научным и культурным центрам, прежде всего — к столице. Учитывая демографическое распределение в РА (более 40% населения живет в столице - Ереване), мы уже имеем город-государство с окрестностями, что с точки зрения национальной безопасности недопустимо. К сожалению, на сегодня практически отсутствует децентрализующая миграционная политика государства, ослабляющая гравитационную миграцию и развитие негативных аккреционных процессов, которые начали набирать темпы еще в советское время.

Статистические данные дают интересную динамику, определяют соотношение городского и сельского населения, сразу же становится видно, что урбанизация Армении начинается с 50-х годов, т.е. после того как страна приняла множество репатриантов-армян.

Продуктивное регулирование и решение миграционных вопросов признано одним из приоритетных направлений деятельности правительства РА в 2011г. Это относится и к вопросу равномерного распределения населения и деурбанизации (Еревана). Правительство заказало глобальный план по распределению населения, который получил Президентскую премию РА. Однако за неимением средств не активизирует данный процесс.


83 Пик процесса притока населения конкретно для Еревана приходился на 70-е, когда были осуществлены великие стройки города и прокладка метрополитена, для чего к Еревану присоединили окружающие деревни и привлекли мигрантов из сельской местности (для получения статуса “миллионной столицы”, дающей право на строительство метрополитена, прим М.И.).
На сегодня, одной из причин неравномерного развития является чрезмерная концентрация бизнеса и производства в столице РА - начиная с предприятий по обработке и выпуску сельхозпродукции до выпуска лекарственных препаратов из природного сырья, все сфокусировано в Ереване.

Говоря о равномерном развитии государства следует обратить особое внимание и на принятие пакета законодательных актов направленных на восстановление малой авиации в РА, еще в советский период связывавшей регионы страны в единый мобильный организм. Использование малой авиации и в медицинских целях, и при проведении спасательных и изыскательских работ, административно-государственном контроле и пр. областях также скачкообразно могло бы поднять развитие регионов РА.

Правительство пытается решить вопрос равномерного развития страны, объявив приоритетные направления развития отдельных городов. Согласно данной стратегии Дилижан должен стать банковско-финансовым центром РА, Гюмри – столицей техноиндустрии и ИТ, Джермук - курортом международного значения и т.д. На все эти преобразования тратится и планируется потратить огромное количество средств, привлекаются спонсоры и инвесторы, но пока все уходит как вода в песок.

На наш взгляд, проблема в том, что государство не связывает данные программы с решением мини - проблем и не старается напрямую заинтересовать конечных потребителей. Когда выгода переселения бизнеса будет очевидна, государству останется лишь построить дороги, провести коммуникации и обновить

84 И это при том, что в среднем из столицы до границ Армении с соседними государствами около 3-4 часов езды на автомобиле, а многие армяне мигранты проживающие в иностранных государствах (в основном мегаполисах) почти столько же времени ежедневно тратят при поездке туда/обратно на работу, т.е. при грамотной постановке вопроса данный психологический барьер можно легко перейти, а налоговые пояса дали бы мощный рывок в развитие регионов.

85 Благодаря усилиям президента НКР, представителей подкомиссии по авиации Общественного Совета при президенте РА под руководством председателя подкомиссии Атбашьяна Д. в течение 2014г. будет открыт авиаарейс Ереван-Степанакерт, что по определению скачкообразно положительно воздействует на экономику и социально-культурную жизнь НКР. Еще в советское время Управление гражданской авиацией РА выполняло 8 рейсов в день только в Степанакерт, перевозя около 500 человек в обоих направлениях. Полет длился 30 мин. Сегодня Перевозка осуществляется маршрутными и частными такси в среднем за 8-9 часов. Планируется возрождение малой авиации в НКР, а затем и в РА, восстановится быстрое сообщение с Капаном, Горисом, Мегри, Гюмри и др. городами Армении.

86 Особое внимание следует уделить проблеме водных коммуникаций и решить вопрос потери 80% водных ресурсов в водопроводной сети.
инфраструктуру, остальное сделает заинтересованный налоговым льготами частный капитал.

К примеру, простым решением вопроса развития приграничных районов могло бы быть их обявление свободными экономическими зонами минимум на 15 лет.

А вопрос перераспределения населения в РА мог бы быть решен в кратчайшие сроки и внебюджетными средствами при принятии пакета законодательных актов о внедрении убывающих налоговых поясов от городов к приграничной сельской местности, с максимально высоким коэффициентом в Ереване и нулевым в приграничных районах.

И это необходимо сделать уже сейчас, поскольку в ближайшее время в Армению /в основном пока в сельскую местность/ в связи с глобальным финансовым кризисом рано или поздно, но вернуться трудовые мигранты армяне, которые не смогли найти подходящую работу вне страны. По длительному же прогнозам, число желающих вернуться или переселиться в Армению будет только увеличиваться, причем не только за счет бывших трудовых мигрантов и переселенцев из РА, а и за счет армянской Диаспоры, исходя из резкого ухудшения состояния мировой экономики и привычных для них условий жизни.

Говоря о различных сторонах миграции и вспомогательных правовых рычагах, регулирующих миграционные процессы, было бы неверным игнорировать негативные последствия миграции. Основные негативные проблемы, требующие срочного регулятивного вмешательства государства, сегодня это обратная сторона трудовой миграции - гендерный дисбаланс, нелегальная миграция, траффикинг, санитарно-эпидемиологическая безопасность и "утечка мозгов".

Гендерный дисбаланс. Неконтролируемая государством миграция приводит в основном к оттоку из страны мужчин репродуктивного возраста. Высокий уровень подобной миграции может стать причиной разрушения генофонда нации, так как большинство трудовых мигрантов – мужчины в возрасте от 19 до 45 лет. В условиях отсутствия общенациональной программы по поддержке этнокультурной жизни диаспор быстро идет процесс ассимиляции подрастающих на чужбине поколений армян, даже в моноэтничных семьях.

Интересно, что данное обстоятельство сильно влияет на снижение преступлений совершенных насилием, поскольку действует фактор феминизации общества (именно феминизация, не суфражизма) и традиционного домашнего воспитания армянских женщин.
Миграция мужского фертильного мужского населения негативно влияет на социально-демографическую обстановку внутри Армении, резко увеличивает количество разводов в республике и увеличивает количество межнациональных браков, в том числе у женщин. Один из аспектов гендерного дисбаланса и сохранения армянского генофонда мог бы быть решен путем принятия закона о создании всеармянского международного брачного банка данных (доступный в Загсах РА, консульствах РА, общинах в Диаспоре и т.д.) при контроле и патронаже правительства РА. Подобная практика давно существует у иных диаспор (индийской, еврейской и др.)

Санитарно-эпидемиологическая безопасность. Влияние на санитарно-эпидемиологическую безопасность также является одной из угроз миграционных процессов. Достаточно сказать, что СПИД в Армению был завезен армянами-мигрантами, а в 2009 в стране от свиного гриппа скончались более 10 человек. Для предотвращения подобного "экспорта" мигрантами необходим принципиально новый подход и правовая база, обеспечивающие контроль в отношении основных параметров здоровья мигрантов, въезжающих в страну. На наш взгляд, решением проблемы могла бы быть всеобщая паспортизация миграционных историй (на подобие банковских) и создание единой информационной базы по различным параметрам в т.ч. и санитарно-эпидемиологическим.

По разработанным и рекомендуемым МОМ правилам, миграционная история в отправляющем государстве должна состоять из следующих основных параметров. **Миграционная история:** собираться ли данный человек работать за границей впервые;

  если данный человек работал за границей ранее: дата первого отъезда из страны для работы за границей;
  страна трудоустройства в течение первого случая работы за границей;
  род занятий в течение первого случая работы за границей;
  количество различных контрактов за рубежом, заключенных до настоящего времени (за исключением учитываемого в настоящий момент);
  период действия последнего контракта (даты начала и окончания);
  страна трудоустройства по последнему контракту;
род занятий по последнему контракту;
дата последнего возвращения в страну;
является ли учитываемый контракт продлением последнего контракта (тот же работодатель) и др.

По замыслу экспертов МОМ внедрение подобных миграционных историй поможет борьбе с нелегальной миграцией на более ранней стадии. Это приведет к более четкому разделению законопослушных трудовых мигрантов от полуlegalных или нелегальных мигрантов, заведомо выявляя нежелательных лиц, еще до их выбывания из страны происхождения. Для Армении это помогло бы предотвратить нежелательную миграцию десятков тысяч наших сограждан, попадающих под категорию нелегальных мигрантов. Сэкономить массу средств, которые данная категория мигрантов затрачивает на выезд из страны. Предотвратить множество случаев траффикинга и депортации, криминализации армянских диаспор и вписывания армян в международные криминальные группировки.

“Утечка мозгов” – это процесс, который является прямым последствием иммиграционной политики богатых стран, куда привлекают квалифицированных иммигрантов. К сожалению, “утечка мозгов” для Армении - это практически осуществившийся факт и суровая реальность. Сегодня, речь может идти лишь о возврате и интеграции потерянных кадров, или лишь небольшой доле приостановления данного процесса. На наш взгляд, одним из сдерживающих факторов могла бы стать закрепленная законодательно выплата залога абитуриентом на время его отсутствия из страны (а не только для военнообязанных как сейчас), при обязательном возвращении и трудовой деятельности, совмещаемой с преподаванием. Это особенно важно для тех случаев, когда обучение было оплачено государством или осуществлялось в рамках межгосударственных программ.

Сегодня в Армении существует ряд межправительственных соглашений по которым ежегодно на обучение выезжает десятки ученников или абитуриентов, из которых практически никто не возвращается, т.е. они учатся на государственные деньги и остаются в стране обучения, не привозя полученные навыки и знания в свою страну, не передавая их другим согражданам. Ярчайший пример - обучение десятков армян

ежегодно в КНР за счет государства, нулевой процент возвратившихся абитуриентов и полное отсутствие национальных кадров по синологии и китайскому языку, что затрудняет торгово-экономические и пр. отношения между странами.

Обращая внимание на необходимость государственной политики по предотвращению “утечки умов”, не стоит также забывать, что в свое время именно миграции высокопрофессиональных специалистов со всех концов мира мы были обязаны ускоренному и скачкообразному развитию Советской Армении.

По мере написания данной работы миграционный фактор приобретал все большую значимость не только в РА, но и для армянских диаспор по всему миру. Иракская война и практическое исчезновение армянской иракской диаспоры, Сирийская война, нарастающий ирано-израильский конфликт - исход армян из Сирии, возможный массовый исход армян из Ирана уже завтра... По последним прогнозам более массовыми станут миграционные потоки армян в связи с новой волной глобального финансового кризиса, который ожидается в связи с падением доллара в 2014-15гг.

Сегодня, несмотря на многочисленные пожелания государственных органов /программы “вернитесь домой” Миграционного Агентства и Миндиаспоры/ и принципиальную готовность общества принять армянских репатриантов/реэмигрантов, армяńskое государство не подготовлено к массовому возвращению наших соотечественников.

Во первых отсутствует государственная программа по репатриации/реэмиграции армянских мигрантов. Во вторых, даже если она в ближайшее время она будет принята, не подготовлены ни международная (межгосударственная) ни национальная правовые базы, для осуществления данной программы. В третьих, отсутствует внятная государственная позиция по их трудоустройству, предоставлению территории для проживания, решению вопросов социального характера мигрантов /в т.ч. обеспечения надлежащего уровня образования, здравоохранения и пр./, а также вопросов по предоставлению льгот (включая льготы военнообязанным, на провоз имущества и оборудования, налоговые отсрочки и пр.). Данные проблемы уже остро стоят в отношении сирийских репатриантов – и вынужденных репатриантов и беженцев, и это при том, что их количество пока ничтожно и не превышает 10000 человек.
При массовом переселении или возвращении армян в РА сегодня, без предварительных серьезных приготовлений, миграционные процессы могут стать не новым фактором и стимулом развития, а национальным стихийным бедствием. А потому их регулирование входит в перечень приоритетных вопросов, требующих внимание органов госуправления.
Основные предложения:

Для решения ряда выдвинутых вопросов в правовом плане считаем необходимым предложить государственным органам произвести многоплановые работы по следующим позициям и направлениям:

а) - внедрения миграционных деклараций в электронном формате (наряду с заполнением документов при получении визы);

- создавая в РА электронного банка миграционных историй;
- введение в РА электронной карты - здоровья мигрантов;
- введение электронного порядка оформления документов для граждан РА не прошедших воинской службы (от подачи документов до оплаты);
- принятия законов “О репатриации”"89 и “Об армянском наследии”90.
- принятие всеармянской (панармянской) миграционной Программы по международной91 и внутренней миграции.
- основание в приграничных районах свободных экономических зон;
- внедрении убывающих налоговых поясов от городов к приграничной сельской местности, с максимально высоким коэффициентом в Ереване.

б) учитывая прошлый опыт и миграционные тенденции для РА, выделение

90 Включая создание и постоянное обновление базы данных по армянскому культурному наследию, особенно вне страны и пр.
91 Значимым пунктом должно быть создание отдельной информационной базы данных по высококвалифицированным специалистам-мигрантам из РА и армянам Спюра, с возможной последующей их кооперацией и интеграцией в РА. Формирование при загасах государственных брачных агентств, работающих со Спюром для создания семей по мононациональному признаку. Проведение сезонных курсов по иностранным языкам для молодежи РА, при содействии волонтеров или пенсионеров из Спюра. Создание оздоровительных платных комплексов по приему пенсионеров из Спюра и др.
миграционного права как важной ветви армянского права, регулирующей общественные отношения в сфере государственно-правового регулирования миграционных процессов, подготовка учебных и методических материалов, способствующих формированию национальных кадров;

- проведение ряда конкретных изменений законодательной базы РА в контексте улучшения миграционного правового поля;
- формирование пакета национальных законов на уровне поднормативных внутриведомственных актов, которые не позволяют иностранному враждебному капиталу и антропотокам иметь существенное влияние на экономику и общественное развитие Армении (и НКР)92. Определение и предоставление приоритета национальным инвестициям93.
- создание спецфондов для нуждающихся мигрантов-армян, решивших переселиться на постоянное жительство в РА, предоставление им льготных ипотечных кредитов по приобретению или строительству жилья, улучшая условия по принципу отдаления от столицы и освобождения от налогов в течение 5 лет94.

92 К примеру, введение ограничений на приобретение недвижимости для иностранцев не являющихся этническими армянами и не имеющих родственников армян первой категории, введение досрочного прекращения визы на пребывание в РА материально необеспеченных иностранных граждан, занимающихся попрошайничеством, бродяжничеством и т.п., экстрадиция иностранных граждан занимающихся общественной пропагандой неприемлемых для армянского общества религиозных и прочих ценностей или асоциальных норм поведения и т.д. (факт приверженности данным ценностям входит в Билль о правах человека, но аспект их пропаганды может стать основой для соответствующего обращения в суд, а затем и основой их экстрадиции).

93 Важным шагом в данном направлении будет создание всеармянского банка и разработка привлекательных национальных программ в сфере реальной экономики по инвестициям Диаспоры, в т.ч. обеспечивая уход армянских капиталов из виртуального сектора экономики иностранных государств и пр.

94 Принцип предоставления привилегий и льгот мигрантам будет определяться их статусом.
в) создание на базе Миграционного Агентства государственного коммерческого предприятия, оказывающего юридические услуги мигрантам, в т.ч. помогающего особой категории мигрантов – трудовым мигрантам на основании межгосударственных договоров и соглашений легально войти в международный рынок труда (речь должна идти и для тех, кто уже находится вне РА, но имеет проблемы со статусом, и для тех, кто только собирается выехать из республики);

Мы глубоко убеждены, что разработка указанных проблем широким спектром специалистов, и в первую очередь юристами, жизненно важна для современного государства и является ключом к благополучию граждан РА и всей армянской нации.

Изабелла С. Мурадян
Председатель подкомиссии по международному экономическому сотрудничеству Общественного Совета РА